New Jersey's topics - tribe.net

Happy New Year!

Jon — Fri, 01 Jan 2010 22:48:18 GMT

Happy New Year's!!!

Wishing everyone a wonderful year!

take care,

Jon

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

Jersey History

Jon — Fri, 13 Nov 2009 13:19:35 GMT

Thomas Edison's Concrete Houses

(some are still around)

http://www.americanheritage.com/articles/magazine/it/1996/3/1996_3_50.shtml

posted in New Jersey - 2 replies

you pay 75% of your income as tax

Zippi — Mon, 19 Oct 2009 02:31:04 GMT

And still they want more more more

Taxes You are paying better than Three Quarters of your gross income to some government entity or other in the form of Taxes:

Overt Taxes:
• Fed income tax
• Fed FICA tax
• Fed SECA tax
• Fed Worker’s Comp
• State Worker’s Comp
• Fed Medicare
• State Income tax
• City Income tax
• Some Counties have an income tax
• Sales taxes
• Luxury taxes
• Road Tolls
• Real Estate taxes
• Vehicle taxes
• …………Surcharges
• …………License fees
• …………Registration fees
• …………Gasoline consumption taxes

Hidden Taxes
(Taxation that is structural – built into the cost of what you pay for things so you don’t see it as “tax” on your receipt but rather, higher prices):
• Real estate taxes on renters: Renters pay their landlord’s Real Estate taxes via higher rent.
• VAT taxation VIA higher retail prices for foods clothing and other goods made in or shipped through Europe.
• Sales and use taxes paid as higher prices for consumer goods that are made in any nation with taxes.
• Highway taxes VIA higher costs for consumer goods that are shipped across any road or rail whether in the US or any foreign
• Waterway use taxes for consumer goods chipped along any US or foreign water way.
• Unemployment taxes passed on to you VIA lower wages.
• Employer provided life insurance taxes you pay in lower wages
• Subsidy taxes for any thing you buy that benefits from a subsidy
• U.S. waterway taxes you pay to go anywhere by boat.
• Medical risk Taxes like the DPD tax
• Taxes on College Scholarships
• Taxes on debt forgiveness when you “cut a deal” with your creditor for anything less than the entire amount with interest.
• Gasoline tax. ( 19 - 45.8 cents {state depending}per gallon in federal, state and local taxes)
• Travel taxes: Airfare, hotels, car rental and taxi service: 7.5% air fare & $3.50 tax for each increment of the flight and $2.50 in security tax on each increment of that flight. Hotel & car rentals are taxed up to 40% of the cost.
• Sin taxes on beer, liquor, gambling and cigarettes. ($13.50-a-gallon tax on hard liquor and the 33-cent tax on a six-pack.)
• State taxes on insurance premiums. A $9-Billion wind fall for each state each year. You state taxes your insurance company which passes that on to you.
• Excise tax. All impoirts have a federal excise tax levied onto them.

The below is a very, very, short list of imports and their respective taxes which you pay.
• Bicycles 11%
• Brussel sprouts 12%
• Cotton hammocks 15%
• Infant formulas 18%
• Flashlights 18%
• Peanut butter 143%
• Girdles and panty girdles 24%
• Brooms 32%
• Plastic school supplies

The list goes on and on.
There are hundreds of taxes you pay. The cumulative effect is a tax of no less than 75% on your gross income.

You can be sure that if there is a transaction where you transfer any of the money you earn to some one for something you are paying a tax.

The result is that you pay on average about 75% of your gross income to government in the form of taxes.

This link takes you to a comprehensive study of the taxes you pay:

Google these names:
Nina Olson
Jared Bernstein
Pete Sepp,
Institute for Policy Innovation, Washington, D.C.

FABULOUS RESOURCE: Taxes You are paying better than Three Quarters of your gross income to some government entity or other in the form of Taxes:

Overt Taxes:
• Fed income tax
• Fed FICA tax
• Fed SECA tax
• Fed Worker’s Comp
• State Worker’s Comp
• Fed Medicare
• State Income tax
• City Income tax
• Some Counties have an income tax
• Sales taxes
• Luxury taxes
• Road Tolls
• Real Estate taxes
• Vehicle taxes
• …………Surcharges
• …………License fees
• …………Registration fees
• …………Gasoline consumption taxes

Hidden Taxes
(Taxation that is structural – built into the cost of what you pay for things so you don’t see it as “tax” on your receipt but rather, higher prices):
• Real estate taxes on renters: Renters pay their landlord’s Real Estate taxes via higher rent.
• VAT taxation VIA higher retail prices for foods clothing and other goods made in or shipped through Europe.
• Sales and use taxes paid as higher prices for consumer goods that are made in any nation with taxes.
• Highway taxes VIA higher costs for consumer goods that are shipped across any road or rail whether in the US or any foreign
• Waterway use taxes for consumer goods chipped along any US or foreign water way.
• Unemployment taxes passed on to you VIA lower wages.
• Employer provided life insurance taxes you pay in lower wages
• Subsidy taxes for any thing you buy that benefits from a subsidy
• U.S. waterway taxes you pay to go anywhere by boat.
• Medical risk Taxes like the DPD tax
• Taxes on College Scholarships
• Taxes on debt forgiveness when you “cut a deal” with your creditor for anything less than the entire amount with interest.
• Gasoline tax. ( 19 - 45.8 cents {state depending}per gallon in federal, state and local taxes)
• Travel taxes: Airfare, hotels, car rental and taxi service: 7.5% air fare & $3.50 tax for each increment of the flight and $2.50 in security tax on each increment of that flight. Hotel & car rentals are taxed up to 40% of the cost.
• Sin taxes on beer, liquor, gambling and cigarettes. ($13.50-a-gallon tax on hard liquor and the 33-cent tax on a six-pack.)
• State taxes on insurance premiums. A $9-Billion wind fall for each state each year. You state taxes your insurance company which passes that on to you.
• Excise tax. All impoirts have a federal excise tax levied onto them.

The below is a very, very, short list of imports and their respective taxes which you pay.
• Bicycles 11%
• Brussel sprouts 12%
• Cotton hammocks 15%
• Infant formulas 18%
• Flashlights 18%
• Peanut butter 143%
• Girdles and panty girdles 24%
• Brooms 32%
• Plastic school supplies

The list goes on and on.
There are hundreds of taxes you pay. The cumulative effect is a tax of no less than 75% on your gross income.

You can be sure that if there is a transaction where you transfer any of the money you earn to some one for something you are paying a tax.

The result is that you pay on average about 75% of your gross income to government in the form of taxes.

This link takes you to a comprehensive study of the taxes you pay:

Google these names:
Nina Olson
Jared Bernstein
Pete Sepp,
Institute for Policy Innovation, Washington, D.C.

FABULOUS RESOURCE: http://www.ipi.org/ipi%5CIPIPublications.nsf/0/3F31DF6F0D040EE986256AB700630B84/$File/PR160-HiddenTax-FINAL.pdf?OpenElement

http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/0,,id=101099,00.html

Google these names:
Nina Olson
Jared Bernstein
Pete Sepp,
Institute for Policy Innovation, Washington, D.C.

Google these names:
Nina Olson
Jared Bernstein
Pete Sepp,
Institute for Policy Innovation, Washington, D.C.

posted in New Jersey - 2 replies

NJ Rainbow Family

Jon — Thu, 19 Nov 2009 18:08:39 GMT

on Tribe:

http://tribes.tribe.net/newjerseyfamily

+++

general Rainbow Family info:

http://www.welcomehere.org/

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

Thank god

Zippi — Wed, 04 Nov 2009 13:51:24 GMT

The end of a nightmare that began with Florio continued with Mcgrevy and was exacerbated by Corzine

These guys inspired the remake of the Clinton phrase, "It's the Economy Stupid." Into :
"It's the CORRUPTION stupid~!!"

posted in New Jersey - 4 replies

Lenni Lenape

Jon — Mon, 02 Nov 2009 08:37:25 GMT

http://www.penntreatymuseum.org/americans.php

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

Deal With Interscope Records

mike — Mon, 12 Oct 2009 23:35:37 GMT

Artistmakers Ent. is auditioning for pop,counrty,rock,R&B acts to sign major recording deals with Interscope Records email demo's, picsor video to Artistmakers@yahoo.com

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

NYC History Factoids

Jon — Thu, 27 Aug 2009 23:53:34 GMT

I've been reading The Island at the Center of the World, about the Dutch history of NYC..

a few factoids from the book:

The Bronx comes from a farmer who settled there named Bronck. The land was called Bronck's farm.

Brooklyn was a small Dutch village that was originally named Breuckelein (sp?)

Yonkers was named after a Dutch "Jonker" (a term for a nobleman).

Who owned the land and it became called "The Jonker's land." He had a big saw mill on his property and that was the original of the Saw Mill River Parkway.

The team colors of the NY Knicks and the NY Mets have their origins in the origin colors of the Dutch colony at the time.

posted in New Jersey - 4 replies

Northern New Jersey

Thu, 08 Oct 2009 23:19:48 GMT

Hi, my name is Joan. I teach fitness classes as well as Pilates in a northern New Jersey club part time. I'm just getting involved in hooping and I'm hoping to bring it into the club at some point.

I wanted something different that wasn't 100 percent low impact as many of the new fitness workouts are. I've watched several short clips using the hoop as a jump rope and to be able to combine low moves and some impact moves sold me on hooping.

I noticed most of the members are from southern Jersey. I'm actually closer to NYC. Are there any hoopers up north in Bergen County?

Would love to hear from you. Thanks!

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

5 Cent Book Sale - Union Twp. P. Library

Jon — Wed, 23 Sep 2009 17:04:36 GMT

Hi.

Union Township Public Library is having a book sale...only 5 cents each!

Picked up Ursula LeGuinn, Tom Wolfe, Penguin Classics, poetry anthologies...including a 1400 page one, hardbound, in good condition.

I think they do this every year about the same time. Last year, it was 10 cents a book. I guess they have to move even more out this year.

Library:

http://www.youseemore.com/UnionPL/default.asp

Enjoy!

Jon

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

Best NJ Hikes

Jon — Sun, 13 Sep 2009 02:34:34 GMT

http://www.trails.com/toptrails.aspx?area=10069

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

Dodge Poetry Festival Update

Jon — Wed, 09 Sep 2009 23:55:02 GMT

http://www.dodgepoetry.org/

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

Cezanne in Montclair!

Jon — Fri, 04 Sep 2009 05:37:18 GMT

Great exhibit coming to the Montclair Art Museum soon..

Cezanne and American Modernism.

18 works by Cezanne and others by Max Weber, Maurice Prendergast, Marsden Hartley, Edward Steichen, Morgan Russell and Arshile Gorky..

http://www.montclairartmuseum.org/cezanne/

posted in New Jersey - 1 reply

Complaints Against Verizon FIOS

Jon — Thu, 15 Jan 2009 16:37:48 GMT

website listing extensive complaints against FIOS:

http://www.complaintsboard.com/bycompany/verizon-fios-a1609.html

Just got it, already the problems are starting. And already their lies are starting.

When will companies ever do the right thing?

Here's one of their delaying tactics....switching out a piece of perfectly fine equipment and saying it is the problem.

Apparently the box in the basement that is one week old (that's right, one week old!) is the problem!

Nonsense...if you were to go to the manufacturer, they would confirm the percentage of boxes that come off the line that are defective. That kind of thing is maybe 1 in 500.

These companies just lie to you, trying to squeeze every last penny out of you, and to heck with you as a human being and your right not to be lied to...your right to be treated decently

posted in New Jersey - 3 replies

My NJ open mic news website

Stan — Fri, 07 Aug 2009 22:03:58 GMT

Hey guys, I'm a college student at Stockton and I started a news website for open mics in NJ. Hope everyone appreciates it, please give me some feedback.

The website is http://JerseyMic.com

posted in New Jersey - 2 replies

New Jersey

Bethany — Fri, 07 Aug 2009 14:17:06 GMT

Hi every one I'm new to NJ and looking to hook in to the local scene.

posted in New Jersey - 1 reply

Kean University Performances

Jon — Mon, 03 Aug 2009 14:17:26 GMT

We just saw the play Duck Crossing at Kean University. Was very well done.

The director of the program asked that we spread the word.

Keanstage is doing some newly created plays.

If the one we saw was any indication, it was very well done and very worthwhile (prices are also a lot cheaper than going to NYC or even the Papermill....)

http://keanstage.com/

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

Cheaper Arts Tix - NJ

Jon — Mon, 03 Aug 2009 14:13:21 GMT

Hi Folks,

Friend of ours just told us about this site:

http://www.njartstix.org/

We got tickets through the site to a Kean University play.

You can only purchase tickets in a 48 hour window before the show. The site says the savings run 25% - 75% (our savings was 29% - not bad!).

Venues include: NJPAC, Papermill, McCarter Theater, Luna Stage, Montclair, George Street Playhouse, Crossroads, 12 Miles West, and dance, jazz, etc. etc. etc.

Enjoy!

take care,

Jon

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

Why oh why do people speak to the police?

Zippi — Mon, 15 Jun 2009 18:27:35 GMT

All my clients have my card. Usually more than one. I instruct them to fully cooperate with police as it regards providing the required documentation such as license insurance and registration.
After that unless it's about the weather they are not to speak to police about anything.
And it's printed on the back of the card which they are instructed to hand to the officer who asks why they have clammed up.

Talking to cops is the single most dangerous thing you can do short of changing lanes without looking.

[6/15/09 – 11:55 am] In this morning’s Supreme Court decision in State v. Baum, the Justices held that third party defendants may not litigate a violation of a co-defendant’s right to remain silent, even when the purported violation results in the discovery of incriminating evidence against the third party. In Baum, the police effected a motor vehicle stop and closely questioned the operator of the motor vehicle at the scene over a prolonged period of time. During the course of the questioning, the driver made admissions that resulted in the recovery of illegal drugs inside the vehicle. A co defendant, a passenger in the vehicle, filed a motion to suppress and argued that the police obtained the information related to the drugs illegally by violating the driver’s Miranda rights. However, the Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that both federally and in New Jersey, the Fifth Amendment privilege is purely personal with the defendant that makes the incriminating statement and does not extend to protect third parties. Simply put, such third party defendants do not have standing to raise and litigate the Miranda violation.

posted in New Jersey - 3 replies

Jersey Family

Kate — Thu, 04 Jun 2009 01:03:40 GMT

Hey I'm looking to have a potluck camp out type thing somewhere in S. NJ..... Let's do this It's been forever since I've seen family and I'm anxious to meet everyone since i'm stuck in NJ for probation this year I wont be at nationals and I'm itchin for a good drum circle

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

NJ Flow-Arts workshops in June!

leenbean — Sat, 16 May 2009 17:40:01 GMT

WHAT: Poi, Contact Staff, and Flow-wand workshops
WHEN: JUNE 26-28,
WHERE: Wantage, NJ near High Point State Park

*There are three workshops throughout the weekend, all taught by Aileen.
*They are all $30/class.
* Please RSVP to Aileen's email and let her know which workshop you'd like to take, and if you are going to need a staff, wand, or pair of poi.
*After the workshops, please hang out for a general glow and fire spin jam at Jessica's beautiful home! Refreshments and yummy treats will be provided
: )

MORE OF THE WHAT:

FRIDAY, JUNE 26

5:00-6:30pm FlowWand workshop
--The Flow-wand is a magical instrument that can be described as a stick on a string. However, once in motion, the wand appears to be a floating object in space, beautiful and inspirational. I'll have flow-wands for students to practice with and purchase if they'd like.

To see what the Flow-wand can do, watch this video:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4lHzZrAQIUM

SATURDAY, JUNE 27

12:00-1:30 Beginner Poi class
--An introduction to poi spinning! We'll play with timing, directions, stalls, extensions, basic weaves, the corkscrew, and buzzsaws. Bring your own pair of poi! If you don't have poi, I'll bring some extra pairs to practice with.

Watch from 1:20-2:13 of the following clip to see most of what you'll be learning:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nvvSnqHjhOI

4:30-6:00pm Intermediate/Advanced Poi workshop
--For folks already familiar with basic poi moves, we'll explore transitions, isolations, behind-the-back patterns, flowers, and I'll introduce the idea of anti-spinning!

Check out the following video for a little idea:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b7ka15CyS3I

SUNDAY, JUNE 28

12:00-1:30 Contact Staff Workshop, mixed levels
--This class will be tailored to each student's level. Beginning contact staff will be taught for those interested, and if you're already familiar I'll throw some neck rolls, duck-outs, shoulder-neck-shoulder variations, and some groundwork and acrobatics. For all levels, I'll be emphasizing movement and dance with the staff, as to avoid stagnation, so we'll also be learning a short choreographed bit with the staff

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FFUMw2x-zv8
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NsVFyZIQLxQ

This video has all three toys:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jbii5Nh08Rk

Message Aileen, or email her at aileenlawlor@yahoo.com for more info or to rsvp

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

Statue of Liberty Crown to Re-Open

Jon — Fri, 08 May 2009 15:10:50 GMT

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090508/ap_on_re_us/us_statue_of_liberty_salazar

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

Far Hills VNA Rummage Sale

Jon — Fri, 08 May 2009 08:13:26 GMT

Huge rummage sale, twice a year, for charity. My friend just went and bought a London Fog raincoat for $8, other huge buys...

FAR HILLS VNA RUMMAGE SALE

NJ's Oldest and Largest 75,000 sq

Fri 5/1, Sat 5/2, 9:30-3:30 Sun 5/3, 12:30-3:30 Far Hills Fairgrounds Free Parking (corner of Peapack Rd. & Rt. 202)

www.visitingnurse.org

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

NJ Traffic Website

Jon — Fri, 08 May 2009 08:12:00 GMT

locates construction, congestion, weather problems, etc:

http://www.state.nj.us/transportation/commuter/511/

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

Judge goes on trial (crickets chirping)

Zippi — Mon, 27 Apr 2009 19:21:20 GMT

June 16th, the N J Supreme Court will hold oral argument in the Matter of Richard M. Sasso, former judge of the Bridgewater Township Municipal Court.

In a presentment the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct (ACJC) said that the former judge
1) was drunk while on the bench
2.) abused and bullied those before the bench
3.) Misused contempt powers,
4.) used his position as a judge to avoid being ejected from a nudie bar while drunk
5.) Conflict of interest by representing a political subdivision of municipality where he served as judge.

Discipline may inclide being barred for life from holding judicial office.

This tribe is about as dead as a tribe can get.
I don't know why I post here even the fukin mod hasn't posted in like 3 years.

posted in New Jersey - 4 replies

Best Hikes in NJ

Jon — Thu, 23 Apr 2009 11:25:14 GMT

http://www.trails.com/toptrails.aspx?area=10069

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

New Jersey Guitar Blues - Billy Hector

Jon — Mon, 20 Apr 2009 16:21:58 GMT

this guy is a lot of fun, I used to book him a bit about 12 years ago....

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TdiXoEEiknk

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

Car searches in NJ clarified

Zippi — Thu, 12 Mar 2009 20:18:53 GMT

Supreme Court of New Jersey.
STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Juan PENA-FLORES, a/k/a Juan C. PenaFlores, a/k/a Juan C. Flores, a/k/a Juan C. Pena and Fausto Parades, a/k/a Fausto Paredes, Defendants-Respondents.
State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Charles Fuller, Defendant-Respondent.

Argued March 11, 2008.
Re-argued Sept. 22, 2008.
Decided Feb. 25, 2009.

SYNOPSIS

Background: Defendants charged separately with drug offenses filed motions to suppress. The Superior Court, Law Division, Camden County, denied one defendant's motion. The Superior Court, Law Division, Union County, denied the other defendant's motion. Defendants appealed. The Superior Court, Appellate Division, 2006 WL 3782930, and 2007 WL 600736, reversed. On grant of state's petitions for certification, the cases were consolidated.

Holdings: The Supreme Court, Long, J., held that:
(1) warrantless searches of defendants' automobiles were not justified, under New Jersey's search incident to arrest exception;
(2) warrantless search of defendant's motor vehicle was justified under the New Jersey automobile exception to the warrant requirement; and
(3) no exigency existed, as required for warrantless search of other defendant's motor vehicle to be justified under the New Jersey automobile exception to the warrant requirement.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Albin, J., filed dissenting opinion.

[1] Headnote Citing References KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote

Key349 Searches and Seizures
Key349I In General
Key349k24 k. Necessity of and Preference for Warrant, and Exceptions in General. Most Cited Cases

Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth amendment, and thus are prohibited unless they fall within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

[2] Headnote Citing References KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote

Key35 Arrest
Key35II On Criminal Charges
Key35k71.1 Search
Key35k71.1(4) Scope of Search
Key35k71.1(4.1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases

Under the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement, the legal seizure of the arrestee automatically justifies the warrantless search of his person and the area within his immediate grasp. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

[3] Headnote Citing References KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote

Key35 Arrest
Key35II On Criminal Charges
Key35k71.1 Search
Key35k71.1(2) Probable Cause; Offense in Officer's Presence
Key35k71.1(2.1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases

Under the search incident to arrest exception to the search warrant requirement, as long as there is probable cause to arrest, the ensuing search is valid even if there is no particular reason to believe that it will reveal evidence, contraband, or weapons. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

[4] Headnote Citing References KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote

Key35 Arrest
Key35II On Criminal Charges
Key35k71.1 Search
Key35k71.1(4) Scope of Search
Key35k71.1(5) k. Particular Places or Objects. Most Cited Cases

Under the Fourth Amendment to the federal constitution, even if an arrestee is removed and secured elsewhere, a search of the passenger area of his automobile incident to his arrest is permissible. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

[5] Headnote Citing References KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote

Key35 Arrest
Key35II On Criminal Charges
Key35k71.1 Search
Key35k71.1(4) Scope of Search
Key35k71.1(5) k. Particular Places or Objects. Most Cited Cases

Under the New Jersey constitution, a warrantless search of the passenger area of arrestee's automobile cannot be sustained where the occupant has been arrested, removed, and secured elsewhere, because the potential for obtaining a weapon or destroying contraband is by then eliminated. N.J.S.A. Const. Art. 1, par. 7.

[6] Headnote Citing References KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote

Key35 Arrest
Key35II On Criminal Charges
Key35k71.1 Search
Key35k71.1(4) Scope of Search
Key35k71.1(5) k. Particular Places or Objects. Most Cited Cases

Under New Jersey law, when occupant of a motor vehicle is arrested but not removed or secured, courts are required to make a fact-intensive determination regarding the danger posed by the arrestee in order to determine whether a search incident to arrest of the passenger area of the vehicle is justified. N.J.S.A. Const. Art. 1, par. 7.

[7] Headnote Citing References KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote

Key48A Automobiles
Key48AVII Offenses
Key48AVII(B) Prosecution
Key48Ak349.5 Search or Seizure Consequent to Arrest, Stop or Inquiry
Key48Ak349.5(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases

Warrantless searches of two defendants' automobiles following traffic stops were not justified, under New Jersey's search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement, where one defendant had not been arrested at the time of the search, and the other defendant had already been secured in the state trooper's vehicle when the search took place. N.J.S.A. Const. Art. 1, par. 7.

[8] Headnote Citing References KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote

Key349 Searches and Seizures
Key349I In General
Key349k60 Motor Vehicles
Key349k62 k. Probable or Reasonable Cause. Most Cited Cases

Under the Fourth Amendment, a warrantless search of a motor vehicle pursuant to the automobile exception is permissible so long as the vehicle is readily mobile and there is probable cause to believe it contains evidence of criminality. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

[9] Headnote Citing References KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote

Key349 Searches and Seizures
Key349I In General
Key349k60 Motor Vehicles
Key349k62 k. Probable or Reasonable Cause. Most Cited Cases

When, without advance planning, police encounter a parked car, have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains criminal contraband, and have articulable reasons to believe that the evidence may otherwise be lost or destroyed, they may seize and search the vehicle for the contraband without the necessity of a warrant, under the New Jersey automobile exception to the warrant requirement. N.J.S.A. Const. Art. 1, par. 7.

[10] Headnote Citing References KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote

Key349 Searches and Seizures
Key349I In General
Key349k60 Motor Vehicles
Key349k64 k. Emergencies or Exigencies. Most Cited Cases

To justify a search of a motor vehicle under the New Jersey automobile exception to the warrant requirement, an exigency above and beyond the mere mobility of the vehicle is required. N.J.S.A. Const. Art. 1, par. 7.

[11] Headnote Citing References KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote

Key349 Searches and Seizures
Key349I In General
Key349k60 Motor Vehicles
Key349k60.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases

Key349 Searches and Seizures Headnote Citing References KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote
Key349I In General
Key349k60 Motor Vehicles
Key349k62 k. Probable or Reasonable Cause. Most Cited Cases

Key349 Searches and Seizures Headnote Citing References KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote
Key349I In General
Key349k60 Motor Vehicles
Key349k64 k. Emergencies or Exigencies. Most Cited Cases

The warrantless search of an automobile in New Jersey is permissible where (1) the stop is unexpected, (2) the police have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime, and (3) exigent circumstances exist under which it is impracticable to obtain a warrant. N.J.S.A. Const. Art. 1, par. 7.

[12] Headnote Citing References KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote

Key349 Searches and Seizures
Key349I In General
Key349k60 Motor Vehicles
Key349k64 k. Emergencies or Exigencies. Most Cited Cases

The exigency necessary to justify a warrantless search of a motor vehicle under New Jersey's automobile exception to the warrant requirement must be determined on a case-by-case basis. N.J.S.A. Const. Art. 1, par. 7.

[13] Headnote Citing References KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote

Key349 Searches and Seizures
Key349I In General
Key349k60 Motor Vehicles
Key349k64 k. Emergencies or Exigencies. Most Cited Cases

No one factor is dispositive in determining whether exigency supports a warrantless search of an automobile in New Jersey; courts must consider the totality of the circumstances. N.J.S.A. Const. Art. 1, par. 7.

[14] Headnote Citing References KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote

Key349 Searches and Seizures
Key349I In General
Key349k60 Motor Vehicles
Key349k64 k. Emergencies or Exigencies. Most Cited Cases

How the facts of the case bear on the issues of officer safety and the preservation of evidence is the fundamental inquiry in determining whether exigency justifies a warrantless search of a motor vehicle in New Jersey. N.J.S.A. Const. Art. 1, par. 7.

[15] Headnote Citing References KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote

Key349 Searches and Seizures
Key349I In General
Key349k60 Motor Vehicles
Key349k64 k. Emergencies or Exigencies. Most Cited Cases

For purposes of a warrantless search of an automobile, under the New Jersey automobile exception to the warrant requirement, exigent circumstances are present when law enforcement officers do not have sufficient time to obtain any form of warrant. N.J.S.A. Const. Art. 1, par. 7.

[16] Headnote Citing References KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote

Key48A Automobiles
Key48AVII Offenses
Key48AVII(B) Prosecution
Key48Ak349.5 Search or Seizure Consequent to Arrest, Stop or Inquiry
Key48Ak349.5(5) Object, Product, Scope, and Conduct of Search or Inspection
Key48Ak349.5(7) k. Drugs and Narcotics. Most Cited Cases

Warrantless search of defendant's motor vehicle was justified under the New Jersey automobile exception to the warrant requirement; when the vehicle was legitimately stopped for a traffic violation late at night, the law enforcement officers noticed the overwhelming smell of marijuana emanating from the vehicle, giving officer probable cause to believe it contained contraband, the officers had no prior information of criminality, they stopped the vehicle only in response to the traffic violation, and exigent circumstances existed, as officers could not look for weapons or contraband from outside the vehicle, since the windows were heavily tinted, defendant and other occupant were removed from the vehicle, but were not placed under arrest or secured inside the patrol car, and ratio of officers to suspects was two-to-two. N.J.S.A. Const. Art. 1, par. 7.

[17] Headnote Citing References KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote

Key48A Automobiles
Key48AVII Offenses
Key48AVII(B) Prosecution
Key48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or Deposit
Key48Ak349(14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry
Key48Ak349(16) k. Ordering Occupants Out of Vehicle. Most Cited Cases

Law enforcement officers may, in the course of a legal traffic stop, order the driver out of the vehicle. N.J.S.A. Const. Art. 1, par. 7.

[18] Headnote Citing References KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote

Key48A Automobiles
Key48AVII Offenses
Key48AVII(B) Prosecution
Key48Ak349.5 Search or Seizure Consequent to Arrest, Stop or Inquiry
Key48Ak349.5(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases

No exigency existed, as required for warrantless search of defendant's motor vehicle to be justified under the New Jersey automobile exception to the warrant requirement; defendant was unexpectedly stopped for traffic violation, and although the law enforcement officers determined that the license plate did not correspond to the vehicle, and a search for vehicle ownership documents uncovered a firearm and some prescription pills, the stop occurred in broad daylight on a city street, defendant was arrested and secured in the patrol car, so that he had no opportunity to gain access to the vehicle or anything in it, and the ratio of officers to suspects was three-to-one. N.J.S.A. Const. Art. 1, par. 7.

Ronald Susswein, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant in State v. Pena-Flores (Anne Milgram, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Mr. Susswein and Maura K. Tully, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the briefs).

Mary E. McAnally, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant in State v. Fuller (Anne Milgram, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).

Antonio R. Espinosa argued the cause for respondent Juan Pena-Flores (Andril & Espinosa, attorneys; Mr. Espinosa and William G. Sanchez, on the briefs).

Thomas J. Butler, Jr., argued the cause for respondent Fausto Parades (Butler & Conti, attorneys).

Michael W. Kahn, Cherry Hill, argued the cause for respondent Charles Fuller (Mr. Kahn, attorney; Mr. Kahn and Scott A. Sheldon, on the briefs).

Joseph P. Connor, Jr., Deputy First Assistant Morris County Prosecutor, argued the cause for amicus curiae County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey (Ronald J. Casella, President, County Prosecutor's Association, attorney).

Stephen W. Kirsch, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for amicus curiae Office of the Public Defender (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney).

John J. Farmer, Jr., argued the cause for amicus curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (Arseneault, Whipple, Farmer, Fassett & Azzarello, attorneys; Mr. Farmer and Joshua C. Gillette, Chatham, of counsel and on the briefs).

Justice LONG delivered the opinion of the Court.
*1 At issue in these appeals, which we have consolidated for the purpose of this opinion, is the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Today, we reaffirm our longstanding precedent that permits an automobile search without a warrant only in cases in which the police have both probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence and exigent circumstances that would justify dispensing with the warrant requirement. The question of whether exigent circumstances exist is to be determined, as it has always been, on a case-by-case basis with the focus on police safety and preservation of evidence.

I.

A. Juan Pena-Flores

On October 5, 2005, at approximately 11:00 p.m., Officer Donald Zsak saw a silver Ford Expedition in the left-turn-only lane at the intersection of Centennial Avenue and Raritan Road in Cranford. The driver abruptly moved to the right, cutting off traffic, and proceeded on Centennial Avenue. Zsak eventually stopped the Expedition on Stiles Street in Linden, near the intersection with Willick Road.

As Zsak approached the driver side of the Expedition, he noticed dark tint covering all the windows and a strong smell of “raw marijuana.” Because of his role in nearly 150 investigations involving raw marijuana and his special training in the identification of marijuana by sight and smell, Zsak was confident that he had properly identified the odor. At that point, Zsak asked the driver, later identified as Fausto Paredes, to get out and move to the rear of the vehicle, where Zsak conducted a pat-down search.

As Zsak searched Paredes, Officer Ryan Greco arrived to provide assistance. Zsak passed Paredes over to Greco and moved to the passenger side of the Expedition, where he removed the passenger, Juan Pena-Flores, from the car. He conducted a pat-down search, and then turned Pena-Flores over to Greco. Neither Paredes nor Pena-Flores had contraband on his person.

At that point, unable to see into the vehicle because of the tinted windows, Zsak entered the passenger side and began his search. Moments later, he uncovered two clear plastic bags of marijuana on the front passenger-side floor. He then instructed Greco to place Paredes and Pena-Flores under arrest.

Zsak next searched the backseat and found a nine-millimeter handgun in the child safety seat. Thereafter, in various places in the car, he found a large clear plastic bag that contained twenty-two clear plastic bags of suspected marijuana; a large plastic bag that contained fifteen clear individual plastic bags of suspected marijuana; a large plastic bag containing one hundred and eleven clear plastic bags of suspected marijuana; eight clear plastic bags containing residue of a suspected controlled substance; and two boxes containing empty, small plastic bags.

A Union County Grand Jury returned an indictment charging Pena-Flores and Paredes with fourth-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(3); third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(11); third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of school property, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7; third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); and second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm while possessing a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1(a).

*2 Defendants moved to suppress, and Officer Zsak, the only witness to testify, established the facts set forth above at an evidentiary hearing. Zsak further testified that it was Cranford Police Department policy to transport one defendant per police car back to police headquarters. In addition to Zsak and Greco, who were already on the scene, there were only three other officers with Cranford police cars available on patrol on October 5, 2005. Zsak explained that because the stop occurred late at night in a heavily trafficked area, and because there was a limited number of officers on duty, it would have been unsafe to leave the car or to guard it while trying to obtain a search warrant.

In his decision, the trial judge noted that Zsak stopped the vehicle lawfully after viewing a traffic violation and found that credible evidence demonstrated that Zsak smelled raw marijuana. Based on the odor emanating from the vehicle, the judge concluded that Zsak lawfully took defendants out of the car to conduct a pat-down search. As for the vehicle, the judge concluded that the search was lawful up to the point at which Zsak placed both defendants under arrest. However, he declared that the additional searches were not lawful and suppressed the evidence found after Zsak discovered the two bags of marijuana on the passenger-side floor.

The judge denied the motion to suppress regarding the two bags found on the passenger-side floor, but granted the motion in respect of the rest of the evidence, declaring that there was no exigency in the case. According to the judge, the only options available to the officers were impounding the car and seeking a search warrant, or acquiring a telephonic warrant.

The Appellate Division analyzed the facts against the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement under State v. Eckel, 185 N.J. 523, 888 A.2d 1266 (2006), and against the automobile exception under State v. Dunlap, 185 N.J. 543, 888 A.2d 1278 (2006). The panel found that the search incident to arrest exception was inapplicable because neither Paredes nor Pena-Flores was under arrest at the time Zsak began the search of the vehicle. As for the automobile exception, the panel noted that Zsak had probable cause to believe the vehicle contained contraband based on the strong smell of marijuana coming from the car, but rejected the notion that exigency existed:

[E]xigency cannot be found based upon concern for the safety of the police officers involved, nor in the desire to preserve evidence that might be found in the vehicle. Both defendants, the sole occupants of the Ford, were in the custody of Officer [Greco]. Protective searches of their persons had not revealed any weapons or contraband.... No other confederates were around, nor was it likely that anyone knew of defendants' arrest. Thus, the probability of some third[ ]party [removing the car or evidence] was minimal at best.

As a result, the panel concluded that the search was unlawful under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The State filed a petition for certification, which we granted. 191 N.J. 311, 923 A.2d 228 (2007).

B. Charles Fuller

*3 Observing defendant Charles Fuller driving a GMC Yukon without a seatbelt, New Jersey State Trooper Terrence Clemens stopped Fuller as he turned left onto Mt. Ephraim Avenue in Camden. The stop occurred at approximately 1:15 p.m. on a busy street in Camden in front of a liquor store. According to the videotape that was admitted into evidence, the street was crowded with passersby who were looking into the vehicle. Fuller initially denied that he was driving without his seatbelt, but subsequently admitted that he removed his seatbelt to pick up his cell phone from the car floor. Fuller gave Clemens a Pennsylvania driver's license issued to Charles Bradley and a bill of sale.

As Clemens examined the license, he noticed that the photograph did not resemble Fuller and that the license number was handwritten on the back. Because that number is normally typed, the handwriting struck Clemens as peculiar. Clemens questioned Fuller about the disparity between the license photograph and his appearance. Fuller stated that the summer season had darkened his skin tone. Clemens also asked Fuller if he had a New Jersey driver's license. The answer was “no”; Fuller said he was a resident of Philadelphia, where he spent almost all of his time.

During his conversation with Fuller, Clemens noticed several motor-vehicle summonses lying on the backseat of the car. Clemens asked to see the summonses, and Fuller gave him the two documents. Those summonses indicated that Charles Bradley had been cited for motor-vehicle infractions in Camden one day earlier: once for disorderly conduct and once for driving a car with fictitious tags. When asked about the disorderly conduct charge, Fuller responded by indicating that the summons was issued only because of the charging officer's poor attitude.

Because the Camden County Sheriff's Department is capable of identifying an individual on the basis of a tattoo, Clemens asked Fuller if he had any tattoos. Fuller noted that he had a tattoo of a heart on his right arm while pointing to his left arm. When Clemens corrected him, Fuller acknowledged that the tattoo was on his left arm. At that point, three additional troopers arrived at the scene.

Clemens returned to his cruiser and radioed Fuller's Social Security number and date of birth to the Camden County Sheriff's Department. The dispatcher responded that the identity information matched Charles Fuller's Social Security number and birth date and that Charles Bradley was an alias for Charles Fuller.FN1 Clemens also learned that the bill of sale and the Pennsylvania license plate on Fuller's vehicle corresponded to a Ford Expedition, not the GMC Yukon that Fuller was driving.

Clemens directed Fuller to get out of the vehicle and move to the rear. Upon further questioning. Fuller explained that his real name was Charles Bradley but on previous occasions, including an arrest, he had used the name Charles Fuller. Clemens then arrested Fuller for displaying a false driver's license and for hindering his own apprehension. Clemens searched Fuller, finding two large bundles of money in the left side pocket of his cargo pants, and one smaller bundle of money in the left front pocket. After the search, Clemens placed Fuller inside the cruiser.

*4 Along with another trooper, Clemens proceeded to search the interior of the car beginning with the driver-side compartment. Clemens found a loaded handgun inside a plastic bag wedged between the console and the driver's seat, and in the console he found money and two prescription bottles. The names of the prescription holder were scratched off the labels on the bottles, which contained a total of 106 alprazolam (Xanax) pills. Clemens also found a light blue plastic bag containing marijuana in a dashboard compartment above the radio and additional bags of marijuana underneath the backseat. Finally, Clemens found a twenty-eight-inch sword behind the backseat.

A Camden County Grand Jury returned an indictment charging Fuller with fourth-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance, marijuana, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(3); third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance, alprazolam, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1); third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance, alprazolam, with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(13); third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance, marijuana, with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(11); third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance, marijuana and/or alprazolam, with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of school property, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7; third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) and N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4; fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, a sword, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d); second-degree possession of a weapon, a firearm, while in the course of possessing with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1(a); second-degree possession of a weapon, a sword, while in the course of possessing with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1(c); third-degree displaying a false motor vehicle driver's license, which could be used as means of verifying identity, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-2.1(c); and second-degree possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7.

Fuller moved to suppress the items found in the Yukon, and an evidentiary hearing took place at which the previous facts were established. Before a decision, Fuller entered a plea of guilty to possession of a controlled dangerous substance, marijuana or alprazolam, with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of school property, and waived his right to appeal pursuant to an agreement with the State. Fuller was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement to a custodial term of five years with a two-year period of parole ineligibility. The trial judge stayed the sentence for forty-five days to allow Fuller to decide whether to appeal because the judge believed that the Appellate Division's decision in State v. Eckel, 374 N.J.Super. 91, 863 A.2d 1044 (App.Div.2004), aff'd, 185 N.J. 523, 888 A.2d 1266 (2006), could have significant bearing on the case. The State accepted the judge's decision and agreed not to set aside the plea even if Fuller appealed.

*5 Ultimately, the judge supplemented the record, denying the motion to suppress. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed, declaring that Clemens conducted an illegal search incident to arrest under Eckel, supra, 185 N.J. at 524, 888 A.2d 1266.

The State filed a petition for certification, which we granted. 188 N.J. 348, 907 A.2d 1009 (2006). We remanded the case to the Appellate Division for consideration under the automobile exception. The Appellate Division reiterated its position that Fuller's motion to suppress should have been granted. We granted the State's subsequent petition for certification. 192 N.J. 71, 926 A.2d 855 (2007).

II.

The State asks us to jettison our decision in State v. Cooke, 163 N.J. 657, 661, 751 A.2d 92 (2000), and return to the standard established in State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 234-35, 440 A.2d 1311 (1981), which, it argues, recognizes an unforeseen stop, probable cause, and the inherent mobility of the vehicle as the only requirements for the automobile exception.

Pena-Flores and Fuller argue that Cooke was merely a reiteration of this Court's longstanding adherence to enhanced search-and-seizure protections under the automobile exception and that it properly reaffirmed the need for exigent circumstances beyond those arising from the mere mobility of the vehicle.

III.

[1] Headnote Citing References In similar language, the United States Constitution and the New Jersey Constitution guarantee the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches or seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7. Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable and thus are prohibited unless they fall within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Wilson, 178 N.J. 7, 12, 833 A.2d 1087 (2003) (citing Cooke, supra, 163 N.J. at 664, 751 A.2d 92). We detailed those exceptions in State v. Hill, 115 N.J. 169, 173-74, 557 A.2d 322 (1989). They include, among others, plain view, consent, community caretaking, search incident to arrest, and the automobile exception. Ibid. It is the two latter exceptions that have been cited by the courts in this case. Indeed, the distinct but interrelated search incident to arrest and automobile exceptions provide the legal framework under which the facts must be analyzed.

A.

[2] Headnote Citing References[3] Headnote Citing References Under the search incident to arrest exception, the legal seizure of the arrestee automatically justifies the warrantless search of his person and the area within his immediate grasp. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 694 (1969). The arrest must precede the search. Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 543, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 1290, 108 L.Ed.2d 464, 467 (1990). So long as there is probable cause to arrest, the ensuing search is valid even if there is no particular reason to believe that it will reveal evidence, contraband, or weapons. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2864, 69 L.Ed.2d 768, 775-76 (1981). The justification for the search of an arrestee is to preclude him from accessing a weapon or destroying evidence. Chimel, supra, 395 U.S. at 762-63, 89 S.Ct. at 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d at 694.

*6 [4] Headnote Citing References[5] Headnote Citing References[6] Headnote Citing References Under the federal Constitution, even if an arrestee is removed and secured elsewhere, a search of the passenger area of his automobile incident to his arrest is permissible. Belton, supra, 453 U.S. at 460, 101 S.Ct. at 2864, 69 L.Ed.2d at 775. In 2006, however, we diverged from federal precedent in Eckel, supra, 185 N.J. at 524, 888 A.2d 1266, and declared that the search of the interior compartment of a motor vehicle incident to arrest is limited to the area from which an occupant may, in fact, seize a weapon or destroy evidence. It follows that such a search cannot be sustained where the occupant has been “arrested, removed[,] and secured elsewhere,” because the potential for obtaining a weapon or destroying contraband is by then eliminated. Id. at 541, 888 A.2d 1266. Where an occupant is arrested but not removed or secured, courts are required to make a fact-intensive determination regarding the danger posed by the arrestee. Ibid.

[7] Headnote Citing References As is obvious, the search incident to arrest exception is focused on the arrestee himself and on eliminating his potential to endanger the police or destroy evidence. See Dunlap, supra, 185 N.J. at 548-49, 888 A.2d 1278 (holding where defendant was restrained outside car and unable to gain access, search of vehicle was not justifiable as incident to arrest). Although the courts below cited search-incident-to-arrest principles, Pena-Flores was not arrested and Fuller was already secured in the troop car when their respective automobile searches took place. Thus, search incident to arrest is not the proper analytical framework in these cases.

B.

We thus turn to the automobile exception. Even where a defendant is not under arrest or where an arrested defendant has been secured, there may be justification to search a vehicle under the automobile exception.

[8] Headnote Citing References Under federal constitutional law, a warrantless search of a motor vehicle pursuant to the automobile exception is permissible so long as the vehicle is readily mobile and there is probable cause to believe it contains evidence of criminality. Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940, 116 S.Ct. 2485, 2487, 135 L.Ed.2d 1031, 1036 (1996). Like the search incident to arrest exception, the purposes of the automobile exception are police safety and the preservation of evidence. The underlying rationales for the automobile exception are: (1) the ready mobility of the vehicle and the inherent potential for loss or destruction of evidence before a warrant is obtained; and (2) the decreased expectation of privacy in motor vehicles, which are subject to extensive government regulation. Ibid. In effect, under the federal standard, exigency is automatic. Ibid.

IV.

We have never subscribed fully to the federal version of the automobile exception and the relationship of our jurisprudence to federal jurisprudence has been an uneasy one. Although not a frontal assault on federal precedent, over three decades ago in State v. LaPorte, 62 N.J. 312, 316-17, 301 A.2d 146 (1973), we first suggested that it is the specific facts of the case and not the mere mobility of the automobile that creates exigency. Later, in State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 216, 440 A.2d 1311 (1981), we grappled with the issue directly. There, police detectives pulled over a speeding vehicle and noticed that the individuals in the vehicle were acting furtively, as if attempting to conceal something. Ibid. When the driver opened the glove compartment to look for his credentials, the detectives observed shotgun ammunition. Ibid. The suspects were asked to exit the vehicle and were frisked, but no weapons were found. Ibid. A subsequent search of the automobile revealed a weapon under the front passenger seat. Id. at 216-17, 440 A.2d 1311. The suspects then were arrested, and a further search yielded two more weapons. Id. at 217, 440 A.2d 1311. The trial judge suppressed all of the evidence. Ibid. The Appellate Division reversed the suppression of the initially discovered weapon, but affirmed the remainder of the judge's order, Ibid.

*7 In reversing that suppression, we applied the automobile exception, concluding that probable cause to suspect that the vehicle contained illegal items arose from viewing the shotgun shells in the glove compartment and that “exigency” was satisfied by “the unforeseeability and spontaneity of the circumstances giving rise to probable cause and the inherent mobility of the automobile stopped on the highway.” Id. at 233, 440 A.2d 1311 (citations omitted). In so ruling, we essentially added a requirement that is not part of the federal automobile standard: the stop and search of the vehicle cannot be pre-planned-it must be unforeseen and spontaneous. See id. at 233-34, 440 A.2d 1311.FN2

On the very day that we decided Alston, we also decided State v. Martin, 87 N.J. 561, 436 A.2d 96 (1981), in which we upheld the warrantless search of a vehicle at a police station, based upon “exigency” at the point of arrest. We said:

The occupants of the car, the suspected robbers, were still at large. Because the police had stopped the car, the occupants were alerted that they might have been suspected of involvement in the armed robbery. They might have returned at any moment to move the car or remove the car's contents. In addition, the officers had reason to believe that the occupants of the station wagon were not only alerted but also armed and dangerous. The illumination in the parking lot where the vehicle was discovered at that early morning hour was dim at best. In view of the possibility of the suspects' return to the car, a careful search at that point was impractical and perhaps not safe for the officers.

The level of exigency in the circumstances surrounding this search was heightened by the fact that the police were actively involved in an ongoing investigation shortly after the armed robbery and near to where it had occurred.... There was an urgent, immediate need for the police to ascertain whether the car contained evidence of the armed robbery, before the suspects had an opportunity to leave the area or to destroy or dispose of other evidence.

Finally, the circumstances that furnished the officers with probable cause were unanticipated and developed spontaneously.

[ Martin, supra, 87 N.J. at 569-70, 436 A.2d 96 (quotation marks and citations omitted).]

Obviously, there would have been no need to detail the facts and circumstances that created the exigency had the mere mobility of the vehicle sufficed. Thus, together Alston and Martin rejected the federal standard by declaring (1) that the stop had to be unforeseen and spontaneous and (2) that exigency must be assessed based on the particular facts and circumstances of the case, and does not automatically flow from the mobility of the vehicle.

In 1991, in State v. Colvin, 123 N.J. 428, 587 A.2d 1278 (1991), we affirmed that view. There, we faced the issue in connection with a vehicle parked on a public street. Id. at 429, 587 A.2d 1278. Officers were patrolling a high-crime area when they observed the defendant sitting on a porch engaging in a suspected drug transaction. Id. at 430, 587 A.2d 1278. When the officers approached him, the defendant attempted to flee, at which time he threw a vial of suspected cocaine on the ground. Ibid. The officers seized the vial, caught up with the defendant, and arrested him. Ibid. Minutes later, an informant told the police that drugs had been stashed in the defendant's car, which was parked near the site of the arrest, and that other people knew about the arrest and would attempt to remove the drugs. Ibid. The officers proceeded to the parked and unlocked car, which matched the informant's description, searched it, and discovered packets of cocaine. Ibid. The trial judge suppressed the evidence and the Appellate Division affirmed. Ibid.

*8 [9] Headnote Citing References[10] Headnote Citing References After concluding that the informant's statements demonstrated probable cause, id. at 435, 587 A.2d 1278, we held that exigency-existed, not because of the inherent mobility of the car or the fact that the stop was unanticipated, but rather because

[a]ny element of surprise had been lost; the vehicle contained the “contraband” drugs; there were “confederates waiting to move the evidence”; [and] the police would need “a special police detail to guard the immobilized automobile.” [ Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 462, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2036, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 580 (1971).] In such circumstances, “it would often be unduly burdensome and unreasonably restrictive to require the police to post a guard and repair to the courthouse for a warrant once they have probable cause to search” the car. United States v. Bradshaw, 515 F.2d 360, 363 (D.C.Cir.1975). Whether a special police detail is less burdensome when a car is parked on a city street than when the car is stopped on an open highway is open to debate. In either case it may be impracticable.

[ Colvin, supra, 123 N.J. at 434-35, 587 A.2d 1278.]

We concluded that the “justification to conduct a warrantless automobile search does not turn on whether the vehicle is parked or moving.” Id. at 437, 587 A.2d 1278. Rather, the dispositive question is whether “the circumstances ... make it impracticable[FN3] to obtain a warrant when the police have probable cause to search the car.” Ibid. (emphasis added). Accordingly,

when, without advance planning, police encounter a parked car, have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains criminal contraband ... and have articulable reasons to believe that the evidence may otherwise be lost or destroyed, they may seize and search the vehicle for the contraband without the necessity of a warrant.

[ Id. at 429-30, 587 A.2d 1278 (emphasis added).]

Colvin is crystal clear: exigency above and beyond the mere mobility of the vehicle is required. In particular, Colvin mandated “articulable” reasons to believe that the evidence would be at risk if a search was delayed. Id. at 429, 587 A.2d 1278. The pellucidity of Colvin underscores that what we said in Alston and Martin was neither “mistaken” nor “unwitting,” as the dissent suggests. Post at ----, --- A.2d at ----.

Nine years later in Cooke, supra, 163 N.J. at 665, 751 A.2d 92, we affirmed that view when we addressed the issue of exigent circumstances and the automobile exception in light of Labron, supra, 518 U.S. at 940, 116 S.Ct. at 2487, 135 L.Ed.2d at 1036, and Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466, 119 S.Ct. 2013, 2014, 144 L.Ed.2d 442, 445 (1999), which had reaffirmed that under federal precedent the automobile exception has “no separate exigency requirement.” FN4 Dyson, supra, 527 U.S. at 466, 119 S.Ct. at 2014, 144 L.Ed.2d at 445. In Cooke, supra, the police had received information from a reliable informant that the defendant was selling drugs in a particular location, and storing the drugs in a gray Ford Escort. 163 N.J. at 662, 751 A.2d 92. A police officer watching a housing complex in a high-crime area “observed [the] defendant in a parking lot working on what appeared to be the radio speakers within [a] Ford Escort.” Ibid. The officer continued watching as the defendant engaged in what appeared to be a drug transaction in which he retrieved the drugs from a nearby Hyundai. Ibid. Two similar transactions subsequently were observed involving the Hyundai and the Ford Escort. Ibid. The defendant then drove away in the Hyundai. Ibid. The Hyundai was stopped, and the defendant was arrested pursuant to an unrelated outstanding warrant. Id. at 662-63, 751 A.2d 92. A search of his person yielded the keys to the Escort. Id. at 663, 751 A.2d 92. The officers then searched the Escort and discovered illegal drugs. Ibid.

*9 A trial judge granted the defendant's motion to suppress based on the absence of exigency. Ibid. The vehicle was not “ ‘readily mobile,’ ” the defendant was in custody, the police had the keys to the Escort, and an officer was surveilling the Escort. Ibid. According to the judge, under those circumstances, the police should have obtained a warrant prior to searching the Escort, a decision with which the Appellate Division agreed. Ibid.

In reviewing the order to suppress, we turned to first principles. “ ‘The requirement that a search warrant be obtained before evidence may be seized is not lightly to be dispensed with, and the burden is on the State ... to bring it within one of those recognized exceptions.’ ” Id. at 664, 751 A.2d 92 (quoting Alston, supra, 88 N.J. at 230, 440 A.2d 1311). Justice Verniero, writing for the Court, detailed the federal version of the automobile exception and noted that Labron, supra, 518 U.S. at 940, 116 S.Ct. at 2487, 135 L.Ed.2d at 1036, had reaffirmed probable cause and the mobility of the automobile as the only requirements in the federal courts. Cooke, supra, 163 N.J. at 665, 751 A.2d 92. As Justice Verniero noted, Labron “essentially disposed of the additional requirement of exigent circumstances” when discerning the applicability of the automobile exception. Id. at 666, 751 A.2d 92.

Looking to our own Constitution, along with “our unwavering precedent and the important rights at stake,” id. at 670, 751 A.2d 92, in Cooke we affirmed that the exigency inquiry has always been a part of New Jersey's automobile exception. Id. at 667, 670-71, 751 A.2d 92. We explained why:

Without a requirement of exigent circumstances, virtually every search of an automobile would be valid provided the police had probable cause to act. For example, ... a car parked in the home driveway of vacationing owners would be a fair target of a warrantless search if the police had probable cause to believe the vehicle contained drugs. Such a broad ruling has no basis in our case law.

[ Id. at 667-68, 751 A.2d 92 (citing Colvin, supra, 123 N.J. at 431, 587 A.2d 1278).]

By way of example, but not limitation, we went on to repeat the kinds of considerations that could factor into the “exigency” calculus for purposes of the automobile exception established in our prior decisions in Alston, Martin, LaPorte, and Colvin. Id. at 668-71, 751 A.2d 92.

In Cooke, supra, we held that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search of the Escort. 163 N.J. at 675-76, 751 A.2d 92. Several factors supported that holding: the impracticability of the surveilling officer leaving his post to secure the Escort; the loss of the element of surprise after arresting the defendant; that third parties knew of the Escort's location and knew that the defendant stored drugs there; that the drugs may have been removed or destroyed; that the Escort could be removed; and that the Escort was in a high-crime area. Id. at 675, 751 A.2d 92. “[A]ny one of [those] factors, standing alone, would be insufficient to support a finding of exigency,” but when combined, the warrantless search was justified. Id. at 675-76, 751 A.2d 92.

*10 Cooke provided us with a long view of the development of automobile-search jurisprudence in New Jersey. Like its predecessors, Cooke demonstrates that the initial policy rationales that justified the existence of the federal automobile exception to the warrant requirement are only part of the larger “exigency” consideration in this State. Thus, courts must not only consider the mobility of the vehicle or the lessened expectation of privacy in it, but also must look to all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the search to determine the existence of exigency.

In 2006, in a unanimous opinion, we decided Dunlap, supra, 185 N.J. at 543, 888 A.2d 1278, which began when the police were notified that an individual had found a handgun and drugs in her daughter's bedroom. Id. at 544, 888 A.2d 1278. When they arrested the daughter, she stated that the contraband belonged to her boyfriend (the defendant), who was a suspect in other drug crimes and had previously been arrested. Id. at 544-45, 888 A.2d 1278. She said that if the defendant came to her house, he likely would have heroin on him; that he often carried guns; and that he would drive a green Hyundai. Id. at 545, 888 A.2d 1278. At the urging of the officers, who had obtained authorization for a consensual telephonic interception, the daughter called the defendant and asked him to come to her residence. Ibid.

Shortly thereafter, defendant arrived and exited the Hyundai. Ibid. Two officers tackled him as he was walking to the house and arrested him. Ibid. At that time, approximately ten officers were at the scene. Ibid. The officers then unlocked the Hyundai and immediately detected the smell of burning marijuana. Ibid. They searched the entire passenger compartment and the glove box, and discovered suspected heroin. Id. at 545-46, 888 A.2d 1278. They also searched a “trap” in the Hyundai and found further evidence. Id. at 546, 888 A.2d 1278.

As part of its justification for the warrantless search, the State asserted that the automobile exception applied. Id. at 549, 888 A.2d 1278. We ultimately upheld the Appellate Division's decision that probable cause existed but exigency did not. Id. at 549-51, 888 A.2d 1278. The Appellate Division cited the residential nature of the neighborhood; the fact that no third parties knew of defendant's destination or his arrest; the number of officers on the scene available to oversee the car while a warrant was sought; and the failure of the police to seek a telephonic warrant when they had just used the telephone to obtain verbal authorization for a consensual recording of defendant's conversation with his girlfriend. Id. at 550, 888 A.2d 1278.

We concluded: “[T]he decision of the Appellate Division is fully supported in every respect by the record and is legally unexceptionable.” Id. at 550-51, 888 A.2d 1278. “The standards remain the same: probable cause and exigent circumstances, each of which to be determined on a case-by-case basis.” Id. at 551, 888 A.2d 1278. In that case, “the unique facts, particularly the presence of ten officers, fully justified the ... conclusion that exigency was absent.” Ibid. We cautioned, however, that “[d]ifferent facts, such as a roadside stop effectuated by only one or two officers, would likely have changed the calculus.” Ibid.

*11 Dunlap precisely captured the point in respect of the exigency element. Indeed, in Dunlap we noted that “ [p]olice safety and the preservation of evidence,” which are the policy rationales underlying the search incident to arrest exception, see State v. Pierce, 136 N.J. 184, 197-98, 642 A.2d 947 (1994), are also the “preeminent determinants” of exigency for purposes of applying the automobile exception. Dunlap, supra, 185 N.J. at 551, 888 A.2d 1278 (emphasis added).

[11] Headnote Citing References Thus, in accordance with “our unwavering precedent,” Cooke, supra, 163 N.J. at 670, 751 A.2d 92, the warrantless search of an automobile in New Jersey is permissible where (1) the stop is unexpected; (2) the police have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime; and (3) exigent circumstances exist under which it is impracticable to obtain a warrant. Id. at 667-68, 751 A.2d 92; Alston, supra, 88 N.J. at 230-34, 440 A.2d 1311. The notion of exigency encompasses far broader considerations than the mere mobility of the vehicle. See Dunlap, supra, 185 N.J. at 551, 888 A.2d 1278; Cooke, supra, 163 N.J. at 667-68, 751 A.2d 92; Colvin, supra, 123 N.J. at 434-35, 587 A.2d 1278; Martin, supra, 87 N.J. at 569-70, 436 A.2d 96; LaPorte, supra, 62 N.J. at 316, 301 A.2d 146.

[12] Headnote Citing References[13] Headnote Citing References[14] Headnote Citing References Exigency must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Dunlap, supra, 185 N.J. at 551, 888 A.2d 1278. No one factor is dispositive; courts must consider the totality of the circumstances. Cooke, supra, 163 N.J. at 675, 751 A.2d 92. How the facts of the case bear on the issues of officer safety and the preservation of evidence is the fundamental inquiry. Dunlap, supra, 185 N.J. at 551, 888 A.2d 1278; see Colvin, supra, 123 N.J. at 429-30, 587 A.2d 1278; State v. Esteves, 93 N.J. 498, 506, 461 A.2d 1128 (1983). There is no magic formula-it is merely the compendium of facts that make it impracticable to secure a warrant. Colvin, supra, 123 N.J. at 434, 587 A.2d 1278 (citing Coolidge, supra, 403 U.S. at 462, 91 S.Ct. at 2036, 29 L.Ed.2d at 580). In each case it is the circumstances facing the officers that tell the tale.

[15] Headnote Citing References Legitimate considerations are as varied as the possible scenarios surrounding an automobile stop. They include, for example, the time of day; the location of the stop; the nature of the neighborhood; the unfolding of the events establishing probable cause; the ratio of officers to suspects; the existence of confederates who know the location of the car and could remove it or its contents; whether the arrest was observed by passersby who could tamper with the car or its contents; whether it would be safe to leave the car unguarded and, if not, whether the delay that would be caused by obtaining a warrant would place the officers or the evidence at risk.FN5 As we have previously noted, “[f]or purposes of a warrantless search, exigent circumstances are present when law enforcement officers do not have sufficient time to obtain any form of warrant.” State v. Johnson, 193 N.J. 528, 556 n. 7, 940 A.2d 1185 (2008) (emphasis added) (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 1645-46, 18 L.Ed.2d 782, 787 (1967)).

V.

*12 [16] Headnote Citing References We turn next to the facts of these cases. Pena-Flores was arrested apparently based on the results of the search, thus obviating the applicability of the search incident to arrest exception. At issue is whether the automobile exception applies. Clearly, the vehicle was legitimately stopped for a traffic violation. The overwhelming smell of marijuana emanating from the automobile gave the officer probable cause to believe that it contained contraband. State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 515-16, 816 A.2d 153 (2003) (holding that smell of marijuana constitutes probable cause to believe crime has been committed and that additional contraband might be present). Thus, the inquiry turns to exigency.

Here, the stop was unexpected; the police had no prior information of criminality and stopped the vehicle only in response to an aggressive traffic maneuver late at night on the side of a highly traveled road. Importantly, Zsak was unable to look for weapons or contraband from outside the vehicle because the windows were heavily tinted. That, in itself, is illegal. N.J.S.A. 39:3-74 (“No person shall drive any motor vehicle with any sign, poster, sticker or other non-transparent material upon the front windshield ... or front side windows of such vehicle....”).

Initially, Paredes and Pena-Flores were removed from the vehicle, but were not placed under arrest or secured inside of Greco's patrol car. The ratio of police officers to suspects was two-to-two, and there was no available backup. Indeed, we view the circumstances here as what we contemplated as the counterpoint to the facts in Dunlap, supra, 185 N.J. at 551, 888 A.2d 1278, where we said “[d]ifferent facts, such as a roadside stop effectuated by only one or two officers, would likely have changed the calculus.” In short, we are satisfied that the circumstances facing the officers gave rise not only to probable cause, but also to exigency, thus satisfying the standards governing the automobile exception. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division to the contrary.

[17] Headnote Citing References We turn next to Fuller, with regard to whom we reach a different conclusion. Clemens pulled Fuller over unexpectedly for a traffic violation. FN6 As a result of a lookup, Clemens determined that the license plate and the bill of sale did not correspond to Fuller's vehicle. Accordingly, he was entitled, separate and apart from the automobile exception, to look into the areas in the vehicle in which evidence of ownership might be expected to be found. State v. Boykins, 50 N.J. 73, 77, 232 A.2d 141 (1967) (citations omitted); State v. Jones, 195 N.J.Super. 119, 122-23, 478 A.2d 424 (App.Div.1984) (“[W]here there has been a traffic violation and the operator of the motor vehicle is unable to produce proof of registration, a police officer may [conduct a] search [of] the car for evidence of ownership .... confined to the glove compartment or other area where a registration might normally be kept in a vehicle.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)). See also United States v. Kelly, 267 F.Supp.2d 5, 14 (D.D.C.2003) (“[I]t is reasonable for [an] officer to conduct a limited search for the registration in those areas where the registration would likely be located.”); 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, § 7.4(d) (4th ed. 2004) (“[I]t is reasonable for the police to make a limited search of a vehicle in an effort to determine ownership.”).

*13 [18] Headnote Citing References During that search in the area of the center console, Clemens inadvertently found a loaded handgun wedged between the console and the front seat, and, in the console, prescription bottles containing 106 Xanax pills. Those items were not subject to suppression.

Although what was uncovered in the search for credentials unexpectedly provided probable cause to believe additional contraband and weapons might be present in the automobile, that, standing alone, did not warrant a further search. Fuller was arrested and secured in the vehicle, thus obviating resort to the search incident to arrest exception. Eckel, supra, 185 N.J. at 541, 888 A.2d 1266. The only justification to search that remained was the automobile exception. As we have said, in order for the automobile exception to come into play, exigency was required.

Citing Dunlap, Fuller argues that there was no exigency, a notion with which we agree. Here, Clemens pulled Fuller over for a traffic violation in broad daylight on a city street at 1:15 in the afternoon. Fuller was subsequently arrested and secured inside the cruiser, and thus had no opportunity to gain access to the vehicle or anything it contained. There is nothing in the record to suggest that Fuller had cohorts who might have come on the scene. Clemens was, at all times, assisted by one to three other troopers. The vehicle could have been impounded or one officer could have remained with it while a warrant was sought by telephone or in person. There was simply no urgent, immediate need for the officers to conduct a full search of the automobile. See Dunlap, supra, 185 N.J. at 550, 888 A.2d 1278.

We see this as an analog to Dunlap, in which we concluded that there was no exigency. Although we referenced the extraordinary number of officers present in Dunlap, it was not a mere matter of head counting, but a proper substantive analysis of all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the search. When that kind of analysis is performed in this case, it satisfies us that exigency was absent. In sum, the combination of probable cause and exigent circumstances was not present, thus vitiating invocation of the automobile exception. Accordingly, the evidence that was uncovered in areas of the vehicle in which credentials would not normally be kept (under and behind the backseat and in the radio compartment) was subject to suppression.

VI.

A few final observations. We recognize, as the dissent argues, that exigency assessments are difficult for the officer on the street and that life would be simpler if we returned to a pure Alston analysis. However, as much as ease of application matters, it has never been our only polestar. Instead, as we said in Cooke, supra, 163 N.J. at 670, 751 A.2d 92, the importance of the rights involved has lit our way. Thus, instead of abandoning our principles, we see this as an opportunity for procedural change.

For example, there is a suggestion in our case law that a search pursuant to a telephonic warrant should be treated, analytically, as a warrantless search. State v. Valencia, 93 N.J. 126, 137, 459 A.2d 1149 (1983). As a result, it may be that resort to such warrants has been inhibited. It makes sense that if a telephonic warrant is treated as the equivalent of no warrant at all, police would generally see no benefit in the procedure. Moreover, our Court Rules have underscored the problem by requiring an applicant for a telephonic warrant to prove to the judge “that exigent circumstances exist sufficient to excuse the failure to obtain a written warrant.” R. 3:5-3(b). By that requirement, which replicates the justification necessary to uphold a warrantless search, the telephonic or electronic warrant maintains its place in the hierarchy as a second-class citizen.

*14 It seems to us that our procedures for seeking a warrant would be improved by recognizing what other jurisdictions have long acknowledged-that a warrant obtained by telephonic or electronic means is the analytical equivalent of an in-person warrant and should be treated accordingly. See, e.g., Cal.Penal Code § 1526(b) (West 2008) (providing that “[i]n lieu of the written affidavit required in subdivision (a), the magistrate may take an oral statement under oath” provided certain transcription requirements are met); N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law § 690.45(2) (McKinney 2008) (requiring only that “[w]here the search warrant has been obtained on an oral application, it shall so indicate and shall state the name of the issuing judge and the time and date on which such judge directed its issuance”); Or.Rev.Stat. § 133.545(5) (2007) (“Instead of the written affidavit described in subsection (4) of this section, the judge may take an oral statement under oath .... [and that] statement shall be considered to be an affidavit for the purposes of this section.”); Wis. Stat. § 968.12(3) (2007) (“A search warrant may be based upon sworn oral testimony communicated to the judge by telephone, radio or other means of electronic communication....”); Wash.Crim. R. 2.3(c) (2008) ( “There must be an affidavit, a document as provided [by statute], or sworn testimony establishing the grounds for issuing the warrant. The sworn testimony may be an electronically recorded telephonic statement.”).

We note that that approach has been embraced by scholars as well. In a thorough analysis of the San Diego Search Warrant Project, researchers concluded not only that telephonic warrants should not be treated as less authoritative than in-person warrants, but also that such warrants may benefit the state, defendants, and the bench and bar. Laurence A. Benner & Charles T. Samarkos, Searching for Narcotics in San Diego: Preliminary Findings from the San Diego Search Warrant Project, 36 Cal. W.L.Rev. 221, 223, 263, 265 (2000).

One of the most puzzling questions is also why the use of statutorily authorized telephonic search warrant procedures has been so limited. We believe that the expanded use of telephonic warrants would enhance the efficiency of both the police and the judiciary.... [T]he Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Leon[, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) ] that a magistrate's determination of probable cause is to be given great deference by a reviewing appellate court and evidence will not be excluded even if the magistrate erred, so long as the officer reasonably relied upon the magistrate's determination. It would therefore seem that one of the best ways to ensure that an officer has reasonably relied upon the magistrate is to make sure that the magistrate has been provided with all the facts rather than just the mind-numbing verbiage embodied in the boilerplate of the typical affidavit. From the judiciary's perspective we believe it would also be a refreshing change for the officer to actually talk to the judge and explain his or her grounds for probable cause in plain common-sense language. Guided by a Deputy District Attorney who structures the sworn verbal statement with a check list of questions, there is little danger such oral affidavits, which are tape recorded and transcribed, will be found insufficient on any technical ground. This method would also eliminate a potential source of delay in the ultimate execution of search warrants once probable cause is obtained.

*15 [ Id. at 265 (footnote omitted).]

Those authors propose that telephonic warrants are not only a permissible method of satisfying the Fourth Amendment, but also an advisable step into the twenty-first century. Ibid.; see also Justin H. Smith, Note, Press One for Warrant: Reinventing the Fourth Amendment's Search Warrant Requirement Through Electronic Procedures, 55 Vand. L.Rev. 1591, 1614-18 (2002) (disputing critics' argument that “the lack of demeanor evidence” and “the absence of a written record” justify disparate treatment of telephonic warrants). “Bypassing the written application requirement is, in reality, one of the most effective ways to decrease the amount of time needed to procure a warrant. As long as another permanent form of documentation is created, few criticisms of the telephonic procedure are justified.” Smith, supra, 55 Vand. L.Rev. at 1618.

The foregoing observations seem to us to be intuitively correct. In furtherance of them, we will amend R. 3:5-3(b) to clarify the parity between the various methods for obtaining a warrant and to underscore that an officer may resort to electronic or telephonic means without the need to prove exigency.

In addition, we will establish a Task Force, including representatives of the Attorney General, the Prosecutors, the Public Defender, the defense bar, and the judiciary, to address the practical issues involved in obtaining telephonic and electronic warrants.FN7 The Task Force will study the telephonic and electronic warrant procedures and make practical suggestions to ensure that technology becomes a vibrant part of our process. That will include recommendations for uniform procedures (including forms), equipment, and training, along with an evaluation of the scheme once it is underway.

We take that action under our supervisory authority, cognizant of our “ ‘responsibility to guarantee the proper administration of ... criminal justice.’ ” State v. Cook, 179 N.J. 533, 561, 847 A.2d 530 (2004) (quoting State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39, 62, 459 A.2d 641 (1983)).

As we said in Cook, in connection with the recording of custodial interrogations, “[t]he proverbial ‘time has arrived.’ ” Id. at 562, 847 A.2d 530. We should give police access to an efficient and speedy electronic and telephonic warrant procedure that will be available to them on the scene; that will obviate the need for difficult exigency assessments; and that will guarantee our citizens the protections that the warrant requirement affords-an evaluation of probable cause by a neutral judicial officer.

Finally, we note that the enhanced availability of electronic and telephonic warrants is not intended to supplant the traditional exceptions to the warrant requirement. We continue to recognize the right of officers to search a motor vehicle without a warrant where probable cause and exigent circumstances coexist.

VII.

The judgment of the Appellate Division in Pena-Flores is reversed. The judgment of the Appellate Division in Fuller is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The cases are remanded to the respective trial courts for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Justice ALBIN, dissenting.
*16 The Court ordered further arguments in the cases before us so that we might “revisit[ ] much of our prior precedent, which declared both probable cause and exigent circumstances necessary” to justify an automobile search. The majority has decided to follow and build on that precedent. In that respect, today's decision represents the final interment of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement in New Jersey-a doctrine followed by the federal courts and most state courts in this country for more than eighty years. In my view, the majority opinion will provide neither greater liberty nor security to the people of this State, but will place greater and unnecessary burdens on law enforcement.

The abandonment of the automobile exception surely did not come about through one decisive, philosophical break with the federal constitutional standard. Rather, over the course of years, in one case after another, through a series of mistaken and unwitting steps, we have marched into our present jurisprudential quagmire. Following precedent serves many valuable and laudable goals. But sometimes in the law, as in life, we have to admit when we have traveled down the wrong path-and not continue merely because it is difficult to change course or retrace our steps. Stare decisis is not a command to follow the mistakes of the past.

Under the standard adopted by the majority, police officers-who lawfully stop a motor vehicle on a highway and have probable cause to believe that there is evidence of a crime inside the vehicle-will have to secure a search warrant before conducting a search, unless they wish to hazard a guess that they meet the majority's formless “exigent-circumstances” test. The police officers who have the hopeless task of applying that amorphous test will find, as they do here, that there will be ample opportunity for trial courts to second-guess their actions and appellate courts to second-guess trial courts' decisions. Caution will lead officers to impound more cars while they apply for warrants, leaving drivers and passengers in custodial limbo in the process. The liberty of the car's occupants therefore will be sacrificed for the illusory purpose of promoting their privacy. Because that approach is not a positive development under our State Constitution, we should return to this State's traditional automobile exception and allow police officers to conduct a warrantless search provided that they have probable cause based on unanticipated information acquired at the time of the search. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

I.

The Fourth Amendment has had to adapt to realities unimagined by the Founders of our Republic. One new reality was the invention of the automobile. With the mass use of cars came the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543, 551 (1925).

Several rationales have been given for not requiring police officers to secure a warrant before conducting a search of an automobile when the officers have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence of a crime. One is that the inherent mobility of the vehicle makes it impracticable to obtain a warrant and another is that a car, given its pervasive regulation by the state, is accorded a lesser expectation of privacy than, say, a house. See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-92, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 2068-70, 85 L.Ed.2d 406, 412-14 (1985); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367-68, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3096, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000, 1004-05 (1976); Carroll, supra, 267 U.S. at 153, 45 S.Ct. at 285, 69 L.Ed. at 551; State v. Patino, 83 N.J. 1, 9, 414 A.2d 1327 (1980). But those are not the only, and perhaps not even the most persuasive, justifications for the current application of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.

*17 In Chambers v. Maroney, Justice Byron White observed that when weighing Fourth Amendment values it is “debatable” whether an immediate search of a car, based on probable cause, is a “greater” intrusion than impounding the vehicle until a magistrate grants approval for a warrant. 399 U.S. 42, 51-52, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 1981, 26 L.Ed.2d 419, 428 (1970). Because in the case of a car search it is questionable whether a warrant provides greater Fourth Amendment protection to the individual, he concluded that “[f]or constitutional purposes, [there is] no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant.” Ibid. Under the Fourth Amendment, “[g]iven probable cause to search, either course is reasonable.” FN1 Id. at 52, 90 S.Ct. at 1981, 26 L.Ed.2d at 428.

Although Justice White and Justice Thurgood Marshall had many disagreements in interpreting the Constitution,FN2 they both recognized the propriety and utility of the automobile exception. Justice Marshall observed that “the warrantless search [of an automobile] is permissible because a warrant requirement would not provide significant protection of the defendant's Fourth Amendment interests.” United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 831, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2176, 72 L.Ed.2d 572, 598 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting). He too noted that the “Court has refused to require a warrant in situations where the process of obtaining such a warrant would be more intrusive than the actual search itself.” Ibid. Justice Marshall found no superior Fourth Amendment benefit in compelling a police officer to impound a vehicle and take into custody its occupants, while the officer seeks the issuance of a warrant, rather than searching the vehicle on the spot. See ibid.

Despite the vastly different jurisprudential approaches that members of the United States Supreme Court have taken in construing the Fourth Amendment, even concerning automobile searches, it appears that the Justices have subscribed to the general contours of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. FN3 Impounding vehicles and taking into custody their occupants while the police seek a search warrant is not a Fourth Amendment panacea. Nor is it a virtue to be extolled under Article I, Paragraph 7 of our State Constitution. Yet, although the majority opinion submits that its approach will expand the privacy interests of New Jersey's residents, it instead will have the unintended consequence of leading to the impoundment of more vehicles and to a greater deprivation of the liberty interests of our citizens while also impairing the immediate investigation of suspected crimes.

II.

Our state-law jurisprudence has not provided a compelling, much less persuasive, reason to depart from the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Currently, to justify a search at the scene of an automobile stop, our Court requires that, in addition to probable cause, the police officer have exigent circumstances to conduct a warrantless search. See State v. Cooke, 163 N.J. 657, 661, 671, 751 A.2d 92 (2000). However, a review of our case law reveals that our Court has displayed an unwillingness, or inability, to live with the consequences of a true exigent-circumstances standard. In case after case, to rescue a search from the reach of the exclusionary rule, our Court has managed to find exigent circumstances in the most unremarkable circumstances. In my view, it is better to honestly apply the automobile exception to the warrant requirement than to resort to fictional exigencies to justify upholding the constitutionality of a search.

*18 At least as of 1981, this Court interpreted the automobile exception to the warrant requirement under Article I, Paragraph 7 of our State Constitution no differently from the federal interpretation of the automobile exception under the Fourth Amendment. In State v. Alston, we upheld the constitutionality of the police search of the defendant's car based on the traditional automobile exception to the warrant requirement. 88 N.J. 211, 235, 440 A.2d 1311 (1981). We explained that “our decision in [ State v. Ercolano, 79 N.J. 25, 397 A.2d 1062 (1979) ] in no way mark[ed] a departure from the established analysis of the [automobile] exception as recognized in Carroll and Chambers.” Id. at 233, 440 A.2d 1311. Indeed, relying on Chambers, we noted that “the exigent circumstances that justify the invocation of the automobile exception are the unforeseeability and spontaneity of the circumstances giving rise to probable cause, and the inherent mobility of the automobile stopped on the highway.” Ibid. (citing Chambers, supra, 399 U.S. at 50-51, 90 S.Ct. at 1980-81, 26 L.Ed.2d at 428). On that basis, it was permissible to conduct a search at the place of the stop rather than impound the vehicle for the purpose of securing a search warrant. Id. at 233-35, 440 A.2d 1311.

In State v. Martin, decided the same day as Alston, the Court again-under the banner of the automobile exception-aligned our jurisprudence, seemingly, with federal law and upheld the warrantless search of a station wagon suspected of being involved in a store robbery. 87 N.J. 561, 563-64, 436 A.2d 96 (1981). However, in Martin, the Court framed the issue as “the level of exigent circumstances sufficient to justify a warrantless search ... under the automobile exception to the Warrant Clause.” Id. at 563, 436 A.2d 96. In doing so, the Court focused on the “urgent, immediate need” requiring impoundment of the station wagon and warrantless search of the vehicle at police headquarters: the defendants, who were armed and dangerous, were “still at large,” and aware that police suspected their involvement in the armed robbery. Id. at 569-70, 436 A.2d 96. The Court's decision was largely informed by its perceived understanding of federal constitutional law. Id. at 568-70, 436 A.2d 96 (citing Chambers, supra, 399 U.S. at 50-52, 90 S.Ct. at 1980-81, 26 L.Ed.2d at 428-29).

Nevertheless, the Court did not explain what “exigent circumstances” or “urgent, immediate need” justified not obtaining a search warrant once the vehicle was safely removed to headquarters. Nor did the Court explain the “exigent circumstances” that compelled law enforcement to leave the scene instead of staking out the vehicle if it was believed the robbers would return to the instrumentality of a crime.

In State v. Colvin, the Court, again believing that it had “harmonized [its] search-and-seizure law with Supreme Court precedent,” upheld the warrantless search of a drug suspect's parked car. 123 N.J. 428, 437, 587 A.2d 1278 (1991). Shortly after the suspect's arrest, an informant advised the police that drugs were stashed in the suspect's car “and that other people knew about the arrest and would attempt to remove the drugs from the car.” Id. at 430, 587 A.2d 1278. The “police entered the unlocked car, searched it, and found tinfoil packets of cocaine underneath the dashboard.” Ibid.

*19 Although using the automobile-exception nomenclature to justify the search, the Court spoke in terms of exigent circumstances, noting that the police had lost the element of surprise, confederates might remove the contraband from the car, and a special detail would be needed to guard the vehicle while a warrant was procured. Id. at 434-35, 587 A.2d 1278 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 462, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2036, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 580 (1971)). Despite its avowed adherence to the automobile exception under federal law, the Court concluded with a pure exigent-circumstances analysis, finding that

[t]he justification to conduct a warrantless automobile search does not turn on whether the vehicle is parked or moving. The justification turns on the circumstances that make it impracticable to obtain a warrant when the police have probable cause to search the car. When, as here, the police have no advance knowledge of the events to unfold, no warrant is required to search a parked car if the police have probable cause to believe that the car contains criminal contraband and have articulable reasons to search the vehicle immediately to prevent the loss or destruction of the evidence.

[ Id. at 437, 587 A.2d 1278 (emphasis added).]

Colvin did not express an intent to break with federal law but, in its exigent-circumstances analysis, it nevertheless laid the seeds for the overthrow of the automobile exception as articulated as recently as in Alston, supra.

The final blow to the automobile exception was struck in Cooke, supra. There, the Court had to confront head-on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Pennsylvania v. Labron, which held that a separate finding of exigent circumstances was not a component of the Fourth Amendment's automobile exception. See Cooke, supra, 163 N.J. at 661, 751 A.2d 92 (discussing Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 116 S.Ct. 2485, 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996)). Until Cooke, as shown, the Court believed it had been following the federal standard.

In Cooke, for the first time, this Court explicitly departed from the Federal Constitution's automobile-exception jurisprudence and decreed that Article I, Paragraph 7 of our State Constitution required exigent circumstances before law enforcement officers, armed with probable cause, could undertake the warrantless search of a car. Id. at 661, 671, 751 A.2d 92. In that case, in upholding the constitutionality of the search, the Court found exigent circumstances, but a close look at the facts suggests that there was no emergency that made it impracticable to secure a warrant.

While conducting surveillance, a police officer observed the defendant, after engaging in a drug transaction with another individual, place suspected drugs in a Ford Escort. Id. at 662, 751 A.2d 92. The defendant and the other individual drove off in another car, but were stopped by police officers serving as a perimeter team. Ibid. Those officers took from the defendant his keys to the Escort and conducted an on-scene search of the car, which uncovered illicit drugs. Id. at 663, 751 A.2d 92.

*20 To reach its exigent-circumstances conclusion, the Court came to a number of findings either not supported by the evidence or irrelevant to the case: “it would have been impracticable to require” the officer conducting surveillance to leave his post to guard the Escort; “the element of surprise was lost” because of the defendant's arrest; “third parties had knowledge of the location of the Escort” and the stored drugs and “could have attempted to remove or destroy the drugs in the time necessary to obtain the warrant”; and “other parties in this known drug-trafficking area could have removed the car itself.” Id. at 675, 751 A.2d 92.

Why were those findings unsupported by the evidence or irrelevant? The surveillance officer did not have to leave his post because he had a view of the Escort and could have alerted the officers on the perimeter team if confederates sought access to the Escort. Ordinarily, the police attempt to apprehend as many of the culprits involved in an illicit scheme. Here, the Court is suggesting-without any apparent basis-that the police needed to take flight out of fear that the confederates would arrive on the scene. More importantly, for purposes of the exigent-circumstances analysis, because the Escort was used as the instrumentality in a crime, it was obvious that it would be impounded and taken to police headquarters. Once the car was removed from the scene, no exigency required forgoing the warrant procedure.

Under the automobile exception set forth in Alston, supra, the search clearly would have been permissible because of the “unforeseeability and spontaneity of the circumstances giving rise to probable cause.” Alston, supra, 88 N.J. at 233, 440 A.2d 1311. However, the Court eschewed that standard for a pure exigent-circumstances test, relying, in large part, on Colvin as precedent. See Cooke, supra, 163 N.J. at 667-676, 751 A.2d 92. As revealed, the Court resorted to fictional exigencies to justify the search. The totality-of-the-circumstances standard the Court enunciated, moreover, has become so open-ended that our trial and appellate courts can reach almost any desired result in determining the constitutionality of a search under state law.

That brings us to the cases now before this Court.

III.

In Pena-Flores, at approximately 11:00 p.m., a police officer stopped a car, which had dark-tinted windows, for a motor vehicle violation in Cranford. When the officer approached the driver's window, he smelled the strong odor of raw marijuana. The officer directed the driver to step from the vehicle. When a back-up police officer arrived on the scene, the passenger also was removed from the car. Without first securing a warrant, one of the officers entered the vehicle and conducted a search, uncovering a substantial amount of drugs and a handgun. Both the driver and passenger were charged with committing various drug and gun offenses. At a pretrial hearing, the trial court found no exigent circumstances justifying the search and suppressed all the evidence that the police discovered in the car, except two bags of marijuana that were retrieved from the passenger-side floor. The Appellate Division, also finding no exigency for the search, upheld the trial court's decision.

*21 The majority, however, now reverses Pena-Flores, finding exigent circumstances because “[t]he ratio of police officers to suspects was two-to-two, and there was no available backup.” Ante at ----, --- A.2d at ----. But given the presence of probable cause based on the overwhelming smell of marijuana wafting from the car and the fact that the car ultimately was towed and impounded with just the two officers on the scene, it is difficult to discern the exigent circumstances for not securing a search warrant when the car was going to be impounded in any event.

In Fuller, in the afternoon, a state trooper stopped a car driven by the defendant for a motor vehicle violation in Camden. The defendant handed the trooper a driver's license, which identified him as Charles Bradley and which contained a photograph that did not resemble the defendant. The trooper also quickly determined that the license plate and the bill of sale tendered by the defendant did not correspond to the car that the defendant was driving. The officer noticed traffic summonses on the backseat of the car, which the defendant then gave to the officer. Those summonses were issued to a Charles Bradley, which the officer soon learned from dispatch was an alias for the defendant. A pat-down of the defendant uncovered two large bundles of money in the side pocket of his pants.

With the aid of another trooper who arrived on the scene, a warrantless search was conducted of the car, revealing a gun wedged between the console and driver's seat and, in the console, bottles of Xanax without a proper prescription. A further search of the car disclosed marijuana in a dashboard compartment and underneath the backseat, where a sword also was hidden. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, but the Appellate Division reversed, finding no exigent circumstances for the search.

The majority, however, upheld the search of the handgun and the bottles of Xanax because the trooper discovered them inadvertently while looking for evidence of the car's ownership. Ante at ----, --- A.2d at ----. However, before entering the car for the purported purpose of looking for registration or other proof of ownership, the trooper already had probable cause to arrest the defendant for possession of a stolen car, and, as in Pena-Flores, a justifiable basis to impound the car, which ultimately was towed from the scene. Therefore, under the majority's exigency standard, the search could have been postponed until after the car was impounded at which time the troopers could have secured a warrant.

To inform the exigent-circumstances analysis in an automobile-stop case, which it applied in Pena-Flores and Fuller, the majority set forth a number of factors to be considered, such as

the time of day; the location of the stop; the nature of the neighborhood; the unfolding of the events establishing probable cause; the ratio of officers to suspects; the existence of confederates who know the location of the car and could remove it or its contents; whether the arrest was observed by passersby who could tamper with the car or its contents; whether it would be safe to leave the car unguarded and, if not, whether the delay that would be caused by obtaining a warrant would place the officers or the evidence at risk.

*22 [ Ante at ----, --- A.2d at ----.]

That multi-factor test will lead to widely divergent outcomes and allow trial courts and appellate courts routinely to second-guess the officers on the scene and eventually themselves. It is asking too much of law enforcement officers, who are responding to fast-moving and -evolving events, to process the type of complex and speculative information contained in that formula and expect uniform and consistent decision-making. In the above exigent-circumstances analysis, for a permissible automobile search, what is the acceptable ratio of officers to suspects, what should the officer know about the neighborhood, how is he to know if confederates are skulking about, and what does it mean to consider leaving the car unguarded when the car can be safely towed and impounded? The exigent-circumstances formula expounded by the majority will leave many police officers with an unwillingness to hazard a guess, fearing that a mistaken decision will result in the suppression of critical evidence. Thus, in many cases, the prudent police officer will impound the vehicle and later secure a warrant. For those who venture to use the formula, our courts will be kept busy for years ironing out the meaning and application of its various components.

Society pays an exorbitant price when otherwise relevant evidence is suppressed not because police officers have acted in flagrant violation of the law, but rather because they erred while attempting to follow judicially-imposed rules too difficult for the average officer or constitutional scholar to understand. Moreover, as explained earlier, I do not believe the regime adopted by the majority expands the privacy and liberty interests of the people under Article I, Paragraph 7. That is probably the reason why the majority of jurisdictions have not taken the road the majority continues to traverse. See Commonwealth v. Rosenfelt, 443 Pa.Super. 616, 638, 662 A.2d 1131 (1995), appeal denied, 544 Pa. 605, 674 A.2d 1070 (1996) (collecting cases); see also 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.2(b), at 557 n. 79 (4th ed. 2007) (same).

Under the Alston automobile-warrant exception, the search of the vehicles in both Pena-Flores and Fuller would have been constitutional because the “unforeseeability and spontaneity of the circumstances [gave] rise to probable cause.” Alston, supra, 88 N.J. at 233, 440 A.2d 1311. Let me be clear that I do not fully subscribe to the current federal doctrine, which does not set forth an “unforeseeability and spontaneity” requirement. The standard articulated in Alston provides greater protection to the people of New Jersey than the United States Supreme Court's decision in Labron, supra, and to that extent I would depart from the federal standard under Article I, Paragraph 7 of our State Constitution. Police officers who know in advance that there is contraband in a car and have sufficient time to obtain a search warrant should do so. The Attorney General conceded that law enforcement could work effectively with that standard.

IV.

*23 Through the passage of time and benefit of hindsight, experience reveals that sometimes a state's highest court, or even the highest court in the land, has made a mistake, however well-meaning the original intention. The United States Supreme Court, as well as this Court, has acknowledged that stare decisis is not a compelling reason to uphold an erroneous or improvident interpretation of law. Stare decisis, surely, furthers the important purpose of according respect “to the judgments of the Court and to the stability of the law,” but “[i]t is not ... an inexorable command.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2483, 156 L.Ed.2d 508, 525 (2003) (reversing seventeen-year precedent that interfered with liberty interests of homosexuals to engage in certain sexual conduct); see also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2609, 115 L.Ed.2d 720, 737 (1991) (“ Stare decisis is not an inexorable command; rather, it is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Likewise, New Jersey courts have not viewed the doctrine of stare decisis as a straitjacket preventing us from making appropriate and necessary course corrections to our law. Chief Justice Vanderbilt recognized in his dissent in Fox v. Snow: “The doctrine of stare decisis [does not] render[ ] the courts impotent to correct their past errors.... The doctrine when properly applied operates only to control change, not to prevent it.” 6 N.J. 12, 23, 76 A.2d 877 (1950) (Vanderbilt, C.J., dissenting); see also White v. Twp. of N. Bergen, 77 N.J. 538, 550-52, 391 A.2d 911 (1978) (noting acceptance of “Vanderbilt thesis”). We re-heard arguments in the cases before us to grapple with the underlying rationale of the current law controlling automobile searches. Stare decisis should not be a sufficient basis for staying our hand from taking corrective action.

V.

In conclusion, I believe that the majority, while faithfully following precedent, perpetuates and expands an exigent-circumstances standard that will continue to confound law enforcement and our courts. We should not continue with a failed and unrealistic policy governing automobile-search cases. If there was some compensating benefit to the majority's approach-a true extension of privacy and liberty interests under Article I, Paragraph 7, despite the negative impact on law enforcement-that might be a worthwhile approach. But, in the end, it is better to have a real standard that can be genuinely applied to achieve uniform results than a standard that pretends to give greater rights to the people when, in fact, it is likely to weaken our citizens' rights and unnecessarily impede law enforcement in performing its duties.

Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

For reversal and remandment-Justices LONG, LaVECCHIA, WALLACE, and HOENS-4.

For affirmance-Chief Justice RABNER and Justices ALBIN and RIVERA-SOTO-3.

For affirmance in part, reversal in part, and remandment-Justices LONG, LaVECCHIA, WALLACE, and HOENS-4.

For Dissent-Chief Justice RABNER and Justices ALBIN and RIVERA-SOTO-3.

FN1. Although the record is not completely clear on the subject, it appears that Fuller's lawful name is Charles Bradley.

FN2. The dissent accurately recounts our statement in Alston that our decision in State v. Ercolano, 79 N.J. 25, 397 A.2d 1062 (1979), was not a departure from federal automobile-exception jurisprudence. Post at ----, --- A.2d at ---- (quoting Alston, supra, 88 N.J. at 233, 440 A.2d 1311). However, that does not undermine the importance of what Alston added to the automobile-exception calculus in New Jersey.

FN3. According to Black's Law Dictionary 1210 (8th ed. 1999), impracticable means not “reasonably capable of being accomplished; [not] feasible.”

FN4. In Labron, the Supreme Court of the United States noted that the automobile exception initially was premised on “the automobile's ‘ready mobility,’ an exigency sufficient to excuse failure to obtain a search warrant once probable cause to conduct the search is clear.” 518 U.S. at 940, 116 S.Ct. at 2487, 135 L.Ed.2d at 1035-36 (emphasis added) (citing California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-91, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 2068, 85 L.Ed.2d 406, 412 (1985); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925)). However, the Court relied on more recent cases to explicitly hold that, under the federal Constitution, requiring “unforeseen circumstances involving the search of an automobile .... [is] incorrect.” Id. at 1035, 116 S.Ct. 2485 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

FN5. Contrary to our dissenting colleagues' characterization, our ruling today is nothing more than a reaffirmation of over three decades of prior jurisprudence from LaPorte, supra, 62 N.J. at 316-17, 301 A.2d 146, through Cooke, supra, 163 N.J. at 667-68, 751 A.2d 92, and Dunlap, supra, 185 N.J. at 551, 888 A.2d 1278. We do not, by this opinion, establish a new “multi-factor test.” Post at ----, --- A.2d at ----. To the contrary, we have merely detailed, by way of example but not limitation, the various factors that our prior cases have recognized as relevant to an exigency analysis. Why such a recounting would result in the dire consequences suggested by the dissent, see post at ----, --- A.2d at ----, ---, ---, is a mystery to us. Indeed, if the law is as it has always been (and it is), what logic is there to the dissent's suggestion that under our opinion the police will “impound more cars while they apply for warrants, leaving drivers and passengers in custodial limbo in the process”? Post at ----, --- A.2d at ----. The answer is clearly none.

We have no quarrel with the right of the dissent to suggest a break with our deeply rooted jurisprudence. We resist only its refusal to acknowledge that its proposed divergence from precedent is not precipitated by anything in this opinion, in which we merely recount the story of our past.

FN6. As for Fuller's contention that he was impermissibly removed from his vehicle, established precedent from this Court permits officers in the course of a legal stop to order the driver out of the vehicle. State v. Smith, 134 N.J. 599, 611, 637 A.2d 158 (1994) (holding police officers have automatic right to remove driver of lawfully stopped vehicle to ensure officer safety).

FN7. For example, the State argues that, in reality, obtaining such a warrant is a difficult and time-consuming effort, in the main because judges are not always instantly available. There may be problems in developing an effective scheme to obtain warrants electronically or telephonically, but quick access to a judge should not be one of them.

FN1. In Chambers, the Court also held that a police officer who could conduct a warrantless search of a car at the scene pursuant to the automobile exception could likewise conduct a warrantless search of the car at headquarters. 399 U.S. at 52, 90 S.Ct. at 1981-82, 26 L.Ed.2d at 428-29.

Here, I would depart from the United States Supreme Court's extension of the automobile exception. Whatever inherent exigency justifies a warrantless search at the scene under the automobile exception certainly cannot justify the failure to secure a warrant after towing and impounding the car. The Fourth Amendment should not be sacrificed to fake exigencies. I am not suggesting, however, that under appropriate circumstances an inventory of a car at headquarters cannot be undertaken pursuant to State v. Slockbower, 79 N.J. 1, 397 A.2d 1050 (1979), and State v. Ercolano, 79 N.J. 25, 397 A.2d 1062 (1979). Therefore, under Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, I would limit the automobile exception to on-scene warrantless searches.

FN2. See, e.g., Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 100 S.Ct. 1912, 64 L.Ed.2d 559 (1980); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980).

FN3. In Pennsylvania v. Labron, a majority of the United States Supreme Court held that “[i]f a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the [automobile exception of the] Fourth Amendment thus permits police to search the vehicle without more.” 518 U.S. 938, 940, 116 S.Ct. 2485, 2487, 135 L.Ed.2d 1031, 1036 (1996). Justices Stevens and Ginsburg did not disagree with the majority's reasoning, but dissented only because they believed that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision, which the majority reversed, was based on “the Pennsylvania court's independent consideration of its own Constitution.” Id. at 941-42, 116 S.Ct. at 2487-88, 135 L.Ed.2d at 1036-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

In Maryland v. Dyson, the Court affirmed Labron by holding that the federal automobile exception “does not have a separate exigency requirement.” 527 U.S. 465, 467, 119 S.Ct. 2013, 2014, 144 L.Ed.2d 442, 445 (1999). Although dissenting from the majority's summary reversal, Justices Breyer and Stevens nonetheless “agree[d] that the Court's per curiam opinion correctly states the law.” Id. at 468, 119 S.Ct. at 2014, 144 L.Ed.2d at 446 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

--- A.2d ----, 2009 WL 485101 (N.J.)

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posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

Princeton Elks

Friga — Tue, 27 Jan 2009 16:08:28 GMT

Has anyone here ever had a meal at the Princeton Elks lodge, either at a private event or their weekly dinner? I'm considering hiring out their banquet hall and catering. Of course I'll check it out myself, but reviews from people who've been there are always helpful.

posted in New Jersey - 1 reply

Question - Sweat Lodges

Jon — Mon, 18 Aug 2008 18:07:58 GMT

Anyone know of any Sweat Lodges in New Jersey?

My friend does sweats with the Lakota people, but I guess he would be into other groups also.

Thanks!

posted in New Jersey - 3 replies

Verizon and Fraud

Jon — Tue, 26 Aug 2008 22:24:38 GMT

Not that this is anything new, but be very careful when choosing your phone plans.

Verizon just basically stole $160 from me.

They seem to leave in loopholes into the contracts so that they can slam you with huge charges if you make a slight error.

I made a long distance call. The call did not go through. I had the operator assist me.

I did not know that such a call was not covered by my plan.

And, instead of charging me, oh, $5 or $10 for the operator assistance, they bounced that call off of the free calling plan, and I caught $160 worth of charges.

It was two calls. Note: that one was a counseling call.

Please be aware that this kind of practice is really illegal. They may have spent enough more on lobbyists to protect themselves - at least in the short term...but a contract is a contract.

I contracted with them for free long distance service. That is the clear implication of the agreement between the two parties. They cannot throw in some obscure clause that a client might overlook and then say, "Gotcha." That constitutes a breach of the contract...because what is implied is not only the specificity of the language, but the plain interpretation that anyone would lend to it.

So, I called them for a plan that would give me free long distance. They responded with a plan. That is the agreement. And they breached it.

It is a basic principle of law (in the 9th Amendment among other places) that fairness is the pervading principle of law. If you have been wronged, then the law must advocate for you. And all other contractual relationships must bow before the prevailing principle of fairness, civil rights and the general societal contract that all citizens have with society.

So, don't let them hoodwink you....learn your rights and advocate for them.

Take care all,

Jon

posted in New Jersey - 3 replies

Dodge Poetry Festival

Jon — Tue, 16 Sep 2008 14:06:36 GMT

For anyone interested, Coleman Barks will be performing poems by Rumi at the Dodge Poetry
Festival later this month.

One of many poets at the festival.

It is in Western NJ, near the Pennsylvania border, about a 1 1/2 hour ride from NYC:

http://www.dodgepoetry.org/

take care all,

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

B-52's, Everclear - Free Concert in Cranford

Jon — Fri, 29 Aug 2008 14:57:47 GMT

http://www.topix.com/city/cranford-nj/2008/08/the-b-52s-everclear-headline-musicfest-08

posted in New Jersey - 1 reply

People With Albinism,......

Mon, 04 Aug 2008 19:25:35 GMT

How many People With Albinism are there in New Jersey besides Me?

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

Happy Fourth of July!

Jon — Fri, 04 Jul 2008 18:57:04 GMT

Hope everyone has a fun day!

posted in New Jersey - 1 reply

the nj hat

michael — Wed, 30 Jul 2008 17:12:09 GMT

where can you find one these days? is it possible?

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

The Origin of the NJ Hat

terrapintrading — Thu, 22 Jun 2006 16:20:10 GMT

Can anyone tell me the origin of this marvelous creation?

posted in New Jersey - 11 replies

The Totally Normal Event

WickedFaire — Fri, 20 Jun 2008 04:21:25 GMT

Put on by Jeff Mach, this is his last non-Wicked Faire event for some time. Proceeds will be going to SPARC, Summer Program for Academic Reach and Creativity. It is a nonprofit summer program for gifted adolescents, founded by people closely involved with WickedEvents. It is On June 28th and tickets are $20 in advance, $30 at the door - you can't beat this price for the performers who will be there.

The premise: "The Totally Normal Event takes place in a universe much like our own, only one in which most fantasy, mythology, and science fiction is essentially true. The idea is that, under the guise of being some sort of convention for normal humans who dress up, we're actually those creatures of myth, disguised. Not disguised very well, mind you, but still.

Within the event itself is an enormous world of entertainments, performances, workshops, pleasures, panels, parties, and entertainments.

And we're working on a Secret Project to extend the event outside the confines of time and place..."

Performers include The Dresden Dolls, Sxip and the Luminescent Orchestrii, Freezepop, Barry Louis Polisar, Voltaire, Isaac Bonewits, The White Elephant Burlesque Society (which is worth going just to see them), David W. Jacobsen, Psyche Corporation, Lilith Lore, Captain Velocity, Mary Cyn, Daniel the Jester, The Mighty Mike Saga, Aaron Glotfelter (the Erotic Hypnotist) and Princess Sunshine. This is in addition to all the parties being held by the Tribes (of which there are four: The Makers [mad scientists], The Takers [evil overlords], The Hedonists [do I need to explain that one?], and The Talesenders [Harnessing the power of story] and other smaller happenings including a The Silent Auction, Rock Band Ball, Human Bingo, Screening of Straight On Till Morning, and many, many more.

For those with extra cash, there (as always at events) will be loads of vendors! They include: Speampunk Weaponary, Face/Body painting, Ruff Doggie Styles, Sculptoons, BondcoDSM, Oxelot Cyberlox, Nicholas Leather, Secret Shop, Christina Yoder, Queen of the Cat People, Ishta Arts, The Pointy Eared Artisan, For Your Nymphomation, Radiance Bound, Horror Show Jack, DragonWeave Jewelry, The Drum and Whistle, Nightshade Leather, The Five Wits, Griffons Claw Armoury, Brute Force Leather, Private Island Toys, Crystals, Grendel's Den, David Sklar, and Dragonflame Archery.

And don’t forget the after-parties, they rock!

Also, there will be some pre-event happenings on Friday night as the staff and many, many minions will be there early to set up and there are parties in the works.

www.wickedfaire.com

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

Possible South Jersey Meeting at Wharton State Park

Jim — Sat, 26 Apr 2008 16:31:48 GMT

Hey, I'm trying to get some people together just to chill at Wharton State park at Batsto some time this Summer '08.

I made a post concerning the topic at this forum: http://welcomehere.org/cgi-bin/yabb2/YaBB.pl?board=New_Jersey , but it doesn't appear to have too many members.

I am very serious about this since it would be easy to do and fun, as long as we can get a good amount and the right type of people (youthful and free) to come. We could do drum circles, play frisbee or wiffle ball, play catch, do a watergun fight, etc.

If interested contact me at any of the addresses listed in the post in the above link.

I dont really have any friends on here but to prove that I'm not some weird old shady dude check out my facebook: Jim Flynn (Voorhees, NJ)

posted in New Jersey - 1 reply

First timer going to burningman 08!

Andrew — Sun, 06 Apr 2008 05:48:13 GMT

Hello fellow burners. My name is Andy, and I am FINALLY going to burning man for the first time this year. I have been reading the site and have wanted to go for YEARS............but things never worked out with my schedule. I decided this year that I am going come hell or high water. I have been reading about what I need to bring on the burningman website........but I am hoping to talk with some experienced burners, who can hopefully give me some advice. Also, I am going to be doing this on my own :-( since none of my friends are up for it.......and I am quite nervous about going to the playa alone. I know everyone will be very welcoming and loving, but I am sure you can all understand, it is alot less nerve wracking when you have others going on the adventure with you. If anyone knows others traveling out to the playa from NJ who are looking for travel buddies......I would love to get in touch with them. I have a car, and if I need to do this on my own in my own car, I am going to. I will not let another year go by of me seeing the fabulous pictures and stories from the playa, and missing out on the fun LOL. I am determined to have this experience. Burners I have talked to have all told me that it is a life changing experience. Well, that is all for now.......if anyone can help, I would greatly appreciate it,. If not, I cant wait to see you all on the playa. Much love, Andy

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

New NJ Procedures for DWI Sentencing

Zippi — Wed, 02 Apr 2008 20:11:58 GMT

SUBJ: Procedures for DWI Sentences Previously Stayed by State v. Chun Order

DATE: March 31, 2008

On March 17, 2008, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in State v. Chun, ____ N.J. ____ (2008), holding that the Alcotest breath testing device (Alcotest) is scientifically reliable to measure blood alcohol content (BAC), subject to certain conditions. At the same time, the Court issued an Order which, among other things, vacated the stay it had previously imposed on the execution of sentences of certain driving while intoxicated (DWI) convictions. This memorandum will provide the municipal courts with guidance on how to proceed with the DWI cases in which the stay of execution of sentence has now been vacated.

Identifying the Affected Cases

In courts in which the police have been using the Alcotest to measure BAC, court staff shall develop a list of all DWI cases in which the sentence had been stayed under Chun. In order to do this, the staff should access, in RMDS, the report entitled “Cases on Appeal” (TFC1740), a monthly cumulative report. The staff should review the cases on that report that show the violation number as N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 (DWI), and the appeal status of “ST” (stayed), to determine whether the sentences of those cases had been stayed under Chun. The most recent version of the “Cases on Appeal” report will be available on April 7, 2008. The court staff shall then provide a list of those cases to the municipal prosecutor and the municipal court judge no later than April 12, 2008.

March 31, 2008

Page -2-

Hearing

For those identified cases, the municipal court judge shall schedule court dates as promptly as possible. The court staff shall send notice of the hearing by ordinary mail to defendant and to defense counsel, if any. The staff must also give notice of the hearing date to the municipal prosecutor. The municipal prosecutor, defendant, and defense counsel, if any, must appear at the hearing, which shall take place in open court. At the hearing, the “State shall . . . produce a calculation, in a form consistent with Worksheet A . . . [attached to the opinion in State v. Chun], that ensures that the two [breath] samples meet the acceptable range of tolerance . . . . “ March 17, 2008 Supreme Court Order, State v. Chun, par. 1A(1)(a). Further, “the court shall verify the accuracy of the State’s calculations and . . . make the calculation a part of the record to facilitate further review.” March 17, 2008 Supreme Court Order, State v.Chun, par. 1A(1)(b).

The judge, after verifying the worksheet, must, at the hearing, again inform defendant of the sentence that had been imposed, collect defendant’s driver’s license or licenses, and inform defendant, orally and in writing, of the enhanced penalties for subsequent DWI violations, the penalties for driving while suspended, and the penalties for failing to satisfy the requirements of the Intoxicated Driving Program Unit, even if this information was previously given to defendant at the initial sentencing hearing. N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(b) and (c). However, if defendant or defense counsel raises facially meritorious issues calling into question the admissibility of defendant’s Alcotest reading under Chun, the judge may ask the parties to brief the issues, so that the judge may give the issues thoughtful and deliberate consideration.

Recording Sentence and Notifying the Motor Vehicle Commission

and the Intoxicated Driving Program Unit

Once the sentence has been executed, the court staff must update the ATS system with return appeal (RA). If the sentence imposed is different than the sentence originally imposed and stayed, the court staff must modify the disposition in ATS accordingly. All sentences executed at these hearings, whether modified or not, must be sent to the Motor Vehicle Commission. Instead of sending out a manual MF1 card, the staff should screen print the ATS disposition screen and mail it to:

The Motor Vehicle Commission

225 East State Street

PO BOX 134

Driver Management: Authorization Unit

Trenton, NJ 08666

Attention: Dennis Maddalena

This address is dedicated solely to this purpose.

March 31, 2008

Page -3-

For every affected case, the court must forward an “Order and Certification, Intoxicated Driving and Related Offenses,” detailing the sentence and signed by the defendant, to the Intoxicated Driving Program Unit, even if the court had previously sent one.

Defendant’s Failure to Appear

If defendant fails to appear at the scheduled hearing date, the court may proceed under R. 7:2-2(c) and R. 7:8-9 with suspending defendant’s driver’s license or issuing a warrant. Judges should keep in mind, however, before taking such actions, that some of the affected cases are, by now, over two years old, and defendant thus may have changed address since the last hearing date.

Training for Judges

Judges are reminded that the Administrative Office of the Courts has scheduled three trainings on “Alcotest and State v. Chun Update” on April 22, May 13 and June 27, 2008. All municipal court judges are required to attend one of these three sessions. These trainings will include a comprehensive discussion of the State v. Chun opinion.

If you have questions regarding this policy, please feel free to contact Robert W. Smith, Assistant Director, at (609) 984-8241.

c: Chief Justice Stuart Rabner

Attorney General Anne M. Milgram

Sharon A. Harrington, Chief Administrator, MVC

Ann Wanamaker, Acting Chief, IDP

Assignment Judges

Trial Court Administrators

AOC Directors and Assistant Directors

Presiding Judges—Municipal Court

Municipal Division Managers

John Dell’Aquilo, D.A.G.

Dennis Maddalena

John P. McCarthy, Jr., Director

Steven D. Bonville, Special Assistant

Robert W. Smith, Assistant Director

Lawrence E. Walton, Chief

John Podeszwa, Chief

Debra Jenkins, Chief

Carol A. Welsch, Esq.

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

Is anyone from the atlantic county area 609?

aquixNJ609 — Thu, 27 Mar 2008 01:46:49 GMT

Just curious...

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

Jersey Photos

Jon — Wed, 26 Mar 2008 17:49:22 GMT

World's view of New Jersey

a collection of photos of and about NJ, from around the world

article:

http://www.nj.com/news/ledger/index.ssf?/base/news-13/1206509714119660.xml&coll=1#continue

gallery of photos (samples):

http://www.nj.com/news/ledger/photos/gallery.ssf?cgi-bin/view_gallery.cgi/njo/view_gallery.ata?g_id=9593

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

Strange NJ

foxy — Tue, 18 Mar 2008 21:09:48 GMT

So im always hearing about weird places to visit in NJ, abandoned buildings, old tracks. If you have been, or know abotut hese places please share. I move in August and want to visit as many strange places before i move. And if any of you are down to visit these places with me, let me know.

posted in New Jersey - 1 reply

ALCOTEST

Zippi — Tue, 18 Mar 2008 13:39:27 GMT

3/17/08 – 12:49 pm] This morning, the New Jersey Supreme Court released its long-awaited opinion in the Alcotest case captioned State v. Chun. In a 131-page, unanimous opinion written by Justice Hoens, the Court ruled that the Alcotest 7110 is a scientifically reliable instrument for determining the blood-alcohol concentration of living human beings. Further, subject to a large number of procedural safeguards, the Alcotest can be utilized in the prosecution of intoxicated operators of motor vehicles in New Jersey courts. The specific technical procedures and safeguards to be utilized in Alcotest cases are set forth at the conclusion of the opinion in a comprehensive Court Order.

Among the many findings and conclusions of the Supreme Court are the following:

1. While a minimum breath sample of 1.5 liters of air is appropriate for most subjects, women over 60 years of age are only required to provide a sample of 1.2 liters of air.

2. There will be no requirement that the state install breath-temperature sensors on the Alcotest instruments now in use.

3. Admissibility of Alcotest results are subject to the same standards that were mandated in Romano v. Kimmelman, 96 N.J. 66 (1983); that is two tests that are within 0.01% of each other. The instrument will have to be re-programmed to provide for this standard. Until that time, the Court provides a form in an appendix to the opinion that can be used to calculate whether the breath-test results are within the required tolerance.

4. As recommended by Judge King in his factual findings, the Alcotest instruments in use should be re-examined and recertified by the State twice per year.

5. The alcohol influence report is admissible in evidence and is non-testimonial within the meaning of Crawford v. Washington.

6. There are twelve documents that must be provided by the State in discovery in every Alcotest prosecution. The precise nature of these documents and their contents are listed in the opinion and set forth in the Court’s order.

7. The manufacturer of the Alcotest must provide training at a reasonable price to the New Jersey defense bar on the operation of the Alcotest.

8. The manufacturer must make public any future revisions to the software that runs the Alcotest through the State Bar Assoc.

9. The Chun “stay order” from January 2006 is now vacated and pending cases are to be resolved in conformity with the Court’s order at the end of the case.

10. The State must establish an on-going Alcotest result database that will be available to the defense bar.

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

Mana-Fest @ Seed NEWARK, NJ

gizem bacaz — Wed, 20 Feb 2008 06:30:45 GMT

SEED GALLERY
cultivating visionary exploration
239 Washington Street
Newark, NJ 07102
http://newarkseed.com

MANA-FEST
2.22.08
8pm-3am

Join us for an evening of bliss! Support the Seed so it can continue to grow and plan more events for the future.
The evening is devoted to experimental performance art and collaborative fusions of sound and light.

Visual Performances:
Warren C. Fry
Reid Bingham
Philippe Garcesto
Gizem Bacaz
Analiese De Saw
Teo Olivieri
Neal Iannone
Asad Khan

Fire:Alien Ambassador

VJ's
Kaliptus
Domino

Sound
DJ L-ement

DJ Skin Tight

DJ Goodwill

TIme=Art

$20

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

Free Drum & Dance Performance March 8 Willingboro, NJ

alexia — Mon, 11 Feb 2008 16:40:53 GMT

Drum & Dance Learning Center Ensemble
Performance
Women's History Month Program
Saturday, March 8, 2008

2:00 - 3:30pm
@ The Kennedy Center
429 JFK Boulevard, Willingboro, NJ
Free Performance - Reservations suggested (609) 265-5068

Celebrating Women, Past and Present Music & Dance from:
West Africa
Spain
North Africa
the Middle East
the Caribbean and more!!
Read the September 2007 Showcase review: http://www.drumdancecenter.com/2007review.html

Performers
Kim Leary, Dave Merritt, Dan DiFlavis, Gus Johnson, Alex Lewko, Kazutaka Horinouchi, Donna Manalo, Kirsten Mascioli, Naylon Dunbar, LaToya Morgan, Janessa Jones, Jennifer Bridgewater, Dawn Davis, Marilyn Ham, Erika Meyer, Mary Nogami, Suzanne Onesti, Stephanie Campbell, Aisha Khan, Rosibel Mota, Donna Sullivan and Vino Iyer.

Guest Artists:
Audrey Davis
Patricia Irizarry - Barreto
Lisa Botalico

Sponsored by the Burlington County Board of Chosen Freeholders; Department of Resource Conservation; Division of Cultural & Heritage Affairs and Tourism. Also made possible in part by funds from the New Jersey State Council on the Arts/Department of State, a Partner Agency of the National Endowment for the Arts.

For more info about classes and workshops at the Drum & Dance Learning Center, visit our website: www.drumdancecenter.com

posted in New Jersey - 1 reply

Salon of Visionaries, Microcosm Gallery

gizem bacaz — Sat, 09 Feb 2008 22:14:20 GMT

February 7, 2008- March 29, 2008

MicroCoSm Gallery Presents "Salon of Visionaries", a show of iris giclee prints of some of visionary art's living masters. The term iris giclee describes a contemporary category of printmaking in which signed limited edition fine art prints of archival quality are produced from digital source using ink-jet printing.

The collection of prints are affordable, framed and ready to hang! Great opportunity to begin a collection, or complete one.

Artists:
Paul Laffoley
Mars-1
Robert Venosa
Martina Hoffmann
Carey Thompson
Luke Brown
Robin Larsen
Mikio Kennedy
Michele Wortman
Alex Grey
Allyson Grey
and more...

Microcosm Gallery is open Tue-Sat 11-6
542 West 27th Street, NYC 4th Floor
212-594-8841
contact Gizem Bacaz, manager@microcosmgallery.com
more info: http://www.microcosmgallery.com
or, http://www.cosm.org

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

Missing Person - Update

Jon — Sat, 24 Nov 2007 20:31:51 GMT

Hi Folks..

Awhile ago, I passed this along...about a Tribe sister who's son Chris has been missing since September.

(Here is the website:http://www.findchris.org/)

There is some news! It is the first lead in the case!

"Today a girl working at a gas station in Cortez, CO says' she can positively identify Chris as a boy that has come in several time, most recently with 2-3 day, trying to buy cigarettes..."

Here's hoping that the good folks in law enforcement can take this lead and finally bring Chris home!

Please send out some good vibes and, if you could, pass this info along to anyone you know in Colorado
and especially in the Cortez area.

Here is a link to a map for Cortez, CO:

http://maps.google.com/maps?q=Cortez,+CO,+USA&sa=X&oi=map&ct=title

thanks,

Jon

PS - Wendy from the Tribe Net staff has given me permission to cross post

posted in New Jersey - 2 replies

be careful where you drive in NJ

Zippi — Mon, 28 Jan 2008 02:01:53 GMT

Last July, the Attorney General promulgated Directive 2007-02 which requires that law enforcement officers obtain information from people who have been arrested for drunk driving that relates to the commercial establishment where they had their last drinks. Following a waiver of the right to remain silent, the law enforcement officer is now required to question the DWI defendant on what kinds of alcoholic drinks he has had, how many and where. Evidence that the defendant consumed his drinks in a commercial establishment must be recorded and forwarded to other New Jersey enforcement agencies for analysis. The information gleaned from these data can be used by law enforcement for the purpose of DWI enforcement associated with a particular commercial establishment.

The up shot is you can be pulled over for nothing at all solely because you drove past one of these places.

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

Photo traffic light enforcement

Zippi — Wed, 16 Jan 2008 19:41:25 GMT

Yesterday, the governor signed into law an amendment to Title 39 that establishes a pilot program which will permit traffic control device enforcement to be made via digital photography at intersections. The photographs made by the cameras would used to establish a violation of NJSA 39:4-81 and other statutes related to red lights. For purposes of this statute, the owner and driver would be jointly and severally liable for the violation. Process in the form of a summons will be issued by a law enforcement officer for this violation. In addition, unlike other red light violations, no motor vehicle penalty points or insurance eligibility points will be assessed for violations enforced by way of a camera at an intersection. The text of the statute follows:

The Legislature finds:

The disregard of traffic control devices at intersections impedes the efficient flow of traffic, and more importantly, dramatically increases the likelihood of accidents that endanger the safety and well being of motor vehicle occupants and pedestrians.

The installation and use of a traffic control signal monitoring2 system, which complements the efforts of local law enforcement, 1 could1 serve as an effective tool in encouraging drivers to strictly obey traffic control devices at intersections, facilitating the flow of traffic and protecting the safety and well being of motor vehicle occupants and pedestrians.

The Legislature, therefore, declares:

It is altogether fitting and proper, and within the public interest, to require the Commissioner of Transportation to establish a pilot program to determine the effectiveness of the installation and utilization of traffic control signal monitoring systems in this State and to approve applications municipalities where such systems may be installed.1

2. As used in this act:

“Recorded image” means a digital image recorded by a traffic control signal monitoring system .

"Summons" means a citation alleging a violation of a traffic control signal.

“Traffic control signal” means a device, whether manually, electrically, mechanically 2,2 or otherwise controlled 2,2 by which traffic is alternatively directed to stop and to proceed 2, and2 which has been approved by the Commissioner of Transportation in accordance with the "Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways."1

“Traffic control signal monitoring system” means an integrated system or device utilizing a camera 2, or a multiple camera system,2 and vehicle sensors which work in conjunction with a traffic control signal and is capable of producing:

a. high resolution color digital recorded images that show: (1) the traffic control signal while it is displaying a red light; (2) a motor vehicle unlawfully entering and continuing through2 the intersection while the traffic control signal is displaying a red light; and (3) a portion of the rear of the motor vehicle unlawfully in the intersection sufficient to clearly reveal the vehicle’s license plate and the make and model of the vehicle; and

b. a video recording of the violation 2that shows the violation occurring2.

A digital camera may be used as part of a traffic control signal monitoring system provided the violation images are captured by a digital camera , or a multiple camera system,2 which produces a set of 2at least2 two images for each violation. At least one of the digital color images shall contain the following: (1) the scene of the location where the violation occurred; (2) the violating motor vehicle; (3) 2 the license plate numbers, letters 2,2 and issuing jurisdiction; (4)2 the day, month 2,2 and year of the violation; (5)2 the time of the violation in hours, minutes 2,2 and seconds; (6)2 the amount of time that had passed between the time the light turned red and the violation occurred; and (7) the frame sequence code2. This information shall be imprinted along the bottom or top edge of the image frame so as not to obstruct the violation image.

13. a. The Commissioner of Transportation shall establish a 2five-year2 pilot program to determine the effectiveness of the installation and utilization of traffic control signal monitoring systems in this State. A municipality desiring to participate in the program shall submit an application to the Commissioner of Transportation. The application shall include:

(1) The intersection or intersections in the municipality at which it is desired to install and utilize a traffic control signal monitoring system;

(2) Data which indicate that the intersection or intersections in question have a high number of violations of the traffic control signals, and any additional safety data the municipality deems appropriate;

(3) A certification by the municipal engineer that (a) the intersection or intersections in question have a minimum duration of the amber light at the traffic control signal of three seconds if at least 85 percent of the vehicular traffic approaching the signal is traveling at a speed of 25 miles per hour or less; and (b) for each five mile increase in the speed of vehicular traffic referred to in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph above 30 miles per hour this minimum duration of the amber light shall be increased by one-half second.

(4) Such other information as the Commissioner of Transportation may require.

The commissioner may approve as many2 municipalities making application 2as he deems appropriate,2 and shall indicate which of the intersections in those applications are approved for the installation and utilization of traffic control signal monitoring systems.

b. Notwithstanding the provisions of P.L.1992, c.91 (C.39:4-103.1 et seq.), the governing body of a municipality, by ordinance, may determine to install and utilize a traffic control signal monitoring system to facilitate the lawful observance of and compliance with traffic control signals governing the flow of traffic at intersections under its jurisdiction approved by the Commissioner of Transportation pursuant to subsection a. of this section.

c. A traffic control signal monitoring system installed and utilized pursuant to this section shall be of a type approved by the governing body of the municipality.

d. In any municipality where the governing body has authorized the installation and use of a traffic control signal monitoring system pursuant to subsection b. of this section, a sign notifying drivers that such a monitoring system is being utilized shall be placed on each street converging into the affected intersection. The sign shall be of a design and 2[shall be]2 placed in accordance with specifications approved by the municipal engineer. The specifications so approved shall conform with the uniform system set forth in the "Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways."

e. A traffic control signal monitoring system shall be inspected and certified at least once every six2 months by the municipal engineer2 from the date of its installation for the duration of the five-year pilot program prescribed by P.L. , c. (C. ) (pending before the Legislature as this bill)2.

4. a. In any municipality where the governing body has authorized the installation and use of a traffic control signal monitoring system, a law enforcement official of such municipality shall review the recorded images produced by the traffic control signal monitoring system. In conducting such review, the law enforcement official shall determine whether there is sufficient evidence to conclude that a traffic control signal violation has occurred and shall issue a summons where it is deemed appropriate.2 1A traffic control signal violation summons issued pursuant to a traffic control signal monitoring system established in accordance with this act shall be served by a law enforcement official in accordance with the Rules of Court. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the recorded images produced by the traffic control signal monitoring system shall be available for the exclusive use of any law enforcement official for the purposes of discharging the official’s duties pursuant to P.L. , c. (C. ) (pending before the Legislature as this bill). Any recorded image or information produced in connection with the traffic control signal monitoring system shall not be deemed a public record under P.L.1963, c.73 (C.47:1A-1 et seq.) or the common law concerning access to public records. The recorded images shall not be discoverable as a public record by any person, entity, or governmental agency, except upon a subpoena issued by a grand jury or a court order in a criminal matter, nor shall they be offered in evidence in any civil or administrative proceeding not directly related to a traffic control signal violation.

Any recorded image or information produced in connection with the traffic control signal monitoring system pertaining to a specific violation shall be purged and not retained later than 60 days after the collection of any fine or penalty. If a law enforcement official does not issue a summons for a traffic control signal violation within 40 business days, all recorded images and information collected pertaining to that alleged violation shall be purged within two business days. Any municipality operating a traffic control signal monitoring system shall certify compliance with this subsection in the report required to be filed with the Commissioner of Transportation pursuant to section 6 of P.L. , c. (C. ) (pending before the Legislature as this bill)2.

b.1 Except as provided in subsection c. of this section, the owner and operator shall be jointly liable for a traffic control signal violation issued pursuant to a traffic control signal monitoring system established in accordance with this act, unless the owner can show that the vehicle was used without his consent, express or implied. An owner who pays any fine, penalty, civil judgment, costs or administrative fees in connection with a traffic control signal violation issued pursuant to a traffic control signal monitoring system shall have the right to recover that sum from the operator in a court of competent jurisdiction.

c.. The owner of a motor vehicle who is a lessor shall not be liable for a traffic control signal violation summons issued pursuant to this act when the motor vehicle is under the control or in the possession of the lessee, if upon notice of a traffic control signal violation, the owner of the motor vehicle which was leased at the time of the offense notifies the clerk of the court where the case is pending, by an affidavit2 of the name and address of the lessee. The affidavit2 shall be in a form prescribed by the Administrative Director of the Courts.

After providing the name and address of the lessee, the owner shall not be required to attend a hearing of the offense, unless otherwise notified by the court.

2d. In no case shall motor vehicle points or automobile insurance eligibility points pursuant to section 26 of P.L.1990, c.8 (C.17:33B-14) be assessed against any person for a violation occurring under the provisions of this act.

e. It shall not be a defense to any traffic control signal violation that the signs required to be posted pursuant to subsection c. of section 3 of P.L. , c. (C. ) (pending before the Legislature as this bill), notifying drivers that a traffic control signal monitoring system is being utilized, are not posted or are improperly posted.2

5.2 The Commissioner of Transportation, the Chief Administrator of the Motor Vehicle Commission, and the Superintendent of the State Police may, in accordance with the “Administrative Procedure Act,” P.L.1968, c.410 (C.52:14B-1 et seq.), promulgate rules and regulations to effectuate the purposes of this act. The Supreme Court of New Jersey may adopt Rules of Court appropriate or necessary to effectuate the purposes of this act.

6. The municipalities whose applications have been approved for the pilot program established pursuant to this act shall submit reports 2every 12 months after a traffic control signal monitoring system has been installed2 to the Commissioner of Transportation detailing increases or decreases in violations and accidents at intersections where traffic control signal monitoring systems have been installed. 2The2 Commissioner of Transportation shall prepare and submit an annual report to the Governor, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the General Assembly, and the Senate Transportation Committee and the Assembly Transportation and Public Works Committee or their successor committees describing the pilot program developed pursuant to this act, including accident and violation information reported by the affected municipalities.The first such report shall be submitted no later than one year after the installation of the first traffic control signal monitoring system authorized pursuant to this act. Thereafter, subsequent reports shall be submitted annually for the duration of the five-year pilot program prescribed by P.L. , c. (C. ) (pending before the Legislature as this bill), with the fifth and final report providing a comprehensive review of the pilot program, including but not limited to, an evaluation of the program’s effectiveness, a discussion of extending the program to other intersections in the State, and any other information relevant to the report.

7. This act shall take effect ninety days following enactment and shall expire upon the submission of the Commissioner of Transportation’s fifth and final report to the appropriate parties pursuant to section 6 of this act.

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

neat and inspiring story

Jon — Sun, 13 Jan 2008 20:46:34 GMT

80 Year Old Doctor Still Doing House Calls!

http://blog.nj.com/iamnj/2007/12/mickey_mintz.html

I was actually treated by this guy.Kind of an ornery old guy, but with a real devotion to medical care, to people, to healing.

He caught my hypoglycemia. And once he saw that my blood sugar was profoundly off, he immediately was extremely concerned and extremely devoted to me getting proper treatment.

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

Corzine's taxes begin to emerge

Zippi — Tue, 08 Jan 2008 16:24:28 GMT

Tolls would rise every four years and be extended to Route 440 as part of the financial restructuring plan Gov. Jon Corzine is expected to offer up in his State of the State speech today, according to individuals involved in crafting the plan.

The Star-Ledger has learned that any new or increased tolls proposed in the plan would not be collected until at least 2010, the year after Corzine would stand for re-election. A source with direct knowledge of the plan confirmed Statehouse reports of a 50 percent toll hike every four years mixed with annual cost of living increases.

That would mean the average Turnpike toll for a motorist paying in cash would rise from the current $1.92 to nearly $10 by 2022. [...]

The individuals involved in drawing up the plan said Corzine agreed to tolls on Route 440 -- five miles of highway between the New Jersey Turnpike and the Outerbridge Crossing to Staten Island -- because 30 percent to 40 percent of the motorists using the road are from out of state.

posted in New Jersey - 1 reply

Ore Tenus State v. Chhun - - The Video~!!

Zippi — Tue, 08 Jan 2008 22:54:04 GMT

The New Jersey Supreme Court held final argument yesterday in the Alcotest 7110 Reliability case captioned State v. Chun. The following link will permit you to view the argument of counsel and the questioning from the Justices.

mms://a556.v193115.c19311.g.vm.akamaistream.net/7/556/19311/v0001/yorkmedia.download.akamai.com/19311/wm.yorktelecom/NJ/Judiciary/20080107/A_96_06.wmv

posted in New Jersey - 1 reply

In another forum There as a post

Zippi — Thu, 03 Jan 2008 15:34:36 GMT

Where a person was complaining about taxes how the money got spent and feeling as though that person had absolutely no voice.

I posted this in response:
****************************************************************

You have what is often referred to as a "representative form of government."
That means you elect representatives who are supposed to "represent you." Of course there are problems with this.
The problem with such a thing begins with the fact that your reps are humans just like you and they have flaws and weaknesses just like you. Another problem is that there are a whole lot of "you" and trying to sort out all of the many many "yous" out there and distill all their bleating whining demands into some articulated focused mandate is - - well - - it's a lot of work.

And of course once you put the Reps in office they will tend to try to use that office to make themselves more powerful and wealthy and to defend those things as well as they can. They are, after all, only human.

Then there is the problem of others not in government who accrete power wanting more. They are the special interests (SI) who trade favors with your reps. There are all kinds of SIs from corporate to NGO - you name it. The SIs have money and they have individuals who belong to the SIs. Those individuals donate money through PACs run by the SIs. Those individual contributions are collected in large funds and the SIs use these funds to bend the Reps ( your Reps) to their will. They get to be the voices the Reps hear almost exclusively because they are the ones with the access and the clearly articulated focused voices. They also have all the money.

So the Reps give them things to keep them coming back with their money and demands. Your reps make special interest pandering laws and produce ear marks. A nice big PAC can accrete a staggering lot of money. It's perfectly legal as each contributor is donating their own small sum and the PAC presents it as exactly that - individual sums - except they are all in one big beautiful bundle.

You ( the individual) on the other hand are just one whimpering, whiny, impetuous, unfocused, tangential, inarticulate, very small voice and you never - ever - get heard.

"But But But" you complain "they are supposed to be my representatives." "MINE~!!"

Yah you are correct they are supposed to be. However, they are also the reps for those persons who belong to the SIs and donate to the PACs. Those people are smarter than you. They did something you have not done:
1.) They organized.
2.) They focused their interest into a single well articulated easy to understand voice.
3.) They made sure they had access by putting their money together in a large pool and waved it in front of their Reps..
4.) They demanded that their Reps ( they do see them as their Reps and they are correct ) pay close attention and meet their demands BEFORE making all that lovely money available.
5.) Then they donated it.

What have you done~? The SIs haven't done anything you can't do. The only difference is that they actually did something.

Look at all those stupid spoiled snot-nosed morons who protest and march and stamp about screaming all manner of stupid shit (protesters they are called). Who the hell wants to be associated with those run-a-muck fools~? Those dirty screaming brats? Certainly not an educated sophisticated person who troubled themselves to get elected~!! No wonder they don't get heard.

The Elected Legislators prefer to listen to those among the SIs who are also sophisticated and present as educated who come bearing lovely gifts, using reasoned tones, and know which fork to use & when.

What if instead of engaging in destructive noisy pointless pity parties in the streets as the snot-nose morons do waving their inane signs signs and banners and howling stupid infantile slogans and chants - - what if they put all that effort into organizing and developing a SI and a PAC and did it right? What if they hired a real lobbyist with an education and some personal class to present their demands along with that ever necessary bag of money all dependent on a sure promise of all due attention?? Do you think they might have a voice then?

The only problem with this is that you the individual are still not going to get heard. Not as a single person anyway. You need to prioritize you interests.
***************************************************

And of course it's all true. Money talks everything else walks.

I have a little Activist Tribe called "LEGALIZE IT" It's dedicated to the legalization of marijuana. Ya might want to check it out.

Along that vein, I'd like to form a NJ specific PAC ( yah a Special Interest group) that can present to our legislators with the erudition and sophistication of an educated well financed entity with the ever necessary big bag of money designed to bend the will of the politician to legalizing marijuana.

To do that I need people. People who are willing to prioritize their interests along that path.
I need people who will do grass roots recruiting and gather donations and signatures.

If you are similarly inclined you might want to contact me.
I bring a Doctorate and a NJ law license to the party.

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

Happy New Year!

Jon — Wed, 02 Jan 2008 15:08:32 GMT

Happy New Year Everyone!

Hope you all had a good New Year's and wishing everyone

new joy, hope and spirituality in the coming year!

My favorite image of Happiness is from Peanuts, when

Snoopy is dancing to some music and he's staring up at

the ceiling with a big grin on his face!

http://modernartobsession.blogs.com/modern_art_obsession/images/snoopy_dance.jpg

May All Our Hearts Dance With That Joy and Freedom!

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

Belly Dance, West African Dance, Zumba

alexia — Mon, 31 Dec 2007 17:59:27 GMT

Next six week session begins Jan 12
Register Now!

Jan 3 - West African Dance with Audrey Davis
Jan 5 - Belly Dance Folkloric Fusion
Jan 5 - Funk Fusion Dance Workout
Jan 8 - Belly Dance Floorwork Workshop with Rayhana
Jan 9 - Conditioning for Dance: Pilates with Phil
Jan 10 - Zumba! Latin Dance workout with Vin
Jan 10 - Belly Dance Drum Solo Choreography: Sahra Saidi
Jan 10 - Middle Eastern Percussion
Jan 10 - West African Percussion

Register Now!
www.drumdancecenter.com/registration.html

The Drum & Dance Learning Center
The Barracks Trading Post Plaza
Rt 206 & Elizabeth St
Bordentown, NJ
609-324-7383

posted in New Jersey - 1 reply

Merry Christmas

Jon — Sun, 23 Dec 2007 14:39:40 GMT

Merry Christmas!

http://www.liverpoolmuseums.org.uk/picture-of-month/graphics/large/christ_blessing_haydon.jpg

Have A Nice Holiday Everyone!

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

Long Branch Music Awards

drogulus — Thu, 29 Nov 2007 20:46:13 GMT

Its the 1st annual Long Branch Music Awards, complete with prizes and chaos...everything you could want in an awards show and more!

Bands:
The Sex Zombies
the Invincible Gods
the killyous
Mau Mau Tsunami
Sunshine Flipside

tomorrow 11/30/07 at the Brighton Bar, Long Branch, NJ
Doors at 9
$10 to get it.

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

Intimate Networks

ralph — Thu, 29 Nov 2007 15:14:32 GMT

Hey.
My wife told me recently that she would like to establish friendships with people because we have been friendless for a couple of years now.(shed tears here)Actually, we HAD some friends, but they have either moved far away or have gotten insane from right-wing nut politics. We are Liberal/Progressives, we are Catholic, but she is more serious about "religion" than he is. He is the more political of the two. She wants to raise our 3 kids with decent, moral, ethical values, but I argue that you DON'T need a "church" for that. He is more spiritual than religious. Anyway, we desire friendships with other couples who are more or less similar to us. I've only just heard about Polyamory, and have not introduced the concept to her just yet. I don't want her to think that it's just a bunch of New Age hippies engaging in hedonistic swinger group sex. Although, that does sound kinda fun.
I basically want to know how to learn more about the Intimate Network philosophy, either through books, websites or even a chat with real people who know about this stuff. Just post your replies here and I'll get to it when time allows. We're not in a terrible hurry, but I want to start working on this soon after the holidays. Our dancecard is REALLY full right now. I'll fill out the profiles and stuff as soon as I get a chance.Thanks.

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

Happy Thanksgiving!

Jon — Thu, 22 Nov 2007 16:01:38 GMT

Wishing everyone a very happy Thanksgiving.

take care all,

Jon

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

December Dance Class Specials at DDLC

alexia — Mon, 12 Nov 2007 17:37:33 GMT

Class card only $100 - Save $15
Good for 2 months from date of purchase

Check out all the awesome classes this December! Drop -in OK too!
www.drumdancecenter.com/registration.html

Tuesday 7:00 - 8:00 pm Conditioning for Dance
(Open Level) Pre-Registration Suggested, Drop in & Class Card OK
December 4, 11 & 18 $50

Tuesday 8:15 - 9:15 pm Belly Dance (Intermediate)
Finger Cymbals & Combos/Veil
(DDLC Belly Dance Adv Beg Two & instructor's permission) Pre-Registration Suggested, Drop in & Class Card OK
December 4, 11 & 18 $50

Wednesday 6:45 - 7:45 pm Belly Dance Veil Open Level
Pre-Registration Recommended, Drop in or class card OK
Some viels available to borrow.
December 5, 12 & 19 $50

Wednesday 8:00 - 9:00 pm Belly Dance Folkloric Fusion (Open Level)
Pre-Registration Recommended, Drop in & class card OK
December 5, 12 & 19 $50

Thursday 7:00 - 8:00 pm Belly Dance: Folkloric Fusion
(DDLC Belly Dance Adv Beg One and above) Pre-Registration Recommended, Drop in & Class card OK
December 6, 13 & 20 $50

Thursday 8:15 – 9:15 pm Belly Dance Gypsy Fusion (Open Level)
Pre-Registration Recommemded, Drop in & class card OK
December 6, 13 & 20 $50

Thursday 7:00 - 8:00pm Middle Eastern Drum Class(Open Level) Pre-registration Recommended, Drop-in or class card OK
December 6, 13 & 20
$50

Thursday 8:15 - 9:15 pm West African Drum Class(Open Level) Pre-registration recommended, Drop-in or Class card OK
December 6, 13 & 20
$50

Saturday 9:30 - 11:00 am Belly Dance Basics (Open Level)Pre-Registration Required
December 1, 8, 15 & 22 $80

Saturday 11:15 am - 12:15 pm Belly Dance: Combinations
(DDLC Belly Dance Basics Required) Pre-Registration Recommended, Drop in or class card OK
December 1, 8, 15 & 22 $60

Monday 11:00 am - 12:00 pm Funk Fusion Workout
(Open Level) Pre-Registration Recommended, Drop in or class card OK
December 31 $15

all classes at
The Drum & Dance Learning Center
Barracks Trading Post Plaza
Rt 206 & Elizabeth St
Bordentown, NJ
(609) 324-7383

Directions: www.drumdancecenter.com/map.html

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

Wood Smoke Dangers

Jon — Mon, 15 Oct 2007 04:13:13 GMT

With 70,000 chemicals already in our air and water, adding just that extra bit of smoke to already polluted air, is not a wise thing to do.

http://burningissues.org/car-www/index.html

Sure, I understand the nice feeling of a fire on a holiday.

But if you burn wood day in and day out, that smoke is going to spread to an area large enough to impact the breathing of at least several asthmatics.

Asthma has become a rampant problem in our society today. And much of the asthma going on is not a "breathing problem," but a pollution problem, however much the companies involved want to spin it to be something else. Pollution is ruining the breathing of many, many, many people. And it is particularly horrible in already heavily polluted areas like Northern New Jersey and New York City.

If you can avoid added to the problem, please do so and save someone from choking on their breath.

And, of course, the next asthma victim could be you or your kids. Wood smoke is good for no one.

posted in New Jersey - 6 replies

Tribal Belly Dance Classes offered in East Windsor, NJ

jennA — Tue, 06 Nov 2007 17:27:19 GMT

Tribal Belly Dance Classes offered in East Windsor, NJ
held at One Yoga & Wellness Center - www.oneyogacenter.net
405 Route 130, North - Lower Level - East Windsor, NJ 08520

American Tribal Style Belly Dance is a fusion style inspired
by traditional belly dance movements blended with
stylistic influences from India, Asia, Africa, Spain and the Middle East.
The movements are strong and sensual, and showcase the beauty of the dancers.
This dance is unique in that is it performed as a
“tribe” using improvisational cues to lead and follow one another.

in Tribal Basics, we will be learning the basic movements
and work our way up to dancing successfully as a group.
All ages, shapes, sizes and experience levels are encouraged.

Tribal Basics class will be held at the
One Yoga & Wellness Center
on Wednesdays at 7:15-8:15pm
starting December 12th. Fee will be $16 per class
or $150 for entire 10 week session
For more information, email Jenna at
jennabellybare@hotmail.com

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

California Fires Info

Jon — Wed, 24 Oct 2007 13:27:36 GMT

If folks want to see if their friends and relatives are ok...

here is the website for info about the California Fires, complete with maps:

http://www.calfires.com/

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

For South Jersey Folks

Jon — Tue, 16 Oct 2007 14:04:10 GMT

Buddhist Monk Speaking

Buddhism Monk Dharma Talk in Philadelphia

October 26, 2007
7:30-10pm
McCleland Conference Room
Pennsylvania Hospital
800 Spruce Street
Philadelphia, PA 19107

Dharma talks are engaging and informative, and

each one is a unique experience.
Master Thich Thien Son has been applauded by

Buddhist masters from the east,western business leaders, and students from around
the globe.His talks often bring to light what western psychologyand the latest scientific
research leaves in the dark. Thich Thien Son provides students with the foundation for insight
and the tools to create confidence and harmony within.

(Complimenting the Dharma talks are Zen Workshops
conducted by Master Thich Thien Son and his
student Hue Gioi,an American born monk)

for more information:

www.phathue.com

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

NJ pedophile, famous again.

Zippi — Fri, 28 Sep 2007 15:05:54 GMT

foxnews.com

Philadelphia

Seven years ago, Russian courts convicted a wealthy American motel owner of molesting children, sent him to prison, then expelled him from the country.

The experience did little to keep Anthony "Mark" Bianchi stateside. Over the next few years, U.S. officials allege, he traveled to Moldova, Romania, Cambodia and Cuba to recruit destitute boys for sexual trysts.

Bianchi, 44, of North Wildwood, N.J., faces trial beginning Monday under a controversial federal law aimed at thwarting "sex tourism." He is accused in this country of committing crimes — assaulting nearly a dozen minors — on foreign soil.

More than 50 cases have been brought under what's known as the Protect Act, and more than 30 of the defendants have been convicted, the Justice Department says.

So far, however, only one federal appeals court — the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals — has reviewed the law, upholding it in a 2-1 ruling. The U.S. Supreme Court decided not to hear an appeal of that decision.

Critics, including dissenting 9th U.S. Circuit Judge Warren J. Ferguson, charge that Congress reached too far in giving international police power to U.S. prosecutors. Ferguson asked if U.S. agents should likewise round up Americans who buy marijuana in Amsterdam or Cuban cigars in Timbuktu.

"It is a very unusual theory to say that you can prosecute an American citizen in this country for actions taken completely in another country," said Rory Little, a former federal prosecutor and Justice Department official who is now a University of California law professor. "This is not a crime against America, although it's a crime against universal morality."

The majority in the 9th Circuit case found the law to be an appropriate extension of the Constitution's foreign commerce clause, since money changed hands.

The 9th Circuit case involved Michael L. Clark, a 70-year-old Seattle man who in 2004 became the first person prosecuted under the law. He pleaded guilty to molesting boys in Cambodia, while reserving the right to challenge the law itself, and is serving a 97-month sentence.

Beyond the constitutional issues, attorneys say defending clients in these cases is a nightmare, in part because they can't match the overseas investigative resources, including diplomatic and political clout, of the U.S. government.

"To do this in a foreign country, you have to send an investigator over there, and that person has to make contacts in the community. That may not be possible, given the language differences and cultural differences," said Michael Filipovic, an assistant federal public defender in Seattle.

In the case due to start Monday, prosecutors charge that Bianchi assaulted nearly a dozen teenagers and plied them with money, liquor, gifts and trips.

"Americans go to these countries and create a pretty bad image," Assistant U.S. Attorney Michael Levy said. "A hundred dollars can buy a lot of food for a pretty long time for a lot of these families. ... This is the kind of case that shows why there's a need for this (law)."

Bianchi's lawyer, Mark Geragos, said the discovery process has shown what defense attorneys are up against in such cases. He said records make it difficult to even verify the age of the reported victims, and he planned to argue that several of the boys recanted their accusations.

posted in New Jersey - 1 reply

been strip searched lately?

Zippi — Thu, 27 Sep 2007 20:37:35 GMT

NJ County To Pay Up to 20,000 People Wrongly Strip Searched PDF Print E-mail
Thursday, 06 September 2007

The Trentonian

Mount Laurel, New Jersey

Camden County has agreed to pay $7.5 million to settle a lawsuit with people illegally strip searched at the county jail between 2003 and 2005.

A lawyer for the plaintiffs said that as many as 20,000 people may have been improperly searched and could be eligible for the money, which he said he expects to come to about $1,000 per person.

A smaller group of people who were held as long as 24 hours even after they posted bail could get even more, said Charles J. LaDuca, one of the lawyers for the plaintiffs.

The two original plaintiffs, Laverne Hicks and Michael Velez, are entitled to $15,000 each under the terms of the settlement.
Both were arrested on minor charges and strip searched.

In a court filing, Hicks said he arrested for not paying a previous traffic ticket. He paid his bail of $168, then was strip searched.

Velez said he was held for about 10 hours while police checked into whether he had any outstanding warrants. He had none.

The settlement must be approved by a federal judge before it takes effect.

The plaintiffs say that it was the policy of the jail for about two years to strip search every one sent to the jail awaiting trial, even if there was no reason to think the suspects were hiding contraband on their body.

Also, they said, some people who were arrested on charges as minor as failure to pay parking tickets we held in jail for up to 24 hours after they had paid bail while officials checked to see if there were other warrants out for them.

The measures came amid broad efforts to reduce crime in Camden, a city that consistently ranks as one of the nation's most crime-ridden.

LaDuca, who works in Washington, said the detention practice is one he has not seen elsewhere in the many similar cases he has handled.

But the strip searches, he said, happen in many jails.

"It's more common than you would ever imagine," he said.

LaDuca said that several federal judges have ruled that authorities may not strip search suspects in non-felony cases unless they have reasonable suspicion of contraband. If so, the searches are conducted in private and only in the presence of corrections officers of the same gender as the detainee.

Jail officials in Camden County stopped conducting the routine strip searches after the lawsuit was filed in April 2005.

A spokesman for Camden County did not immediately return a call seeking comment.

posted in New Jersey - 2 replies

Sad News

Jon — Mon, 10 Sep 2007 22:54:23 GMT

Sad News

Someone in my friends network here on Tribe Net is experiencing some real problems.

Her son has now been missing for seven days.

Here is the news article:

http://boards.courttv.com/showthread.php?s=4224a720d737d5fdc0475258fd04b73a&threadid=310444

And here is her profile page:

http://people.tribe.net/artistpriestess

Please send her and her son some good vibes.

Thanks,

Jon

posted in New Jersey - 1 reply

who is in the mood for a sunday potluck?

PixieKelly — Mon, 17 Sep 2007 12:39:12 GMT

I'm opening my home to all you wonderful jersey tribers on 9/23 for a potluck....I live all the way out in W. Jerz near P'burg.... send me your email if you would like an evite... hopefully the weather will cooperate with us.....

posted in New Jersey - 1 reply

Grocery Delivery

Jon — Thu, 16 Aug 2007 20:26:12 GMT

If you use or know someone who uses a home grocery delivery service, please be careful.

I am now at about 7 deliveries in a row where the food is coming to the house with barely any refrigeration.

(I am disabled and homebound, so I don't have many options).

I have used both Shop Rite and Peapod.

One of the Peapod drivers admitted that they pack the stuff in dry ice at 11 PM the night before! the delivery!

If they do the delivery at 2PM the next day...that is 15 hours later!

No wonder the food isn't cold.

To my understanding this is a violation of the law and it will certainly give food poisoning to whoever is unlucky enough not to catch what is going on before they put it in their fridge.

I called the health department, but I guess they were too busy sorting through their bribes to take any action.

posted in New Jersey - 4 replies

Cool New Jersey

Jon — Sun, 17 Jun 2007 22:10:18 GMT

Thought I might start of thread of neat and cool things to do in Jersey, and especially the out of the way places, that only the locals know about.

I posted some of these in the recommendations section:

They include the Montclair Art Museum

(The Newark Museum is great too!)

The Dodge Poetry Festival

The Duke Gardens

The Raptor Trust (sanctuary for wild injured raptors, including hawks, eagles and more)

The Montclair Hawk Watch

Ray's Pizza in Verona

Montclair has two great places for amazing breakfast crepes...one is on Church Street, right near the back entrance to the theater and the other is in that Watchung Plaza area, just across from the gas station. (if you really want to indulge, try the dessert crepe with chestnut paste! yum!!!!!)

Emack and Bolio Ice Cream in Millburn, just off Millburn Avenue, a block or so from where it intersects with Morris Avenue

posted in New Jersey - 5 replies

Driving Jersey: The Trailer

vulcan — Mon, 30 Jul 2007 17:06:28 GMT

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tLDY9HfFIoA

posted in New Jersey - 1 reply

Sad News

Jon — Tue, 31 Jul 2007 13:15:20 GMT

A poet in my arts community just passed away.

I wanted to honor his memory a bit.

I wasn't a close friend of him or anything, but saw him at a bunch of readings that my buddy Dave ran.

wrote a little poem-sketch for him
and below are a couple of websites about him/ with his work

Gentle mountain of a man,
Calling out to the winds,
Strong stance for sensitivity,
Powerful voice, echoing through and resounding...
Will continue its echo
In ripples
And in lives
Of hearts touched.

http://users.tellurian.com/swaa/yictove.html

http://www.poetz.com/2000/yictove.htm

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

spank 'em or thank 'em * My rep is getting a spannking.

Zippi — Thu, 26 Jul 2007 20:34:05 GMT

http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2007/roll733.xml

posted in New Jersey - 1 reply

Comcast Cable TV

Jon — Sat, 03 Mar 2007 20:32:52 GMT

anyone else here having constant problems with Comcast TV and their signal?

I constantly get digital tiling. They have been out here 6 times, fixed everything under the sun, the problem still comes back.

I also seem to be in a bad area for the power grid...we get all kinds of power surges here. Maybe that is the problem.

Been to the NJPIRG site. They are working on a campaign to get more competition so that Comcast won't be a monopoly.

Who knows?

Greedy people just do what greedy people do.

posted in New Jersey - 8 replies

Act today Medical Marijuana

Zippi — Tue, 24 Jul 2007 18:04:31 GMT

Act today Medical Marijuana
You can e-mail 'em too.
Find your rep here
http://www.house.gov/writerep/
find your zip + 4 here
http://zip4.usps.com/zip4/welcome.jsp

URGENT: Call Congress today about medical marijuana

The U.S. House of Representatives will be voting on medical marijuana as soon as tomorrow (Wednesday). We urgently need you to take one minute to call your congressperson and ask him or her to vote for the Hinchey-Rohrabacher medical marijuana amendment.

It's easy: Just call the Capitol switchboard at (202) 224-3121. Give the operator your zip code and ask to be connected to your U.S. House member; you don't even need to know your congressperson's name to do this.

When the receptionist for the congressperson â�� not the Capitol switchboard operator â�� answers, say something like: "Hi, this is [name]. I live in [city], and I'm calling to ask Congressman/Congresswoman ________ to vote for Congressman Maurice Hinchey's [HIN-chee's] medical marijuana amendment to the Justice Department's spending bill, which I understand will be considered on the House floor tomorrow. The amendment would prohibit the Justice Department from spending taxpayer money to arrest medical marijuana patients in the 12 states where medical marijuana is legal."

This call is especially important because of the DEA's recent attacks on medical marijuana. Last week, the DEA announced the indictments of four medical marijuana dispensary owners in California. And, a week before that, the DEA sent out letters notifying more than 150 Los Angeles landlords that they stand to lose their property and face 20 years in prison for renting to tenants who operate medical marijuana dispensaries legally under state law. An L.A. Times editorial condemned the outrage as "a deplorable new bullying tactic."

Please call Congress now: (202) 224-3121

If you agree that sick and suffering patients should not have to live in fear of armed federal agents breaking down their doors, this is the best chance to do something about it this year.

Momentum is on our side: Earlier this month, America's second largest cancer society, the Leukemia & Lymphoma Society, passed a resolution in support of medical marijuana access. We're hopeful that House members will take this important endorsement into account when casting their votes tomorrow.

Please call your member of Congress now: (202) 224-3121

posted in New Jersey - 1 reply

Sopranos

Jon — Fri, 06 Jul 2007 19:18:16 GMT

New Ending to the Sopranos

http://www.theonion.com/content/news/james_gandolfini_shot_by_closure

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

Happy July 4th!

Jon — Wed, 04 Jul 2007 03:48:46 GMT

Happy July 4th!

Hope everyone has a nice holiday!

take care

Jon

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

Passengers in a DWI crash

Zippi — Wed, 27 Jun 2007 12:54:22 GMT

Podias v. Maiers

(or - - another fucked up opinion by Before Judges Lefelt, Parrillo and Sapp-Peterson New Jersey's MOST biased anti-defendant pro-police judges. )

In this matter there were passengers and a driver. The driver was DWI. There was an accident and a person died. That was sad and indeed the passengers in this matter acted like brats. In my not so humble opinion they deserved harsh treatment but not at the expense of perverting the law.

Right off it should be noted that AT LAW (not at morality mind you - but at law) you have absolutely NO DUTY to render aid to an injured person if you were not the cause of his injuries. You DO have a duty if you caused the injuries directly. And you DO have a duty if you caused the injuries indirectly by some affirmative act which then caused the actor to cause the injury. It must however be an Affirmative act AND it must be close enough in the chain of causal events to have allowed you reasonable opportunity to determine that the injuries that later happened were foreseeable. An omission won’t do.

A duty to aid can not arise from an omission or a non act. You have to do something. Here the Judges twisted the mere fact of social companionship into an affirmative act by virtue of indirect Non action. It's really twisted.

In this case the passengers did nothing for an injured person who appeared to them to be dead.
The judges looked at the law and in a manner typical of these particular idiots when they want a result to fit their biases and preconceptions. They twisted things to suit their preconceptions and preferred results.

They took what they believed to be a moral duty ( but was no duty at law) and conflated the facts to insist that there was guilty knowledge on the part of the passengers that the dying man was in fact not dead ( at law an irrelevant issue) and that these passengers had encouraged the driver to commit the crime of DWI. How the judges arrived at this perverse and twisted result is almost impossible to know as the facts on the record support no such conclusion.

But typical of their format and style they simply made shit up and then found based on their made up shit.

Then typical of all weak judges everywhere they added the Hallmark of a Result Driven Judicial Outcome to the opinion. They stated that their opinion was not president ~!! Which pf course means that it’s of no value for lower courts and they may not use it as law. However it is law for the poor bastards whom they convicted.

**********************************************************-

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-6312-05T5

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

SEVASTI PODIAS, Administratrix
ad Prosequendum and General June 26, 2007
Administratrix of the Estate of

APPELLATE DIVISION

ANTONIOS N. PODIAS, Deceased,
and SEVASTI PODIAS, Individually,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
MICHAEL J. MAIRS, JOHN M. MAIRS,
PATRICIA URIBE, LUZ R. CROUSILLAT-
URIBE, THOMAS CHOMKO, DANIEL
CHOMKO and ANNE CHOMKO,

Defendants,

and

ANDREW K. SWANSON, JR. and
KYLE CHARLES NEWELL,

Defendants-Respondents.

Argued May 9, 2007 – Decided June 26, 2007

Before Judges Lefelt, Parrillo and Sapp-Peterson.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Ocean County, Docket No. L-000138-03.

Jeffrey A. Peck argued the cause for appellant Sevasti
Podias (Drinker, Biddle & Reath, attorneys; Mr. Peck
and Jodi Sydell Rosenzweig, on the brief).

Aldo J. Russo argued the cause for respondent Andrew

K. Swanson, Jr. (Russo & Della Badia, attorneys; Mr.
Russo, on the brief).
Frank P. Menaquale argued the cause for respondent
Kyle Charles Newell (Michael J. Dunn, attorney; Mr.
Menaquale, on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARRILLO, J.A.D.

At issue is whether passengers in a car may, in certain circumstances, owe a duty to a pedestrian struck by a driver who is either unwilling or unable to seek emergency aid or assistance himself. Plaintiff Sevasti Podias, Administratrix of the estate of decedent Antonios Podias (Podias), appeals from the summary judgment dismissal of his wrongful death and survivorship action against defendants Andrew K. Swanson, Jr. and Kyle Charles Newell, which concluded that defendants owed decedent no such duty as a matter of law. We now reverse.

We view the facts of record in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995). In the evening of September 27, 2002 and early morning hours of September 28, eighteen-year old Michael Mairs was drinking beer at the home of a friend Thomas Chomko. He eventually left with two other friends, defendants Swanson and Newell, both also eighteen years of age, to return to Monmouth University where all three were students. Mairs was driving.

A-6312-05T5

2

At approximately 2:00 a.m., while traveling southbound in the center lane of the Garden State Parkway, Mairs lost control of the car, struck a motorcycle driven by Antonios Podias, and went over the guardrail. All three exited the vehicle and "huddled" around the car. Swanson saw Podias lying in the roadway and because he saw no movement and heard no sound, told Mairs and Newell that he thought Mairs had killed the cyclist. At that time, there were no other cars on the road, or witnesses for that matter.

Even though all three had cell phones, no one called for assistance. Instead they argued about whether the car had collided with the motorcycle. And, within minutes of the accident, Mairs called his girlfriend on Newell's cell phone since his was lost when he got out of the car. Swanson also used his cell phone, placing seventeen calls in the next one and- one-half hours. Twenty-six additional calls were made from Newell's cell phone in the two-and-one-half hours after the accident, the first just three minutes post-accident and to Matawan, where Chomko resides. None of these, however, were emergency assistance calls. As Swanson later explained: "I
A-6312-05T5

3

didn't feel responsible to call the police." And Newell just "didn't want to get in trouble."

After about five or ten minutes, the trio all decided to get back in the car and leave the scene. Swanson directed, "we have to get to an exit." Upon their return to the car, Swanson instructed Mairs "not to bring up his name or involve him in what occurred" and "don't get us [Swanson and Newell] involved, we weren't there." The three then drove south on the parkway for a short distance until Mairs' car broke down. Mairs pulled over and waited in the bushes for his girlfriend to arrive, while Swanson and Newell ran off into the woods, where Newell eventually lost sight of Swanson. Before they deserted him, Swanson again reminded Mairs that "there was no need to get [Swanson and Newell] in trouble . . ." Mairs thought Swanson was "just scared" and that both defendants were concerned about Mairs "drinking and driving." Meanwhile, a motor vehicle operated by Patricia Uribe ran over Podias, who died as a result of injuries sustained in these accidents.

In the ensuing investigation, when State Police located Mairs hours after the accident, Mairs claimed that he was alone in the car. He also denied striking the motorcycle, seemingly unaware of any impact despite being told otherwise by Swanson. At the time, the police officers observed that Mairs "manifested

A-6312-05T5

4

symptoms of alcohol consumption and intoxication." Indeed, when blood was drawn at 5:12 a.m., more than three hours after the accident and well after his last drink at Chomko's house, Mairs' blood alcohol level was .085. It was not until months afterwards that Mairs admitted that defendants were passengers in the car on the evening of the accident and that he had lied to the police because "he was doing what his friends asked him to do." Consequently, when defendants were separately interviewed three months after the accident, they each confirmed the police officers' initial observations. Newell told State Police that Mairs appeared intoxicated from "[t]he way he was acting" and "the odor of his breath." "He had a wobble walk and his speech was slurred a little." Swanson attributed the accident to "[f]irst and foremost, Mike's intoxication." Swanson also claimed that Mairs threatened to leave him at the scene after he told Mairs he had struck the motorcycle and possibly killed the cyclist. Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of decedent's estate, filed a complaint against several defendants, all of whom save Swanson and Newell, either settled or were found liable after jury trial. Following discovery, defendants Swanson and Newell moved for summary judgment, which the motion judge granted, dismissing plaintiff's complaint with prejudice, finding

A-6312-05T5

5

defendants had no legal duty to volunteer emergency assistance to one whose injury they neither caused nor substantially assisted another in bringing about. As to the latter, the judge

reasoned:

I find that the Plaintiff has not established sufficient facts to permit a rational factfinder to resolve any dispute in issue in favor of the Plaintiff concerning the actions of Mr. Newell and Mr. Swanson that would indicate a concert[ed] action. Even assuming that the defendants individually should have known of the duty of Mr. Mairs to call the police, there is absolutely no testimony that either Newell or Swanson encouraged Mairs not to call the police and to leave the scene of the accident or to substantially assist Mr. Mairs in that endeavor. Assistance and encouragement requires active and purposeful conduct in order to be liable under the provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.

Plaintiff appeals, arguing that under the circumstances, defendants owed a duty to decedent which a jury could reasonably find was breached in this instance, and further, under the derivative theory of concert liability, a jury could reasonably find that defendants substantially assisted another in his breach of a direct duty.

(i) Traditional tort theory emphasizes individual liability, which is to say that each particular defendant who is to be charged with responsibility must be proceeding negligently.

A-6312-05T5

6

Ordinarily, then, mere presence at the commission of the wrong, or failure to object to it, is not enough to charge one with responsibility inasmuch as there is no duty to take affirmative steps to interfere. See W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts (Prosser) § 46, at 323-24 (5th ed. 1984). Because of this reluctance to countenance "inaction" as a basis of liability, the common law "has persistently refused to impose on a stranger the moral obligation of common humanity to go to the aid of another human being who is in danger, even if the other is in danger of losing his life." Id. § 56 at 375. Thus, the common law rule imposes "no independent duty of rescue at all" and relieves a bystander from any obligation to provide affirmative aid or emergency assistance, even if the bystander has the ability to help. Praet v. Borough of Sayreville, 218

N.J. Super. 218, 224 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 108 N.J. 681 (1987); see also Lundy v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc., 34 F.3d 1173, 1178 (3d Cir. 1994). The underlying rationale for what has come to be known as the "innocent bystander rule" seems to be that by "passive inaction", defendant has made the injured party's situation no worse, and has merely failed to benefit him by interfering in his affairs. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. Pa. L. Rev. 217, 22021 (1908).
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Of course, exceptions are as longstanding as the rule. For instance, if one already has a pre-existing legal duty to render assistance, who either by statute or "public calling" has undertaken a duty to give service, then it is that duty which impels him to act, for which omission he may be liable. Praet, supra, 218 N.J. Super. at 224; see generally Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 321 to 324A at 132-145 (1965) (1965 Restatement). So too, at common law, those under no preexisting duty may nevertheless be liable if they choose to volunteer emergency assistance for another but do so negligently. Praet, supra, 218 N.J. Super. at 223-24; see also 1965 Restatement, supra, § 314 at 116 and § 324 at 142.1

Over the years, liability for inaction has been gradually extended still further to a "limited group of relations, in which custom, public sentiment, and views of social policy have led courts to find a duty of affirmative action." Prosser, supra, § 56 at 373-74. Thus, a duty to render assistance may either be "contractual, relational or transactional." Praet, supra, 218 N.J. Super. at 224. In New Jersey, courts have

1 This feature of the common law rule has been abrogated by statute. In New Jersey, the Good Samaritan Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-1, offers immunity from tort liability not just to "health care licensees", L. 1963, c. 140, but to "any individual" who renders emergency assistance. L. 1968, c. 254, § 1.

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recognized that the existence of a relationship between the victim and one in a position to provide aid may create a duty to render assistance. Ibid.; see also Lundy, supra, 34 F.3d at 1178. In Szabo v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 132 N.J.L. 331 (E. & A. 1945), for instance, the Court held that if the employee, while engaged in the work of his or her employer, sustains an injury rendering him or her helpless to provide for his or her own care, the employer must secure medical care for the employee. Id. at 333. According to the Court, "[t]his duty arises out of strict necessity and urgent exigency." Ibid. To establish liability, however, such relationships need not be limited to those where a pre-existing duty exists, or involving economic ties, or dependent on the actor's status as, for instance, a landowner or business owner. Rather, it may only be necessary "to find some definite relation between the parties [ ] of such a character that social policy justifies the imposition of a duty to act." Prosser, supra, § 56 at 374. So, for instance, the general duty which arises in many relations to take reasonable precautions for the safety of others may include the obligation to exercise control over the conduct of third persons with dangerous propensities. J.S. v. R.T.H., 155 N.J. 330 (1998); 1965 Restatement §§ 315 and 319; Harper and Kline, The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43 Yale L.J. 886,

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898 (1934). In J.S. v. R.T.H., supra, the Court held that when a spouse has actual knowledge or special reason to know of the likelihood of her spouse engaging in sexually abusive behavior against a particular person, the spouse has a duty of care to take reasonable steps to prevent or warn of the harm, and breach of such a duty constitutes a proximate cause of the resultant injury. 155 N.J. at 352.

So too, even though the defendant may be under no obligation to render assistance himself, he is at least required to take reasonable care that he does not prevent others from giving it. Soldano v. O'Daniels, 190 Cal. Rptr. 310 (Ct. App. 1983). In other words, there may be liability for interfering with the plaintiff's opportunity of obtaining assistance. And even where the original danger was created by innocent conduct, involving no fault on the part of the defendant, there may be a duty to make a reasonable effort to give assistance and avoid further harm where the prior innocent conduct has created an unreasonable risk of harm to the plaintiff. Hollinbeck v. Downey, 113 N.W.2d 9 (Minn. 1962); 1965 Restatement § 321.2

2 In New Jersey, the hit-and-run driver statute, N.J.S.A. 39:4129( a), imposes a duty on a driver regardless of fault, to remain at or return to the scene of the accident. Moreover, if a party is injured and no police officer is present, the driver "shall forthwith report such accident to the nearest . . . police department". N.J.S.A. 34:4-129(c). See also State v.
(continued below)

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************************************************-
Indeed, one commentator has suggested that "the mere knowledge of serious peril, threatening death or great bodily harm to another, which an identified defendant might avoid with little inconvenience, creates a sufficient relation to impose a duty of action." Prosser, supra, § 56 at 377. Actually, the extension of liability based on these and other "relational" features mirrors evolving notions of duty, which are no longer tethered to rigid formalisms or static historical classifications. This progression is not surprising. The assessment of duty necessarily includes an examination of the relationships between and among the parties. J.S. v. R.T.H., supra, 155 N.J. at 338. The fundamental question is "whether the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant's conduct." Ibid. (quoting Weinberg v. Dinger, 106 N.J. 469, 481 (1987)). In this regard, the determination of the existence of duty is ultimately a question of fairness and public policy, Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 186 N.J. 394, 401 (2006), which in turn draws upon "notions of fairness, common sense, and morality." Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 443 (1993).
*************************************************-
(continued from above)
Saulina, 177 N.J. Super. 264, 268-69 (App. Div. 1980); Fuentes v. Reilly, 590 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1979).

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The duty determination, which is a judicial one, Olivo, supra, 186 N.J. at 401, involves a complex analysis that weighs and balances several related factors, including nature of the underlying risk of harm, that is, its foreseeability and severity, the opportunity and ability to exercise care to prevent the harm, the comparative interests of, and the relationships between or among the parties, and, ultimately, based on considerations of public policy and fairness, the societal interest in the proposed solution. [J.S. v. R.T.H., supra, 155 N.J. at 337 (citing Hopkins, supra, 132 N.J. at 439).] Specifically, "[f]oreseeability of the risk of harm is the foundational element in the determination of whether a duty exists." J.S. v. R.T.H., supra, 155 N.J. at 337; Williamson v. Waldman, 150 N.J. 232, 239 (1997). Foreseeability, in turn, is based on the defendant's knowledge of the risk of injury. Weinberg, supra, 106 N.J. at 484-85. A corresponding consideration is the practicality of preventing it. J.S. v. R.T.H., supra, 155 N.J. at 339-40; Clohesy v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 149 N.J. 496, 516-20 (1997); Hopkins, supra, 132 N.J. at 447. "When the defendant's actions are 'relatively easily corrected' and the harm sought to be presented is 'serious,' it is fair to impose a duty." J.S. v. R.T.H., supra, 155 N.J. at 339-40 (citing Kelly v. Gwinell, 96 N.J. 538, 549-50 (1984)).
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Also included in the analysis is "an assessment of the defendant's 'responsibility for conditions creating the risk of harm' and an analysis of whether the defendant had sufficient control, opportunity, and ability to have avoided the risk of harm." J.S. v. R.T.H., supra, 155 N.J. at 339 (citing Kuzmicz v. Ivy Hill Park Apts., Inc., 147 N.J. 510, 515 (1997); Carvalho v. Toll Bros. & Developers, 143 N.J. 565, 573 (1996)). And ultimately, there is public policy, which "must be determined in the context of contemporary circumstances and considerations." J.S. v. R.T.H., supra, 155 N.J. at 339; see also Kelly, supra, 96 N.J. at 544-45 (noting that in a society growing increasingly intolerant of drunken driving, the imposition of a duty on social hosts "seems both fair and fully in accord with the State's policy").

Governed by these principles, we are satisfied that the summary judgment record admits of sufficient facts from which a reasonable jury could find defendants breached a duty which proximately caused the victim's death. In the first place, the risk of harm, even death, to the injured victim lying helpless in the middle of a roadway, from the failure of defendants to summon help or take other precautionary measures was readily and clearly foreseeable. Not only were defendants aware of the risk of harm created by their own inaction, but were in a unique

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position to know of the risk of harm posed by Mairs' own omission in that regard, as well as Mairs' earlier precipatory conduct in driving after having consumed alcohol. Even absent any encouragement on their part, defendants had special reason to know that Mairs would not himself summon help, but instead illegally depart the scene of a hit-and-run accident, N.J.S.A. 39:4-129; see also N.J.S.A. 39:4-130, either intentionally or because of an inability to fulfill a duty directly owed the victim, thereby further endangering the decedent's safety.

Juxtaposed against the obvious foreseeability of harm is the relative ease with which it could have been prevented. All three individuals had cell phones and in fact used them immediately before and after the accident for their own purposes, rather than to call for emergency assistance for another in need. The ultimate consequence wrought by the harm in this case – death – came at the expense of failing to take simple precautions at little if any cost or inconvenience to defendants. Indeed, in contrast to Mairs' questionable ability to appreciate the seriousness of the situation, defendants appeared lucid enough to comprehend the severity of the risk and sufficiently in control to help avoid further harm to the victim. In other words, defendants had both the opportunity and
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ability to help prevent an obviously foreseeable risk of severe and potentially fatal consequence.

In our view, given the circumstances, the imposition of a duty upon defendants does not offend notions of fairness and common decency and is in accord with public policy. As evidenced by the grant of legislative immunity to volunteers afforded by the Good Samaritan Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-1, public policy encourages gratuitous assistance by those who have no legal obligation to render it. Praet, supra, 218 N.J. Super. at 224. Simply and obviously, defendants here were far more than innocent bystanders or strangers to the event. On the contrary, the instrumentality of injury in this case was operated for a common purpose and the mutual benefit of defendants, and driven by someone they knew to be exhibiting signs of intoxication. Although Mairs clearly created the initial risk, at the very least the evidence reasonably suggests defendants acquiesced in the conditions that may have helped create it and subsequently in those conditions that further endangered the victim's safety. Defendants therefore bear some relationship not only to the primary wrongdoer but to the incident itself. It is this nexus which distinguishes this case from those defined by mere presence on the scene without more, and therefore implicates policy considerations simply not pertinent to the latter.
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(ii)
Even assuming no independent duty to take affirmative action, at the very least defendants were obligated, in our view, not to prevent Mairs from exercising his direct duty of care. Soldano, supra, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 315-17. In this regard, traditional tort theory recognizes vicarious liability for concerted tortious action. Prosser, Law of Torts, § 46 at 291 (4th Ed. 1971). Concerted action may be either by agreement (conspiracy) or substantial assistance (aiding and abetting). Id. at 292; Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep't, 174 F.3d 95, 127 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1074, 120 S. Ct. 786, 145 L. Ed. 2d 663 (2000); Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1983). These two bases of liability correspond generally to the first two subsections in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 876 (1979) (1979 Restatement) on "Persons Acting in Concert":

For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he
(a)
does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common design with him [conspiracy], or
(b)
knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself [aiding-abetting], or

(c)
gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person. [Halberstam, supra, 705 F.2d at 477 (quoting Restatement, supra, § 876) (emphasis added).]

Thus, "aiding-abetting" focuses on whether a defendant knowingly gave "substantial assistance" to someone engaged in wrongful conduct, not on whether the defendant agreed to join the wrongful conduct. Halberstam, supra, 705 F.2d at 478.

Of course, how much assistance is substantial enough is fact-sensitive. The 1979 Restatement lists five factors: the nature of the act encouraged, the amount of assistance given by the defendant, his presence or absence at the time of the tort, his relation to the other [tortfeasor] and his state of mind[.] [1979 Restatement, supra, § 876(b) comment d.]. See also Tarr v. Ciasulli, 181 N.J. 70, 83-84 (2004). Additionally, the court in Halberstam provided a sixth factor, the duration of the assistance provided. Halberstam, supra, 705 F.2d at 484.

Vicarious liability does not have to be based on acts of assistance but may rest on inaction, Hurley, supra, 174 F.3d at

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126; Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., Inc., 579 F.2d 793, 800 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930, 99 S. Ct. 318, 58 L. Ed. 2d 323 (1978), or on words of encouragement. Halberstam, supra, 705 F.2d at 481-82; Landy v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d 139, 163 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960, 94 S. Ct. 1979, 40 L. Ed. 2d 312 (1974). "Advice or encouragement to act operates as a moral support to a tortfeasor and if the act encouraged is known to be tortious it has the same effect upon the liability of the adviser as participation or physical assistance." 1979 Restatement, supra, § 876(b), comment d. Thus, suggestive words that plant the seeds of or fuel negligent action may be enough to create joint liability. In Rael v. Cadena, 604 P.2d 822 (N.M. 1979), the defendant had given verbal encouragement ("Kill him!" and "Hit him more!") to an assailant. The defendant had not physically assisted in the battery. The court explained that liability did not require a finding of action in concert, nor even that the injury had directly resulted from the encouragement. Instead, it found, citing 1979 Restatement § 876(b), that the fact of encouragement was enough to create joint liability for the battery. Mere presence at the scene, it noted, would not be sufficient for liability.

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In Cobb v. Indian Springs, Inc., 522 S.W.2d 383 (Ark. 1975), a security guard allegedly urged a younger motorist with a new car to "run [the car] back up here and see what it will do." Id. at 387. The driver then struck the plaintiff while trying to avoid a pedestrian during his high-speed "test run." The court held, relying on 1979 Restatement § 876(b), that a jury could have found the guard's encouragement substantial because he had first proposed the trial drive and because his position of authority gave his suggestion extra weight. On the issue of extent of liability, the Cobb court found that the guard could have foreseen an appreciable risk of harm to others at the time of encouragement.

Applying the Restatement's factors to the facts of the summary judgment record viewed most favorably to plaintiff, we conclude a jury may reasonably find defendants' assistance was "substantial." Whether the principal wrongdoer was either impaired or entirely coherent, it is reasonable to infer that at the very least defendants collaborated in, verbally supported, or approved his decision to leave the scene, and at most actively convinced Mairs to flee as a means of not getting caught. The record reasonably admits that defendants feared apprehension. Mairs had just engaged in wrongful conduct causing injury to another under circumstances from which

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defendants evidently desired to disassociate. Defendants were aware of Mairs' role in the tortious activity and took affirmative steps in the immediate aftermath to conceal their involvement in the event. Indeed, Swanson supposedly told Mairs not to disclose their names and participation and Mairs complied "because he was doing what his friends told him to do." After five or ten minutes of arguing, there was agreement to depart without calling for assistance. Thereafter, Swanson directed Mairs to the nearest parkway exit and when the car broke down, defendants ran into the woods. The entire aftermath of the incident betrays an orchestrated scheme among the three to avoid detection not only by taking no action to prevent further harm to the victim, but by affirmatively abandoning the scene, practically guaranteeing his death. Whether Mairs was especially vulnerable to defendants' pleas because of a mental condition weakened by alcohol or whether he was simply encouraged by defendants' "group" mentality of escaping accountability, a jury could reasonably find on the evidence defendants' assistance substantial enough to justify civil liability vicariously, on an aiding and abetting theory.

(iii)
We formulate today no rule of general application since the question of duty remains one of judicial balancing of the mix of

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factors peculiar to each case. We also stress the narrowness of the issue before us. As we understand plaintiff's claim, defendants, while riding as passengers in a third person's car, are not liable to another run over by the car even though they may know or have reason to know the driver was unable to operate the vehicle in a reasonably careful and prudent manner. Rather, plaintiff's claim of actionable negligence on the part of defendants is based on their alleged breach of a duty arising thereafter in the accident's aftermath to take emergency action to prevent further harm to the helpless victim. On this score, we mention the original danger created by third party conduct not to suggest defendants' liability therefor, but only insofar as it might have created an unreasonable risk of further harm to the already injured victim, of which defendants were aware and had the opportunity and ability to help prevent, and to illustrate defendants' connection to the entire episode, which, as part of a common undertaking, transcended that of the innocent bystander or uninvolved stranger who is otherwise shielded from liability for failing to summon emergency aid. It is the degree of defendants' involvement, coupled with the serious peril threatening imminent death to another that might have been avoided with little effort and inconvenience, suggested by the evidence, that in our view creates a sufficient

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relation to impose a duty of action. Of course, it still remains a question of fact whether the primary wrongdoer was able to exercise reasonable care to summon emergency assistance or was prevented from doing so by defendants; whether, on the other hand, defendants knew or had reason to know that Mairs was unable or unwilling to do so, and thereafter were in a position to have influenced the outcome; whether the decision to abandon the victim was otherwise Mairs' alone or the result of encouragement, cooperation or interference from defendants; and finally, if the latter, whether the assistance was substantial enough to support a finding of liability. The facts here are certainly not such that all reasonable persons must draw the same conclusion. We cannot say that upon any version of the facts there is no duty.

Reversed and remanded.

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posted in New Jersey - 3 replies

Power Surges

Jon — Thu, 21 Jun 2007 07:50:01 GMT

Getting a lot of power surges here, Union (Union County)

We seem to get a lot of power surges around 8AM and 8PM

Power went out the other day, and just a little before a heat wave

Apparently the geniuses running the show are messing up again...

I think they can easily solve these problems, they just don't feel like putting in the effort and spending the extra three cents to do it.

My main concern with this is refrigeration. I think that refrigeration units all across NJ are affected. I think that this is a big concern with food, not only in the home, but especially with restaurants, food warehouses and etc.

If the "geniuses that be" are going to leave the grid so unprotected, then they are going to need to create some dedicated lines to the food industry and other essential services, so that one week, a few thousand people don't get food poisoning because thousands of compressors went offline during the night and no one knows.

That kind of level of increased bacteria can be too subtle to detect...because the food doesn't immediately go bad, it just has less refrigeration, for hours and for hours over the course of days. Then, the cheese that would have lasted x number of days, lasts less, no one notices and the whole population gets to consume just a nice little bit of more poison in their diet.

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

LEGALIZE It~!!

Zippi — Mon, 11 Jun 2007 15:24:08 GMT

Consider becoming involved New Jersey’s efforts to pass medical marijuana legislation. Contact Roseanne Scotti of the Drug Policy Alliance, as DPA she has been coordinating efforts in New Jersey. Roseanne can be reached at rscotti@drugpolicy.org.
For more information about the status of marijuana policy reform in New Jersey, please contact MPP Legislative Analyst Zane Hurst at (202) 462-5747, ext. 119, or at Zane@mpp.org.
If you are a medical professional, a patient who might benefit from medical marijuana, or if you know somebody who might benefit from medical marijuana, we would like to hear from you. Additionally, if you are a law enforcement official or a clergy member, please email Zane@mpp.org to see how you can be of special help.
Visit www.mpp.org/2007plan to read about MPP's broader goals for the year and www.mpp.org/faq for basic answers about MPP and marijuana policy reform. Finally, you can download a copy of our extensive state-by-state guide to medical marijuana laws at www.mpp.org/statelaw.
And please contact your legislators and write them to tell them you want to see marijuana made legal.

I have drafted a letter which you can use and distribute freely it is stored in the tribe: LEGALIZEIT~!! Found here:
http://tribes.tribe.net/legalize_it.

I will also post a Bill there which I hope will serve as a model for other around the nation.

New Jersey Representatives at the state level by county:
http://www.congress.org/congressorg/dbq/officials/

Use your Zip+4 to Find you federal representative here:
http://www.house.gov/writerep/

Find your Zip+4 here:
http://zip4.usps.com/zip4/welcome.jsp

posted in New Jersey - 1 reply

Couples Massage Class Sunday June 10th, Nutley

Joachim — Sun, 03 Jun 2007 23:04:55 GMT

Hi everyone !

Just wanted to let everyone know that I will be facilitating the Couples Massage Class on June 10th in Nutley NJ.

Everyone is invited !!! Bring your friend, husband, wife or mother for a great experience.

More is at:

http://www.njholistichealthservices.com/partnermassage.html

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

When is a traffic stop an arrest~??

Zippi — Thu, 31 May 2007 13:26:46 GMT

As it regards whether you are being routinely detained or arrested:
New Jersey courts have not established any firm guidelines regarding the length of time or circumstances involves that would convert a routine traffic stop into a de facto arrest.

It is generally understood that longer detentions by police become arrests by virtue of the time involved and or the means of detention. Example: on those TV shows where they film the police handcuffing people and informing them that they are not under arrest - - the police are lying. Hand cuffs are absolutely an arrest.

The longer a traffic stop continues, the more likely the courts are to regard the investigative detention as an arrest.

Today in State v. Baum, the Appellate Division found that a traffic stop lasting 26 minutes was reasonable. They found that the delay caused by false hoods told to the police --- DURING A FULL BLOWN CUSTODIAL DETENTION AND INTERROGATION when no miranda warnings were offered.

It should be noted that the Appellate Judges who decided this case: Parrillo and Sapp-Peterson, are among the most (if not the most) ANTI-Citizen and PRO-Police judges in the state of New Jersey. As an attorney I have read their holdings extensively observing that they are willing to ignore facts plain in the record below while insisting that those facts are not there, that they are willing to invent facts to bolster their unreasonable and unjust decisions. In short I can think of no two judges who are less competent to sit on any bench.

In their opinion Parrillo and Sapp-Peterson justify unlawful police misconduct by using talismanic and meaningless expressions such as : “Interstate 78, which is a known drug courier route.” To describe where the stop was made.

Parrillo and Sapp-Peterson blindly accepted the police explanations as to why they dragged their feet by offering the unrealistic and self serving excuse that there was too much radio traffic to call in a driver’s license.

The police in the instant matter had all the passengers out of a car and separated them to interrogate them fully. The interrogations took 26 minutes during which the police failed to offer Miranda warnings and then violated the law by unlawfully searching the car.
But Parrillo and Sapp-Peterson absolutely had to turn everything around to make the police look like heroes who saved the universe from blood thirsty psychokillers.

It is my most profound hope that this is being appealed to the NJ Supreme Court.

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

Some NJ Traffic issues you might not have known about.

Zippi — Thu, 24 May 2007 14:04:17 GMT

Some Traffic issues you might not have known about.

4 point ticket for improperly passing an ice cream truck~!!

NJSA 39:4-128.4. Approaching or overtaking stopped frozen dessert truck; stopping
a. The driver of a vehicle approaching or overtaking from either direction a frozen dessert truck stopped on the highway shall stop before reaching the truck when the flashing red lights and stop signal arm described in section 3 are in use. After stopping, a driver may proceed past such truck at a reasonable and prudent speed, not exceeding 15 miles per hour, and shall yield the right of way to any pedestrian who crosses the roadway to or from the frozen dessert truck.

b. The driver of a vehicle on a highway having dual or multiple roadways separated by safety islands or physical traffic separation installations need not stop upon meeting or passing a frozen dessert truck on another roadway.
********************************************************************** -

2 points for failure to blow your horn or having your car in neutral when going down hill or aground a blind curve.
NJSA 39:4-55. Action on steep grades and curves
The driver of a motor vehicle traversing a steep grade or mountain highway shall hold the vehicle under control and as near the right-hand side of the highway as reasonably possible, and when traveling upon a down grade upon a highway, shall not coast with the gears of the vehicle in neutral. When approaching a curve where the view is obstructed within a distance of two hundred feet along the highway, he shall give audible warning with a horn or other warning device.

********************************************************************** -

2 pointsd for backing out of your drive way if there are cars in the road

39:4-127. Backing or turning in street

No vehicle shall back or make a turn in a street, if by so doing it interferes with other vehicles, but shall go around a block or to a street sufficiently wide to turn in without backing.
-****************************************************************** -

2 points for not letting the other guy pass you.

39:4-87. Overtaken vehicle to give way

The driver of a vehicle on a highway, about to be overtaken and passed by another vehicle, approaching from the rear, shall give way to the right in favor of the overtaking vehicle on suitable and audible signal being given by the driver of the overtaking vehicle, and shall not increase the speed of his vehicle until completely passed by the overtaking vehicle.
-******************************************************************-

2 points for “slowing”

39:4-97.1. Slow speeds as blocking traffic
No person shall drive a motor vehicle at such a slow speed as to impede or block the normal and reasonable movement of traffic except when reduced speed is necessary for safe operation or in compliance with law.

-******************************************************************-

5 points for tailgating (the required distance is “reasonable and prudent” and is entirely at the discretion of the cops)

39:4-89. Following; space between trucks

The driver of a vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard to the speed of the preceding vehicle and the traffic upon, and condition of, the highway.

The driver of a motor truck when traveling upon a highway, outside of a business or residence district, shall not follow another motor truck within one hundred feet, but this shall not be construed to prevent one motor truck overtaking and passing another.
-******************************************************************-

The state ( the prosecutor) is entitled to benefit from the permissive inference that all Traffic control devices are correctly installed and registered with the DOT.
However in many 9nstances neither is true and you the defendant have the burden of showing that the signs and lights etc., are not installed properly or not registered. If you can make that showing you must be released in court of the charge.

9:4-199.1. Official traffic signs at traffic islands, safety zones and grade separations, etc.
Local, county and State authorities, with respect to highways under their jurisdiction, may erect and maintain appropriate official traffic signs not inconsistent with the provisions of chapter 4 of Title 39 of the Revised Statutes, [FN1] on a highway or at an intersection where the movements of traffic are regulated and controlled by traffic islands, traffic circles, channelizing islands, divisional islands, safety zones, grade separations or other physical structures which have been erected by such authority; and such authorities may erect and maintain railroad advance warning signs and other appropriate official traffic signs where any such highway crosses a railroad at grade.

39:4-183.1. Legal authority
Traffic signs shall be placed only by the authority of a public body or official having jurisdiction as authorized by law and only for the purpose of regulating, warning or guiding traffic.

This section, however, shall not prohibit public utility companies or other authorized persons or companies from erecting temporary MEN WORKING signs to protect construction, maintenance or repair work on or within a public highway; provided, such signs conform reasonably to the specifications included in this act.

posted in New Jersey - 4 replies

drumcircle discussion

william — Mon, 28 May 2007 04:42:19 GMT

look here:

http://health.groups.yahoo.com/group/nj_pa_drumcircles/

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

NJ Supreme Court reviewing 4 cases

Zippi — Thu, 24 May 2007 13:12:22 GMT

On May 16th, the New Jersey Supreme Court certified 4 cases for review, each of which deals with distinct substantive and procedural issues related to the United State Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). This will be the first time the Justices have had the opportunity to discuss the impact of Crawford in detail in a New Jersey case. Apart from the cases under review, the Court’s decisions may also affect at least two additional “Crawford” decisions by the Appellate Division, State v. Renshaw, 390 N.J. Super 456 (App. Div. 2007) (defendant may confront person who drew blood sample in DWI case) and State v. Kent, 391 N.J. Super. 352 (App. Div. 2007) (failure by defendant to request confrontation of person who drew blood sample or tested the sample in a DWI prosecution constitutes waiver). The cases that will be reviewed are the following:

C-1207-05 State v. William G. Sweet

Supreme Court Docket No. 59,661

Order Filed May 16, 2007

Appellate Division Decision Filed May 4, 2006

This unpublished decision is a case where the Crawford issue related to the admissibility of Breath Test Instrument Inspection Certificates in a DWI prosecution. These documents have been held to be non-testimonial within the meaning of Crawford by the Law Division in State v, Godshalk, 381 N.J. Super. 326 (Law Div. 2005) and by the Appellate Division earlier this month in State v. Dorman, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2007).

C-55-06 State of New Jersey in the Interest of J.A.

Supreme Court Docket No. 59,684

Order Filed May 16, 2007

App. Div. Reported at 385 N.J. Super. 544 (2006)

This case relates to statements given to the police in a rapidly unfolding investigation. The statements were deemed to be non-testimonial.

C-85-06 State of New Jersey v. Richard F. Berezansky

Supreme Court Docket No. 59,857

Order Filed May 16, 2007

App. Div. reported at 386 N.J. Super. 84 (2006)

The Court ruled that blood test result certificates in a DWI prosecution were testimonial within the meaning of Crawford.

C-793-06 State v. Ryan Buda

C-794-06 Supreme Court Docket No. 60,611

Order Filed May 16, 2007

App. Div. Reported at 389 N.J. Super. 241 (2006)

This decision held that statements made by a small child to a DYFS investigator were testimonial within the meaning of Crawford.

No date has been set for argument; although it is likely the cases will be argued and decided together.

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

Psytrance in Atlantic City!!

ktritton — Wed, 23 May 2007 18:19:43 GMT

GAIAN MIND Presents: A DECADE OF DANCE - 10-Year Anniversary!
Saturday, May 26th, 2007, Atlantic City, NJ

Join us as we celebrate the first 10 years of GAIAN MIND with a full 9-hours of Transcendental Dance!

Special Guest:

PSYMMETRIX (PharPsyde Records - UK)
Psymmetrix are 27 year old Alastair Crowther and 30 year old Richie (Asimilon) Elmes, both Yellow Star Geminis from the South East of England, and they have been tearing apart the London squat and party scene and after headlining the Liquid stage at the Glade festival last year these two have developed quite a following.

They have been writing music together now for one and a half years, after initially deciding to formulate a back-2-back set in December 2004, their conflicting styles brought about the synthesis of a new collaboration, that month they furiously created their first 7 tracks which met with great success at their début in the Liquid Connective Trance Room December 31st 2004 and it’s been onwards-and-upwards ever since.

They bring 18 years of a love of trance music and dancefloor mayhem to their live sets, which are getting rave reviews wherever they are given the opportunity to unleash their unique brand of full-power psychedelic having-it dancefloor pounders!!!

Look out for upcoming releases from Psymmetrix on PharPsyde Records, Wild Things Records, Acidance Records and Doof Records!

www.psymmetrix.co.uk

Plus:

MUKTI (TDC - NYC)
ALLEN2012 (Gaian Mind - Tampa Bay)
EG~BOT (Gaian Mind - Philadelphia)
MESCALINIUM (Gaian Mind / PSI - Philadelphia)

Outdoor Chillout w/:

PEDRO (Reality Engine / Interchill Records - NYC)
TRITTON (Gaian Mind - Philadelphia)
DEET (Gaian Mind - Philadelphia)
ANDREW LIGHT (Gaian Mind - Philadelphia)
FRACTAL PHONO (Gaian Mind - Philadelphia)
SOLOMOON (Metameme / Onetribe / Esoteric Gen – Denver)

Deco: DAYA CAYUNG (Indonesia)

Saturday, May 26th, 2007
11pm - 8am

$15
21+ w/ ID
(24-hour liquor license)

10 West Bar & Lounge
10 West White Horse Pike, Galloway, NJ 08205
609-652-2400
www.10westnj.com

Directions:

From the North, take exit 40 off the Garden State Parkway, go through first traffic light and take u-turn. Travel West on White Horse Pike (RT. 30), under Parkway, look to your left, we are located on West bound side, 10 West White Horse Pike, Galloway, NJ.

From the South, Atlantic City area, travel West on White Horse Pike (Rt.30) approximately 12 Miles. Pass under Garden State Parkway, look to your left, we are located on West bound side, 10 West White Horse Pike, Galloway, NJ

map

Approx. Driving Times:

Boston - 6 hours
DC - 3 hours
NYC - 2 hours
Philadelphia - 1 hour

Only 5 minutes from the beach and casinos! Join us on the beach on Sunday morning!

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

Search incident to arrest reviewed by NJ Supreme Court

Zippi — Wed, 23 May 2007 13:50:19 GMT

Among the many important legal issues discussed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in this morning's decision in State v. O'Neal, two stand out. First, the justices explain that probable cause to arrest is the triggering event for a search incident to an arrest. Accordingly, once the police have developed probable cause to effect an arrest, they may lawfully search the person for weapons and evidence before formally placing the suspect under arrest.

The second issues relates to the public safety exception to the Miranda warnings. As previously developed by the United States Supreme Court, police may ask questions of an arrested person relating to the immediate recovery of dangerous weapons at an arrest scene. The New Jersey Supreme Court, for the first time, issued guidelines in the O'Neal case relating to the types of questions the police may ask in these limited public safety situations when there is an objectively reasonable need to protect the police and public from the immediate danger posed by a weapon.

A copy of State v. O'Neal is attached below.
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent
and Cross- Appellant,
v.
RAHMIL O'NEAL, Defendant-Appellant
and Cross- Respondent.
A-94/95 September Term 2005
Supreme Court of New Jersey.
Argued October 31, 2006
Decided May 22, 2007

On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division.
Jean B. Bennett, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for appellant and cross-respondent ( Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney). Steven A. Yomtov, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent and cross-appellant ( Stuart Rabner, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Mr. Yomtov and Natalie A. Schmid Drummond, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the briefs).
JUSTICE WALLACE, JR. delivered

I.

the opinion of the Court. Defendant was convicted of selling cocaine in a school zone. The Appellate Division rejected defendant's claim that the police violated his constitutional rights when they asked him a question without first giving him Miranda FN1 warnings, but found that defendant established a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for defense counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress the cocaine. The panel remanded for a hearing on the Fourth Amendment suppression motion, but held that if the trial court denied the motion, the conviction and sentence would be affirmed. Defendant filed a petition for certification, and the State filed a cross-petition. We granted both petitions. We now hold that, based on the observations made by the law enforcement officers, there was probable cause to search and arrest defendant. We also hold that the police officer's question to defendant that elicited defendant's response without prior Miranda warnings violated Miranda, but was harmless under the circumstances. We reverse and remand to reinstate the judgment of conviction and sentence.
At approximately 7:15 p.m. on August 28, 2002, Newark Police Officers Patrick Cantalupo and Bobby Bullock, riding in an unmarked police car and wearing plainclothes, were patrolling a high-crime area near Lincoln Park. They observed defendant Rahmil O'Neal and another man standing in front of a restaurant. The man gave money to defendant in exchange for an unknown object. Cantalupo believed that a drug transaction had taken place and decided to investigate further. He turned the car around and parked across the street from defendant's location.

Several minutes later, Cantalupo and Bullock watched as a second man approached and engaged in conversation with defendant. The man handed cash to defendant and defendant knelt down on his left knee. Defendant then reached in his right sock, removed a clear plastic bag containing black-capped vials that the officers suspected were filled with cocaine, and handed a vial to the man. Cantalupo and Bullock immediately exited the car to approach the two men. Although they were in plainclothes, the police officers wore badges around their necks and announced their presence. The unknown male retreated into a doorway adjacent to the restaurant and locked the metal door. When the police officers were unable to open the metal door, they turned their focus to defendant, who was pretending to use a nearby pay phone.

Cantalupo asked defendant, “what's going on?” Defendant responded that he did nothing wrong. Bullock directed Cantalupo to check the bulge around defendant's right ankle. Cantalupo patted the area, felt the bulge, and asked defendant what was in his sock. Defendant admitted it was cocaine. Cantalupo then searched defendant and retrieved a clear plastic sandwich-sized bag containing forty-nine black-capped vials of cocaine from the area of defendant's right ankle. The officer placed defendant under arrest. A more thorough search of defendant revealed thirteen dollars in his pocket.

Defendant was charged with third-degree possession of cocaine, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(1); third-degree possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) and -5b(3); and third-degree possession of cocaine within 1000 feet of school property, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the drugs, but later withdrew that motion in a pretrial memorandum that was executed by defendant, his counsel, the assistant prosecutor, and the trial court.

On the first day of trial, defense counsel advised the trial court that a hearing was not required to determine the admissibility of defendant's statement to the police that he had cocaine in his possession. The following day, defense counsel changed his position and requested that the trial court hold a hearing to consider suppressing defendant's incriminating statement made in response to the police's inquiry regarding the bulge on his right ankle. Counsel claimed that the statement was elicited from defendant without Miranda warnings and should be suppressed. The trial court granted the request to hold a hearing.

Cantalupo was the sole witness at the hearing. He testified that he observed defendant distribute drugs on two occasions, and that during the second he saw defendant remove a vial of suspected cocaine from his sock and give it to an unknown man in exchange for money. After he and Bullock approached defendant, Cantalupo explained that Bullock advised him to check the bulge on defendant's right ankle. The following exchange between the prosecutor and Cantalupo then took place:

Q. How did you respond?

A. Oh, not knowing if it could be a weapon, it could be anything as far as a Terry frisk goes. I immediately patted the area and I-I asked, you know, what's this?

Q. And what did he say?

A. And that's when he responded, a bag of cocaine.

Q. And did you recover the bag?

A. Absolutely.

Q. Okay. And where did the bag turn-turn on top? Did the bag have anything inside of it?

A. Yes. It was a clear plastic bag, almost like a sandwich bag size with 49 black capped vials of cocaine or I, at the time, suspected cocaine.

On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Cantalupo if, based on the two transactions he observed, probable cause existed to arrest defendant. Cantalupo replied that he thought he “had enough suspicion to approach” defendant. On re-direct, the prosecutor asked Cantalupo if he was able to see what was in the bag when defendant knelt down on his knee. Cantalupo replied, “several black capped vials ... [s]uspected cocaine.” When the prosecutor asked Cantalupo if the cocaine alone gave him probable cause to place defendant under arrest, Cantalupo replied, “[c]orrect.” Cantalupo agreed that when he approached defendant “he was basically going to ... place[ ] [defendant] under arrest.” On re-cross-examination, Cantalupo acknowledged that he did not read defendant his Miranda rights prior to asking defendant what was in his sock.

Defense counsel argued that defendant was in custody and any statement by defendant must be suppressed because the police failed to provide him with Miranda warnings prior to asking him what was in his sock. Focusing on whether defendant was in custody when he made the incriminating statement, the trial court explained that “the issue still is what a reasonable person, innocent of crime in the defendant's position, would have thought.” The trial court found that “a reasonable person, innocent of crime, would not have thought ... that it was a custodial interrogation, that he was in custody,” and therefore Miranda warnings were not required. The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress his statement.

Before the jury, Cantalupo and Bullock testified consistent with the testimony Cantalupo presented at the Miranda hearing. The State also called Detective Reginald Holloway of the Bureau of Narcotics of the Essex County Sheriff's Department as an expert witness in the area of street-level narcotics. Holloway opined that each of the transactions witnessed by Cantalupo and Bullock was an illegal hand-to-hand narcotics transaction. He also opined that the forty-nine vials of cocaine recovered from defendant “would be possessed for the intent to further distribute for monetary gain[.]”

After the trial court denied defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal, defendant testified on his own behalf. Defendant denied he had any drugs on him when he was arrested and denied that he ever told the police that the bag of cocaine belonged to him. Defendant claimed he was on his way to visit a friend when he stopped to shake hands with a man who was standing in front of a restaurant at 77 Lincoln Park. Defendant said that the man ran into an adjacent building when the police appeared. Defendant surmised that the cocaine the police found must have belonged to the other man because that man ran when the police approached.

The jury convicted defendant on each count. After merger, the trial court sentenced defendant to a four-year custodial term with three years of parole ineligibility. Defendant appealed. In an unpublished decision, the Appellate Division held that defendant's initial detention was an investigatory stop and that Miranda warnings were not required. However, the panel found merit in defendant's claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when defense counsel failed to file a motion to suppress the cocaine.FN2 Because the State never had the opportunity to justify the search, the panel remanded for a hearing on the motion to suppress. The panel concluded that if the trial court subsequently granted defendant's motion to suppress the drugs, the judgment of conviction would be vacated, but if the court denied the motion, defendant's conviction and sentence would be affirmed. The panel also rejected defendant's challenge to his sentence.

Defendant filed a petition for certification, and the State filed a cross-petition. We granted both petitions. 186 N.J. 256 (2006).

II.

Defendant argues that the seizure of the drugs during the pat-down search violated his constitutional rights and that his statement to the police must be suppressed because it was elicited after he was in custody and prior to his receipt of Miranda warnings. As a result of his counsel's failure to seek to suppress the drugs that were allegedly seized in violation of the federal and state constitutions, defendant further contends that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. Finally, defendant contends that his sentence was excessive.

The State counters that the drugs seized from defendant are admissible either as the result of a valid investigatory stop or as a search incident to an arrest based on probable cause. The State argues that defendant was not in custody at the time he told the police he had cocaine, and therefore, Miranda warnings were not required. Further, the State urges that the Appellate Division erred in looking to the subjective intent of the police rather than applying an objective test to determine whether the seizure of the drugs from defendant was reasonable. The State also contends that the Appellate Division erred when it determined that defendant's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress and when it remanded for a hearing on that issue.

III.

A.

Before addressing defendant's claim that the police violated his constitutional rights when they failed to give him Miranda warnings prior to questioning him about the bulge in his right sock, we must first decide whether defendant's stop was an investigatory stop or was a search and arrest based on probable cause. Because no warrant was sought for the search and arrest of defendant, the State bears the burden of showing that the warrantless seizure “ ‘falls within one of the few well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.’ ” State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. 471, 482 (2001) (quoting State v. Citarella, 154 N.J. 272, 278 (1998), and citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2043, 36 L. Ed.2d 854, 858 (1973)). The State has the burden of proof to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the warrantless seizure was valid. State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 20 (2004).

The two constitutionally permissible forms of police encounters that we need consider in this case are the investigatory stop, referred to as a Terry FN3 stop, and the stop occasioned by probable cause. The standard for a Terry stop “is lower than the standard of probable cause necessary to justify an arrest.” State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 511 (2003). The police may conduct a Terry stop if the “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” Ibid. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). That is, “would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search [justify a person] of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate?” Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880, 20 L. Ed.2d at 906 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

The second encounter we need consider is one based on the probable cause standard. In State v. Moore, we described that standard as follows:

The probable cause standard is a well-grounded suspicion that a crime has been or is being committed. Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within ... [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed. The substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.

[181 N.J. 40, 45-46 (2004) (alterations in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).]

The totality of the circumstances must be considered in determining whether there is probable cause. Id. at 46. In short, the court must “make a practical, common sense determination whether, given all of the circumstances, ‘there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L. Ed.2d 527, 548 (1983)).

B.

Applying those principles to the present case, we conclude the police had probable cause to arrest defendant. As noted, Officers Bullock and Cantalupo observed a suspected drug transaction in a high-crime area before they moved to a closer position and watched defendant engage in a second drug transaction. They saw defendant remove a clear plastic bag containing black-capped vials of suspected cocaine from the right ankle of his pants and hand a vial to a man in exchange for money. The police, having observed at least one and possibly two drug transactions, had reasonable grounds to believe that defendant had committed a criminal offense.

We reached a similar conclusion with less compelling facts in Moore. In that case, the police observed a group of men in a high-crime area. Id . at 43. At one point, the defendant and another man left the group and walked over to the rear of a delicatessen where they met with a third person. Ibid. The defendant and his companion handed currency to the third person and received a small item in exchange. Ibid. We held that the “observations by the law enforcement officers in the high-crime area supported probable cause to arrest defendant, search him, and seize the suspected drugs incident to that arrest.” Id. at 47.

The State urges that the Appellate Division misinterpreted our law in ruling that the evidence did not justify a search incident to arrest because the police did not have the subjective intent to arrest defendant. The State argues that it is not the subjective intent or state of mind of the officers, but rather, whether the seizure of defendant by the officers was objectively reasonable. We agree that the standard is an objective one.

Recently, the United States Supreme Court commented on the relevance of a police officer's subjective motivations. The Court explained that: “Our cases have repeatedly rejected this approach. An action is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer's state of mind, ‘as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.’ The officer's subjective motivation is irrelevant.” B r igham City v. Stuart, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 1948, 164 L. Ed.2d 650, 658 (2006) (alteration in original) (citations omitted). Moreover, we have explained that “the proper inquiry for determining the constitutionality of a search-and-seizure is whether the conduct of the law enforcement officer who undertook the search was objectively reasonable, without regard to his or her underlying motives or intent.” State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 219 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1030, 104 S.Ct. 1295, 79 L. Ed.2d 695 (1984). Although an officer may testify to his or her subjective intent, the crucial inquiry is whether the officer's conduct was objectively reasonable.

In the present case, the record is sufficient to decide the Fourth Amendment issues. We agree with the State's alternative argument that based on the totality of the circumstances, when viewed objectively, Bullock and Cantalupo had probable cause to search and arrest defendant. After the police stopped defendant, they could have immediately placed him under arrest, searched him, and seized the bag of drugs as a search incident to a lawful arrest. See State v. Eckel, 185 N.J. 523, 530 (2006) (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040, 23 L. Ed.2d 685, 694 (1969)). The fact that the police searched and removed the drugs before placing defendant under arrest does not alter the outcome. When the police search an individual before placing him under arrest “as part of a single uninterrupted transaction, it does not matter whether the arrest precedes the search.” State v. Bell, 195 N.J.Super. 49, 58 (1984) (citing State v. Doyle, 42 N.J. 334, 343 (1964)). It is the “right to arrest,” rather than the actual arrest that “must pre-exist the search.” Doyle, supra, 42 N.J. at 342. As long as the right to arrest pre-existed the search, and the “arrest is valid independently of, and is not made to depend on, the search or its result,” the search will not be invalidated “simply because in precise point of time the arrest does not precede the search.” Id. at 343; see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 2564, 65 L. Ed.2d 633, 645-46 (1980) (“Where the formal arrest followed quickly on the heels of the challenged search ..., we do not believe it particularly important that the search preceded the arrest rather than vice versa.”); Moore, supra, 181 N.J. at 47 (holding that search and seizure incident to arrest was proper because probable cause existed after police observed drug transaction in high-crime area). We conclude that the police had probable cause to arrest defendant for a drug offense, and the seizure of the drugs during the search that preceded the arrest was lawful.

IV.

We turn now to defendant's contention that his oral statement to the police during the pat down was in violation of his Miranda rights. Specifically, defendant argues that it was a violation of his rights for the police to ask him an accusatory question while in custody and prior to being administered Miranda warnings.

A.

In general, Miranda “warnings must be given before a suspect's statement made during custodial interrogation [may] be admitted in evidence.” Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 431-32, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 2329, 147 L. Ed.2d 405, 412 (2000). In Miranda, supra, the Court defined “custodial interrogation” as questioning initiated by law enforcement “after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L. Ed.2d at 706. The determination whether a suspect is in “custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.” Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 1529, 128 L. Ed.2d 293, 298 (1994). That is, a police officer's “unarticulated plan has no bearing on the question whether a suspect was ‘in custody’ at a particular time; the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable [person] in the suspect's position would have understood his situation.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3151, 82 L. Ed.2d 317, 336 (1984) (footnote omitted); see State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103 (1997) (noting that “critical determinant of custody is whether there has been a significant deprivation of the suspect's freedom of action based on the objective circumstances, including the time and place of the interrogation, the status of the interrogator, the status of the suspect, and other such factors”) (citations omitted).

As noted above, based on the observations of the police, a reasonable police officer would have believed he or she had probable cause to arrest defendant for a drug transaction and would not have permitted defendant to leave. Similarly, a reasonable person in defendant's position, based on the nature of the police encounter, would not have believed that he was free to leave. We conclude that defendant was in custody when Cantalupo asked him, prior to administering Miranda warnings, what was in his sock. Consequently, defendant's reply that he had cocaine in his sock should have been suppressed.

Nevertheless, we are satisfied that the failure to suppress defendant's admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The police had probable cause to search and arrest defendant prior to asking the offending question and would have discovered the cocaine when they searched the sock. The fact that defendant told the police what they were about to discover had no bearing on the legality of the seizure of the cocaine. Consequently, the failure to suppress defendant's admission that he had cocaine in his sock was harmless. See R. 2:10-2.

B.

This case presents an opportunity to provide guidance concerning the safety exception to Miranda. That exception is based on the “objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the public from any immediate danger associated with the weapon.” New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 659 n.8, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 2633, 81 L. Ed.2d 550, 559 (1984). It is a narrow exception that “will be circumscribed by the exigency which justifies it.” Id. at 658, 104 S.Ct. at 2633, 81 L. Ed.2d at 559. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court expressed that “police officers can and will distinguish almost instinctively between questions necessary to secure their own safety or the safety of the public and questions designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect.” Id. at 658-59, 104 S.Ct. at 2633, 81 L. Ed.2d at 559.

Although we recently applied the principles of Quarles in finding an emergency-aid exception to Miranda, see State v. Boretsky, 186 N.J. 271, 283 (2006), we have not previously considered the application of a safety exception in a case like the present one. Other jurisdictions have applied a safety exception to Miranda.

In United States v. Shea, 150 F.3d 44 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1030, 119 S.Ct. 568, 142 L. Ed.2d 473 (1998), the police arrested the defendant for his suspected role in an attempted robbery. Id. at 47. Prior to giving Miranda warnings to the defendant, one of the police officers asked the defendant if he had any weapons or needles on him that could harm the officer. Id. at 48. The trial court permitted the question and answer at trial. Ibid. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, concluding that the safety exception to Miranda applied. Ibid.; see also United States v. Carrillo, 16 F.3d 1046, 1049-50 (9th Cir.1994) (finding question by police whether defendant had needles on his person was within safety exception); United States v. Edwards, 885 F.2d 377, 384 (7th Cir.1989) (approving police officer's question whether drug dealer had weapon without first giving Miranda warnings); State v. Stephenson, 350 N.J.Super. 517 (App.Div.2002) (noting that safety exception to Miranda may apply when there is a compelling and exigent need to protect public or police).

We conclude that in limited circumstances, based on an “objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the public from any immediate danger associated with the weapon[,]” a safety exception to Miranda is appropriate. Quarles, supra, 467 U.S. at 659 n.8, 104 S.Ct. at 2633, 81 L. Ed.2d at 559. In such circumstances, the police must specifically frame the question to elicit a response concerning the possible presence of a weapon.

Although the safety exception to Miranda was not raised by the State, if it had been raised, we would reject its applicability in this matter. The question asked by the police in referencing the bulge in defendant's sock was “what's this?” That question was not narrowly tailored to prompt a response concerning the possible presence of a weapon or aimed at protecting the safety of the police.

V.

We turn next to the State's claim that it was error for the Appellate Division to entertain defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim and to remand for a suppression hearing. Before the Appellate Division, defendant argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the seizure of the drugs. The State argued that pursuant to Rule 3:5-7(f), if a motion to suppress is not timely made, the right to file the motion is considered waived. R. 3:5-7(f) (“If a timely motion [to suppress] is not made in accordance with this rule, the defendant shall be deemed to have waived any objection during trial to the admission of evidence on the ground that such evidence was unlawfully obtained.”).

In order to satisfy the Strickland FN4 standard when an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is based on the failure to file a suppression motion, a defendant must establish “that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious.” State v. Fisher, 156 N.J. 494, 501 (1998). Because we conclude that the police had probable cause to arrest and search defendant, there is no merit to defendant's Fourth Amendment claim. Simply stated, a motion to suppress the drugs found on defendant would have failed. It is not ineffective assistance of counsel for defense counsel not to file a meritless motion, or as in this case, to waive the hearing on the motion to suppress. Consequently, we need not address defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel argument or the State's claim that defendant is procedurally barred from raising his motion to suppress.

VI.

Finally, we find no merit to defendant's argument that his four-year, mid-range sentence was excessive.

VII.

The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed. We remand to reinstate the judgment of conviction and sentence.

CHIEF JUSTICE ZAZZALI and JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, and HOENS join in JUSTICE WALLACE's opinion. JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO filed a separate concurring opinion.

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

A-94/95 September Term 2005

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent

and Cross-Appellant,

v.

RAHMIL O'NEAL,

Defendant-Appellant

and Cross-Respondent.

JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO, concurring in the result.

This street-level drug trafficking case requires that we address the legal consequences arising from the everyday interactions between suspected drug sellers and the police, which result in both incriminating statements by a drug dealer and the seizure of drugs. Specifically, we are called on to determine, under these circumstances, what theory applies in respect of the authority of the police to detain, question, and search a person suspected of engaging in drug sales.

The majority concludes that the encounter between defendant Rahmil O'Neal and the police must be gauged under the probable cause standard, a conclusion that places defendant in a custodial setting and, hence, triggers the requirement of Miranda FN5 warnings prior to any interrogation. Ante, ___ N.J. ___ (2007) (slip op. at 2). The majority, however, concludes that any violation of the Miranda requirements here was harmless and, thus, reinstates defendant's convictions and sentence. Ibid.

Although I concur in the result reached by the majority, I differ in respect of the analysis to be applied either to defendant's motion to suppress the statement he made to the police that he had a bag of cocaine at his ankle or defendant's motion to suppress the cocaine seized from him. As to the former, I conclude that defendant's statement made in response to police inquiries during a Terry “stop-and-frisk,” was not the product of a custodial interrogation and, therefore, was not subject to suppression pursuant to Miranda and State v. Stott, 171 N.J. 343, 364-65 (2002).

In respect of defendant's motion to suppress the cocaine seized from him, I conclude as a threshold matter that “[i]f a timely motion [to suppress evidence] is not made [by defendant] in accordance with [the Rules of Court ], the defendant shall be deemed to have waived any objection during trial to the admission of evidence on the ground that such evidence was unlawfully obtained.” Rule 3:5-7(f). Because defendant first made and later withdrew his motion to suppress the contraband seized from him, that issue was waived and is not available for direct appellate review. Moreover, even if one were to consider defendant's substantive arguments in respect of his belated application to suppress, I conclude that, in the circumstances presented, the contraband retrieved from defendant's person was admissible as the result of a valid “stop-and-frisk” or protective search pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed.2d 889 (1968), and State v. Roach, 172 N.J. 19, 27 (2002), or as the product of a search incident to a lawful arrest pursuant to Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L. Ed.2d 685 (1969), and State v. Moore, 181 N.J. 40, 45-46 (2004).

I.

The constitutional mandate that “[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,” U.S. Const. amend. V, is engrained in the very fabric of our democracy. Indeed, although New Jersey “do [es] not have a similar provision in our State Constitution[,] ... the privilege itself is firmly established as part of the common law of New Jersey and has been incorporated into our Rules of Evidence.” State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 312-13 (2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted; formatting supplied). That mandate provides the governing constitutional rule in respect of the admission of a criminal defendant's oral statements: “the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L. Ed.2d at 706. For that reason,

[t]he right against self-incrimination, and the corollary requirement that a suspect be informed of that right, are triggered “when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his [or her] freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subject to questioning[.]” Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1630, 16 L. Ed.2d at 726. The requirement that interrogators warn suspects of certain rights is deemed necessary due to the pressure inherent in an “incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere[.]” Id. at 445, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L. Ed.2d at 707.

[ Stott, supra, 171 N.J. at 364.]

Thus, Miranda 's requirements are triggered as a condition precedent to a valid custodial interrogation, that is, when the police interrogate a person who is in custody. This appeal focuses on the latter factor: was defendant in custody at the time that he responded to the police inquiry and stated that the bulge in his right ankle was a bag of cocaine?

Miranda explained that “[b]y custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L. Ed.2d at 706. In that context,

[w]hether a suspect has been placed in custody is fact-sensitive and sometimes not easily discernible.

It is clear that custody in the Miranda sense does not necessitate a formal arrest, nor does it require physical restraint in a police station, nor the application of handcuffs, and may occur in a suspect's home or a public place other than a police station.

....

We are satisfied that no precise definition can be formulated which would apply in advance to all cases and prescribe the outer limits of the protection afforded. The problem must be dealt with through a case-by-case approach in which the totality of the circumstances must be examined.

[ State v. Godfrey, 131 N.J.Super. 168, 175-77 (App.Div.1974), aff'd o.b., 67 N.J. 267 (1975).]

This Court also has explained that “[t]he critical determinant of custody is whether there has been a significant deprivation of the suspect's freedom of action based on the objective circumstances, including the time and place of the interrogation, the status of the interrogator, and the status of the suspect[.]” State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103 (1997). Another factor is whether a suspect knew that he or she was a focus of the police investigation. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 325, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 1530, 128 L. Ed.2d 293, 300 (1994); State v. Pearson, 318 N.J.Super. 123, 134 (App.Div.1999).

[ Stott, supra, 171 N.J. at 364-65.]

The Supreme Court of the United States has made clear that the determination of whether a person is in custody is an objective one that is independent of “the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.” Stansbury v. California, supra, 511 U.S. at 323, 114 S.Ct. at 1529, 128 L. Ed.2d at 298. Stated bluntly, “[a] policeman's unarticulated plan has no bearing on the question whether a suspect was ‘in custody[.]’ ” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3151, 82 L. Ed.2d 317, 336 (1984).

The calculus of whether a police-citizen encounter rises to the level of a custodial interrogation requires a discerning view, for not all police-citizen encounters trigger Miranda 's requirements. One category of encounter that does not rise to the custodial interrogation level required by Miranda is a “stop-and-frisk” pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880, 20 L. Ed.2d at 906-07. Terry explains that police officers “may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.” Ibid. For their protection, Terry permits police officers to conduct a warrantless, but nonetheless “carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.” Id. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884-85, 20 L. Ed.2d at 911. In doing so,

[t]he officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. And in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch,” but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.

[Id. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883, 20 L. Ed.2d at 909 (citations and footnote omitted).]

The Terry “stop-and-frisk” exception to the warrant requirement has been incorporated into and made part of New Jersey's constitutional doctrine. State v. Valentine, 134 N.J. 536, 543 (1994) (citing New Jersey cases adopting Terry “stop-and-frisk” exception to constitutional warrant requirement, explaining that “we do not interpret the New Jersey Constitution to demand a higher standard than the Fourth Amendment in order to justify a frisk incident to a lawful investigatory stop”). Describing the Terry exception instead by its rationale as the “protective search exception,” it has been observed that

[t]he protective search exception to the warrant requirement was created to protect an officer's safety where there is reason to believe that a suspect is armed and dangerous. The exception allows a law enforcement officer to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm. Specifically, the officer may conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. The search must, however, be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover weapons that might be used to assault the police officer. Therefore, in order to conduct a protective search, an officer must have a specific and particularized basis for an objectively reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed and dangerous. The existence of an objectively reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances. The totality of the circumstances test balances the State's interest in effective law enforcement against the individual's right to be protected from unwarranted and/or overbearing police intrusions. Because the intrusion is designed to protect the officer's safety, the standard governing protective searches is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in his belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.

The standard does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities and common-sense conclusions about human behavior.

Oftentimes law-enforcement officers must make instantaneous decisions about whether a frisk for weapons is justifiable. The task is an unenviable one often fraught with life-and-death consequences. Courts should not set the test of sufficient suspicion too high when the protection of the investigating officer is at stake.

Accordingly, courts have upheld seizures of unidentifiable objects on a suspect's person where a lawful pat-down is either inconclusive or impossible. The reasoning in such cases is that the officer's safety is paramount and that the officer is justified in taking further steps if necessary to protect his safety:

Clearly, a police officer does not need to perceive tactile recognition of a firearm before he may protect himself further by insisting on deliverance of the suspected weapon. It is not even necessary for him to identify by species the object of his concern, so long as the fear for his safety resulting from the pat-down is reasonable. A police officer is not required by his occupation or the Constitution of the United States to take unnecessary risks in the performance of his duties or to refrain from the taking of necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon (or the neutralizing of a) threat of physical harm.

[ State v. Roach, 172 N.J. 19, 27-28 (2002) (citations, internal quotation marks, and editing marks omitted; formatting supplied).]

In determining whether a police officer's actions in conducting a protective search are reasonable, this Court repeatedly has made clear that the standard to be applied is an objective one. As State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 7 (1997), explains, “[t]he standards by which the reasonableness of police conduct involving an investigatory stop of a person or an automobile originate with Terry v. Ohio [.]”

The facts used in that balancing test are to be judged objectively: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate? When determining if the officer's actions were reasonable, consideration must be given to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience. Neither “inarticulate hunches” nor an arresting officer's subjective good faith can justify an infringement of a citizen's constitutionally guaranteed rights. Rather, the officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion.

[Id. at 7-8 (citations, internal quotation marks, and editing marks omitted).]

See also State v. Smith, 155 N.J. 83, 91, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1033, 119 S.Ct. 576, 142 L. Ed.2d 480 (1998) (holding that “[a] protective search does not entail a general search of the person for evidence of crime; rather it is designed to discover weapons that could be used to assault the officer [and it] may be based on reasonable articulable suspicion that a suspect is armed and dangerous” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Thomas, 110 N.J. 673, 677 (1988) (rejecting analysis based on “the subjective factors that might prompt a law-enforcement official to search a suspect who is the subject of a lawful investigatory stop and is thought to pose a threat to the officer's safety” and adopting test of “whether the record contains sufficient evidence of objective criteria to support the search of defendant, which in turn determines the admissibility of the evidence seized”); State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 219, 221 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1030, 104 S.Ct. 1295, 79 L. Ed.2d 695 (1984) (holding that “the proper inquiry for determining the constitutionality of a search-and-seizure is whether the conduct of the law enforcement officer who undertook the search was objectively reasonable, without regard to his or her underlying motives or intent” and explaining basis for rejecting analysis of police officer's subjective intent because “practically every search-and-seizure case would require the court to engage in a costly and time-consuming expedition into the state of mind of the searching officer”).

In this context, objective evidence of drug dealing gives rise to a fair, objective inference that weapons also are present. See State v. Spivey, 179 N.J. 229, 240 (2004) (citing Report to the Governor by the Attorney General on the Need to Update the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1987 (Dec. 9, 1996) (stating that “[f]irearms have become ubiquitous in the world of illegal drug activity. Dealers are armed to protect themselves from law enforcement officers, from other dealers and from their customers”)). Other jurisdictions likewise have made the sad but logical connection between drug dealing and the presence of weapons. See, e.g., United States v. Hishaw, 235 F.3d 565, 570 (10th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 908, 121 S.Ct. 2254, 150 L. Ed.2d 241 (2001) (“[T]he evidence supporting the officers' reasonable suspicion that [the defendant] was distributing drugs ... also indicated that [the defendant] might be armed and dangerous.”); Louisiana v. James, 795 So.2d 1146, 1150 (La.2000) (stating that “the frequent association of narcotics trafficking with firearms justified the officer's brief, self-protective frisk”); Abraham v. Oklahoma, 962 P.2d 647, 647 (Okla.Crim.App.1998) (stating that “as the offense reported was an offer to sell drugs, the officer had an adequate basis for conducting a weapons search”).

A fair application of the objective standard governing the protective search -- or Terry frisk -- to the facts in this case leads to the conclusion that defendant was not in custody at the time that he made his incriminating statement and, as a result, the pre-requisites for the issuance of Miranda warnings had not been triggered. Cantalupo explained that, after observing what appeared to be two separate hand-to-hand drug transactions conducted by defendant, he approached defendant. Cantalupo noted that his intention “was to investigate whether or not [defendant] was, in fact, selling drugs.” As Cantalupo next explained during cross-examination at the suppression hearing:

Q. Well, at that point you didn't feel you had sufficient probable cause to arrest my client?

A. I thought I had enough suspicion to approach your client. Absolutely. I didn't-at the time, like I said, it-to me, in my eyes, it was suspected cocaine. Once I approached and found that cocaine, that was my definite evidence that he was going to be placed under arrest.

Cantalupo also explained that, although defendant was not detained until the cocaine was found on his person, defendant was not free to leave during that initial questioning, but that defendant was not arrested until the cocaine was found.

In these circumstances, the trial court correctly determined that “the description of what happened here up to the point of the question that resulted in the incriminating answer was not a custodial interrogation.” I also agree with the trial court's analysis that “the issue still is what a reasonable person, innocent of crime in the defendant's position, would have thought.” To that extent, the Appellate Division properly held that “based on all the circumstances, a reasonable person would not have believed that he was under arrest when Officer Cantalupo asked him what was around his ankle” and, because “there was no need for Miranda warnings at that point, ... defendant's response was admissible as evidence.”

II.

A.

Defendant also claims that his trial counsel was ineffective because she did not move to suppress the bag of cocaine seized from defendant's ankle. The Appellate Division concluded that such failure meant that defendant's trial counsel was ineffective and, for that reason, remanded the matter for a new suppression hearing. I disagree. Because defendant in fact made and later withdrew a motion to suppress the cocaine seized from him, Rule 3:5-7(f) bars consideration of defendant's claim on his direct appeal.

Our Rules of Court specifically require that

[o]n notice to the prosecutor of the county in which the matter is pending or threatened, to the applicant for the warrant if the search was with a warrant, and to co-indictees, if any, and in accordance with the applicable provisions of R. 1:6-3 and R. 3:10, a person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure and having reasonable grounds to believe that the evidence obtained may be used against him or her in a penal proceeding, may apply to the Superior Court only and in the county in which the matter is pending or threatened to suppress the evidence and for the return of the property seized even though the offense charged or to be charged may be within the jurisdiction of a municipal court.

[ Rule 3:5-7(a).]

That Rule is not self-executing, and the failure to comply by its terms bears the mandatory consequential sanction of waiver. Rule 3:5-7(f) (“If a timely motion [to suppress] is not made in accordance with this rule, the defendant shall be deemed to have waived any objection during trial to the admission of evidence on the ground that such evidence was unlawfully obtained.”).

Erroneously concluding that “defendant is not attempting to litigate a waived argument[,]” the Appellate Division rejected the State's assertion of the Rule 3:5-7(f) bar, relying instead on defendant's assertion that he was challenging his counsel's effectiveness in failing to file a suppression motion, and not the results of that suppression motion itself. Ironically, in order to reach defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Appellate Division perforce was required to consider the merits of defendant's suppression claim. Doing so, the panel concluded that “defendant's Fourth Amendment suppression challenge has merit.” Thus, the Appellate Division permitted defendant to raise an indirect suppression challenge under the guise of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim when a direct challenge otherwise was barred. That it did so became obvious by the unique remedy the panel fashioned: a remand for a suppression hearing only.

If it is to have any meaning, then Rule 3:5-7(f) must mean precisely what it says. If a defendant fails to prosecute a motion to suppress in a timely manner, the immediate consequences are clear: “the defendant shall be deemed to have waived any objection during trial to the admission of evidence on the ground that such evidence was unlawfully obtained.” Because a defendant whose counsel fails to advance a suppression motion cannot be entirely without a remedy, that consequence cannot be draconian and, instead, must be limited to a defendant's direct appeal. Thus, a defendant nevertheless may claim that his or her counsel's failure to prosecute a motion to suppress was constitutionally ineffective such as to warrant post-conviction relief. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim cannot serve as a subterfuge on direct appeal for the failure to prosecute a suppression motion.

That said, however, because the Appellate Division found merit in defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, I address that claim substantively.

B.

The rules governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims have been oft-repeated. As a matter of constitutional mandate, “a criminal defendant is entitled to the assistance of reasonably competent counsel, and that if counsel's performance has been so deficient as to create a reasonable probability that these deficiencies materially contributed to defendant's conviction, the constitutional right will have been violated.” State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). Whether a defendant's constitutional right to competent counsel has been abridged is measured by applying “a simple, two-part test[,]” id. at 52, plainly set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed.2d 674 (1984):

First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.

[Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed.2d at 693.]

In addition, when presenting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel due to the failure to file a constitutionally-based suppression motion, “the defendant not only must satisfy both parts of the Strickland test but also must prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious.” State v. Fisher, 156 N.J. 494, 501 (1998) (citing Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2583, 91 L. Ed.2d 305, 319 (1986)). Those three factors-whether defense counsel's performance was deficient, whether defendant was prejudiced as a result, and whether defendant's Fourth Amendment-based constitutional claim had merit in the first instance -- must be addressed both in order and in their proper context.

Unlike the factual predicate presented to the Appellate Division and upon which the panel reasonably but mistakenly relied, it is now beyond doubt that defendant's counsel in fact did file a pretrial motion to suppress both the statements defendant made prior to being placed under arrest as well as the cocaine seized from defendant's right ankle. Six weeks later, in a written pretrial memorandum signed by defendant, defendant's counsel, the prosecutor, and the trial judge, defendant waived his motion to suppress in all respects. On the first day of trial, the trial court reviewed the pretrial memorandum on the record and noted that “[t]here are no pretrial motions.” Cautioning counsel that if “anybody disagrees [with] any of my statements, they should yell out[,]” the only exception arose when defense counsel noted that there was “a verbal admission” by defendant. The following colloquy ensued:

THE COURT: [A]re we going to have a hearing outside the presence of the jury regarding the admissibility of that statement if the State wishes to have it, or do you not see the need for that? Rule 104(c),FN6 if there's a statement of a defendant being used, there's an entitlement to a hearing if they really want to raise the issue and if you want to hold such a hearing outside the presence of the jury.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I don't think that will be necessary as a trial tactic, Your Honor.

The prosecutor explained that he intended to introduce two separate statements made by defendant: when, in response to the police officer's initial inquiry of “what's going on,” defendant said “I didn't do nothing wrong[,]” and when, in response to the police officer's question during the protective search as to what the bulge in defendant's right ankle was, defendant said it was a bag of cocaine. The trial court then clarified that those statements would not “be the subject of a [ Rule 104(c) ] hearing [as] a matter of defense strategy.” To this, defense counsel responded: “Correct.”

In light of these facts, defendant was not deprived of the level of competent counsel that is constitutionally required. As explained above, supra, ___ N.J. ___ (2007) (slip op. at 3-13), defendant's first detention was solely an investigative stop coupled with a protective search or, in other words, a garden-variety Terry “stop-and-frisk.” Indeed, “a bulge alone has been held sufficient to validate a protective pat-down.” State v. Smith, 134 N.J. 599, 621 (1994) (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111-12, 98 S.Ct. 330, 334, 54 L. Ed.2d 331, 337-38 (1977), and State v. Wanczyk, 201 N.J.Super. 258, 264 (App.Div.1985)). Moreover, “ ‘[m]erely because a trial strategy fails does not mean that counsel was ineffective.’ ” State v. DiFrisco, 174 N.J. 195, 220 (2002) (quoting State v. Bey (V), 161 N.J. 233, 251 (1999)). See also State v. Davis, 116 N.J. 341, 357 (1989) (holding that “[i]n assessing the adequacy of counsel's performance, strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

When gauged against these standards, defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails. As a seizure made as a consequence of a valid Terry “stop-and-frisk,” the cocaine seized from defendant's right ankle was clearly and unmistakably admissible. Defense counsel's performance was not deficient and instead was the product of legitimate defense strategy. In the end, defendant was not prejudiced by the failure of defense counsel to prosecute what would have been a failed motion to suppress, and any motion to suppress the cocaine was clearly lacking in merit and was doomed from the outset.

Finally, in the context of the merits of defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the State also argues that the seizure of the cocaine from defendant's right ankle was proper as a search incident to a lawful arrest, a proposition the Appellate Division rejected. I agree with the State and conclude that the search of defendant's ankle also was justified as a search incident to a lawful arrest.

Based on Chimel v. California, supra, 395 U.S. at 763, 89 S.Ct. at 2040, 23 L. Ed.2d at 694, and its progeny, “[w]hen a valid arrest based on probable cause has been made, a police officer is entitled to search the arrestee's person in order to protect himself and to insure that evidence is not destroyed.” State v. Sims, 75 N.J. 337, 352 (1978). See also State v. Gray, 59 N.J. 563, 569 (1971) (“It is well settled that pursuant to a valid arrest a police officer may search a defendant and the area within his reach to protect himself from attack, to prevent escape or to prevent destruction of the evidence or fruits of a crime.”). Moreover, the fact of an arrest need not precede the search in order for that search to be lawfully incident to an arrest. Instead, “[t]he right to arrest must pre-exist the search [and that o]fficers cannot search in order to arrest, nor arrest because of the product of the search.” State v. Doyle, 42 N.J. 334, 342 (1964) (emphasis supplied). In other words, “[a] search undertaken merely for the purpose of uncovering evidence with which to arrest and convict of crime is not made lawful because the desired evidence is obtained.” Ibid.

This is not to say that where an arrest is valid independently of, and is not made to depend on, the search or its result, evidence produced by a search will be suppressed simply because in precise point of time the arrest does not precede the search. It is sufficient if the valid arrest and search are reasonably contemporaneous, that is, they occur as parts of a single transaction, as connected units of an integrated incident. In such a setting a search should not be condemned as constitutionally unreasonable.

[Id. at 343.]

The operative events in this case were clear: two police officers observed defendant engaging in what appeared to be two separate hand-to-hand drug transactions. Those observations caused the officers to approach defendant, and led one of the officers to remark on the bulge located on defendant's right ankle. Once defendant identified the bulge on his right ankle as a bag of cocaine and the bag was retrieved by the police officer, defendant “was immediately handcuffed and placed into custody.”

Because “[t]he probable-cause requirement is the constitutionally-prescribed standard for distinguishing unreasonable searches from those that can be tolerated in a free society[,]” State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 106 (1987), the inquiry into determining whether the search of defendant was made incident to a lawful arrest is limited: “we need decide only whether the facts found by the trial court provided probable cause to arrest defendant [.]” State v. Moore, 181 N.J. 40, 45 (2004). The following principles guide whether the facts provided probable cause:

Probable cause exists if at the time of the police action there is a well-grounded suspicion that a crime has been or is being committed. The standard defies scientific precision. We have explained, however, that it requires nothing more than a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.

[ State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 515 (2003) (citations, internal quotation marks, and editing marks omitted).]

It is beyond question that Cantalupo and Bullock observed defendant engage in two separate and independent hand-to-hand drug transactions on an open sidewalk; that once the police officers approached defendant, his customer fled behind a locked metal door and defendant attempted to disguise his behavior by faking a non-existent telephone call; that when the officers simply asked him “what's going on,” defendant's immediate reply was “I didn't do nothing wrong;” and that when asked about the bulge in the sock on his right ankle, defendant volunteered that it was a “bag of cocaine.”

The aggregate of those facts clearly and unequivocally establish that the police officers had more than sufficient probable cause to arrest defendant before they actually searched his ankle and seized the cocaine hidden there. It is also beyond peradventure that the search and defendant's arrest, although occurring in that chronological order, were contemporaneous. Because the linchpin for a valid search incident to a lawful arrest is the presence of probable cause, and because there clearly was probable cause for defendant's arrest before the officers seized the cocaine on defendant's ankle, the search of defendant also was justified as a valid search incident to a lawful arrest.

C.

Precious few rights are more deserving of constitutional dignity than a criminal defendant's right to counsel: that right is recognized explicitly in both the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article I, paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ... have the assistance of counsel for his defence.”); N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 10 (“In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall ... have the assistance of counsel in his defense.”). For that reason, a claim that a criminal defendant's rights were burdened by ineffective counsel is entitled to and does receive careful judicial scrutiny.

It has been a consistent feature of our law that “[i]neffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are particularly suited for post-conviction review because they often cannot reasonably be raised in a prior proceeding.” State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 460 (1992). This is so because ineffective assistance of counsel claims “involve allegations and evidence that lie outside the trial record.” State v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293, 313 (2006). However, that rule is not absolute: “when the trial itself provides an adequately developed record upon which to evaluate defendant's claims, appellate courts may consider the issue on direct appeal.” Ibid. (citing State v. Allah, 170 N.J. 269, 285 (2002)). See also State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 247-48 (2000) (explaining that bar to ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal is based on recognition that such claims “often cannot reasonably be raised in a prior proceeding” (quoting Preciose, supra, 129 N.J. at 460)).

This trial record discloses that defense counsel made but later withdrew defendant's suppression motion, the latter action having been done with defendant's concurrence in writing. Defense counsel explained that the withdrawal of the suppression motion was made as a matter of “trial tactics” and “defense strategy.” For those reasons, I concur substantively with the majority's conclusion that because “there is no merit to defendant's Fourth Amendment claim[,]” and because “a motion to suppress the drugs found on defendant would have failed[,]” “it is not ineffective assistance of counsel for defense counsel not to file a meritless motion, or as in this case, to waive the hearing on the motion to suppress.” Ante, at ___ (slip op. at 19).FN7

III.

In sum, in respect of defendant's motion to suppress the statement he made to the police that he had a bag of cocaine at his ankle, I conclude that defendant's statement made in response to police inquiries during a Terry stop was not the product of a custodial interrogation and, therefore, was not subject to suppression. Further, in respect of defendant's motion to suppress the cocaine seized from him, I conclude as a threshold matter that if a timely motion to suppress evidence is not made by a defendant in accordance with the Rules of Court, the defendant is deemed to have waived any objection during trial to the admission of evidence on the ground that such evidence was unlawfully obtained. Because defendant first made and later withdrew his motion to suppress the contraband seized from him, that issue was waived and is not available for appellate review. Furthermore, even if one considers defendant's substantive arguments in respect of his belated application to suppress, I conclude that, in the circumstances presented, the contraband retrieved from defendant's person was admissible as either the result of a valid “stop-and-frisk” or “protective search,” or as the product of a search incident to a lawful arrest. Finally, for all those reasons, I reject defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

NO. A-94/95 SEPTEMBER TERM 2005

ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent

and Cross-Appellant,

v.

RAHMIL O'NEAL,

Defendant-Appellant

and Cross-Respondent.

DECIDED May 22, 2007

Chief Justice Zazzali PRESIDING

OPINION BY Justice Wallace, Jr.

CONCURRING OPINION BY Justice Rivera-Soto

DISSENTING OPINION BY

CHECKLIST

REVERSE AND REINSTATE

CONCUR IN RESULT

CHIEF JUSTICE ZAZZALI

X

JUSTICE LONG

X

JUSTICE LaVECCHIA

X

JUSTICE ALBIN

X

JUSTICE WALLACE

X

JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO

(X)

X

JUSTICE HOENS

X

TOTALS

7

1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed.2d 694 (1966).

2. Apparently, the panel was unaware that defendant filed a motion to suppress the cocaine that was subsequently withdrawn.

3. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed.2d 889 (1968).

4. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984).

5. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed.2d 694 (1966).

6. N.J.R.E. 104(c), titled “Preliminary Hearing on Admissibility of Defendant's Statements,” provides that

[w]here by virtue of any rule of law a judge is required in a criminal action to make a preliminary determination as to the admissibility of a statement by the defendant, the judge shall hear and determine the question of its admissibility out of the presence of the jury. In such a hearing the rules of evidence shall apply and the burden of persuasion as to the admissibility of the statement is on the prosecution. If the judge admits the statement the jury shall not be informed of the finding that the statement is admissible but shall be instructed to disregard the statement if it finds that it is not credible. If the judge subsequently determines from all of the evidence that the statement is not admissible, the judge shall take the appropriate action.

7. However, for the reasons I have noted, I do not join in the majority's conclusion that “we need not address defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel argument or the State's claim that defendant is procedurally barred from raising his motion to suppress.” Ibid.

N.J.,2007.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent and Cross- Appellant, v. RAHMIL O'NEAL, Defendant-Appellant and Cross- Respondent.

END OF DOCUMENT

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

Local Author of "Preparing for the Worst: A Comprehensive Guide to Protecting Your Family from Terrorist Attacks, Natural Disasters, and Other Catastrophes" ISBN 027599631X

James (Jay) — Wed, 16 May 2007 04:57:03 GMT

Published by Praeger Security International, an imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, "Preparing for the Worst: A Comprehensive Guide to Protecting Your Family from Terrorist Attacks, Natural Disasters, and Other Catastrophes" details best practices in antiterrorism tactics and preparing for disaster. This book is for every responsible family, college students, business travelers, corporate executive management personnel, emergency first responders, school students and administrators, and local government officials responsible for public safety and emergency management.

Check out the publisher's Web page
www.greenwood.com/catalog/C9631.aspx

ISBN: 0-275-99631-X
ISBN-13: 978-0-275-99631-4

Available through major book distributors including Baker & Taylor, Ingram, and Blackwells.
You can also order it at www.barnesandnoble.com, www.amazon.com, or www.walmart.com

We are regularly bombarded with reports of disaster and tragedy in the daily news. Catastrophes like earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, violent crimes, and terrorism are so common and routine that many of us have become numb to the stories. Without a heightened awareness, focused concern, and effective planning, we have lost the edge that can save lives. Do you know what you should do to protect your family during a disaster? Does your neighbor have the knowledge required to survive a catastrophic event? Part of the solution is rooted in common sense, but much more depends upon effectively applying learned survival skills. Americans need a helpful reference tool--a "Swiss army knife" for handling today's threats. Jay's book, "Preparing for the Worst: A Comprehensive Guide to Protecting Your Family from Terrorist Attacks, Natural Disasters, and Other Catastrophes" is that tool.

A former U.S. Marine and Desert Storm veteran, Schaefer-Jones (the author) has experienced calamity firsthand. He is also a concerned husband and the father of three young children. While considering how he would personally handle a disastrous event close to home, he came to realize that a comprehensive "how-to" guide was not available--until now.

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

Leaving the Scene in NJ (N.J.S. 39:4-129)

Zippi — Wed, 25 Apr 2007 00:03:28 GMT

I have a case before the NJ supreme Court on leaving the scene asking original and unique questions such as:
Is N.J.S. 39:4-129 a defacto detention statute for the pleasure of the police?
Is exposure to poison ivy a medical necessity?
Is the driver's license exhibition in person a requirement under the statute?
And some other issues of Constitutional magnitude.

The AG also has 5 cases before the court asking similar questions.

Historically the NJ supreme court has held that N.J.S. 39:4-129 is an identification statute that exists so that people who have been harmed or have property damaged will not go uncompensated but the state prosecutors and police have attempted to re-cast it as a statute for the purposes of facilitating a police investigation.

It is my position that the Court is correct and the police are wrong .

This position is not shared among all NJ judges. Sappm and Perillo-Peterson at app div and and Mahon at law div seem to believe it's a defacto detention statute placing you under police custody - even when they are not there in order to further police investigations. I say this is madness and will not stand constitutional scrutiny.

Until the high court clears this matter up there are some thing you may want to know is you are involved in an accident especially a one car accident in NJ.
Identify yourself fully to any persons present or persons harmed or whose property is damaged and make a physical exhibition of your Driver's License. If there are injuries you must see to the welfare of any injured people. Then and only then should you leave.
If here is no one present leave your identification information on whatever property you damage.
If there is no damage other than to the car you are driving (the courts are in turmoil here) you have a Hobson's choice:
1.) Leave and call it in.
2.) leave call it in & return when they instruct you to. I say this is horse shit and it is a wrong reading of the law . After all if you are calling it in you are fully identifying.
3.) Leave and call it in and refuse to return when they ask. That is what I say you should do but some of NJ's inferior courts disagree.

What if your car is wrecked and you can only walk away and no other damage occurred?
DO NOT LEAVE A CELL PHONE AT THE SCENE~!!
Tape your ID all of it to the inside of the Driver's window (or shove it in the gasket to make it stay put) so it can be read from outside and lock the door. Then leave and call it in. If you have had anything to drink get in a house (a home not a restaurant or bar) call it in from there and when the police arrives to interrogate you do not step out of the house. This forces the cop to speak to you through the door and screen or glass is great even holding the door open a crack is great. Stand a bit back from the door and do not step out. He has to get a warrant to arrest you and he can't get one for that. The cop will demand that you step out. DON'T DO IT~!! He is going to arrest you and breathalyze you and charge you with a DWI ~!! If you are not driving when he sees you he can't properly cite you for a refusal either.

Have a witness who will observe exactly what you say and that you maintained a distance of oh say three or more feet from the door - measure it~!!

When the cop asks what caused the accident uses these words and say nothing more - nothing: "The vehicle failed to negotiate a turn." You say that or you simply say that you'd prefer to have an attorney present during any questioning. That'll shut his ass up.

Don't tell him that you failed, that you anything, the vehicle failed not you and don't speculate about why. The idea is to force the cop to go figure out how to do his own job not to get you to do it for him. He should go conduct a forensic analysis of the scene - don't tell him to, just don't give him any information. Say nothing. You already fully identified when you called 911.

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

NJ makes me proud....

leenbean — Thu, 26 Oct 2006 03:34:42 GMT

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20061026/ap_on_re_us/gay_marriage

Hell yeah.

posted in New Jersey - 11 replies

NJ ramifications of new US Sup Ct ruling

Zippi — Thu, 01 Mar 2007 03:11:51 GMT

On March 8, 2004, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Crawford v. Washington, 541 US 36 (2004) that testimonial statements made by witnesses who are absent from trial are admissible only where the declarant is unavailable and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.

In this morning’s decision by the United States Supreme Court in Whorton v. Bockting, the Justices held that the Crawford decision does not apply retro-actively to cases on federal collateral review (the New Jersey equivalent of post-conviction relief).

This decision is of immense importance to municipal court practitioners since several recent rulings by the Appellate Division in drunk driving cases have fundamentally changed the procedures that required to prove intoxication on the basis of Crawford-related issues. (e.g. State v. Berezansky, 386 N.J. Super. 84 (App. Div. 2006) (Laboratory technician must appear to testify upon defense objection to documentary lab results); State v. Renshaw, ___ N.J. Super ___ (App. Div. 2007) (Person who extracted blood samples from defendant must testify as condition of proving sample was taken in a medically acceptable manner, abrogating NJSA 2A:62A-11).

Today’s United States Supreme Court holding may limit or prevent consideration of Crawford issues in post-conviction relief applications under Rule 7:10-2 for convictions occurring prior to the new rule of law announced in Crawford.

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

Any Jersey New Agers?

imakhu — Sun, 21 May 2006 06:56:22 GMT

Looking for like-minded community to create world healing through ritual, drumming, and fellowship.

Is there such a group?

Mwt

posted in New Jersey - 9 replies

Corzine's budget

Zippi — Thu, 22 Feb 2007 18:10:01 GMT

Listened to him present it today. It sounds good in theory but I always worry when I hear phrases like "Fiscally disadvantaged."
It always makes me worry about the next wealth transfer pogrom.

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

The Britanny Spears Continuum

Jon — Sat, 17 Feb 2007 21:37:48 GMT

The Britanny Spears Continuum

Brittany Spears has shaved her head:

news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070...tney_spears

I felt the event needed to be honored with a haiku.

Smile: Brittany Spears!
Brittany Spears Shaves Her Head Bald!
Brewing Meltdown Joy!

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

ON-LINE Point reduction for NJ Drivers

Zippi — Sun, 04 Feb 2007 19:26:53 GMT

Under current law, New Jersey drivers may get a two-point credit against their accumulated MVC penalty points by successfully completing an approved driver improvement school course. This two-point credit is available once every 5 years. There are also substantial (and mandatory) insurance discounts that are available to good drivers who complete the course. On occasion, municipal court judges will want young motorists to complete such a course before the judge will accept a plea bargain to an otherwise serious traffic offense.

Now, under a newly proposed regulation, the approved defensive driving course could be completed online, thereby eliminating the current practice of personally attending the class at a facility.

A copy of the Motor Vehicle Commission’s plan to change its regulations in the New Jersey Administrative Code follows:

RELEASE: January 24, 2007

Proposed Amendments and New Rules Implementing
Online Defensive Driving Schools

The Motor Vehicle Commission has proposed amendments and new rules relating to the addition of an online defensive driving school option to the already existing defensive driving school regulatory scheme. The Commission’s proposed rulemaking implements the public policy as noted in N.J.S.A. 17:33B-45, N.J.S.A. 39:5-30.9 and N.J.A.C. 11:3-24.3 pertaining to insurance rate reductions and reduction of motor vehicle violation points for drivers completing defensive driving classes.

The proposed amendments to N.J.A.C. 13:21-24 include requirements for course providers to offer the same curriculum, quality and length of course as a traditional in-classroom course. Additionally, they will need to satisfy the requirements of the Chief Administrator proving that the course is secure and that the individual who completes the course is the individual that receives credit for the course. Course providers will further be required to administer a proficiency examination with a passage rate of at least 80% in order for a student motorist to successfully complete the course.

The Motor Vehicle Commission’s regulatory proposal was published on January 16th, 2007. The public will have 60 days from the date of publication to submit comments regarding the Motor Vehicle Commission’s regulatory proposal. Comments should be directed to Steven E. Robertson, Director, Legal, Legislative and Regulatory Affairs, Motor Vehicle Commission, 225 East State Street, P.O. Box 162, Trenton, NJ 08666-0162.

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

Free Business Training 01/20/07

Jayme Luzzi — Sun, 07 Jan 2007 02:10:34 GMT

2007 Junior Chamber of Commerce Training School

Saturday January 20, 2007

New Jersey Junior Chamber of Commerce(Jaycees) Service Center

33 Lake Drive
East Windsor, NJ 08520

Agenda

9:30 – 10:00 am: Opening Ceremony with introduction of guests

10:00 – 10:30 am: A Brief History of the United States Junior Chamber and Local Areas

10:30 – 12:00 am: “Unknown at Home” A program to help you learn more about marketing your company/chamber and presenting a positive image in the community

12:00 – 1:00 pm: Lunch – provided for attendees

1:00 – 2:00 pm: Personality Programs (“Color Test” or “People Puzzles”) - A program to help you learn the different types of personalities that make up your clients/employees/chamber members and how to deal with them

2:00 – 3:00 pm: “The Principle Foundation” This will give new comers an idea about what the Junior Chamber of Commerce is all about and what we have to every one. The Activation Course will also be a guide to current members for activating, marketing, and making certain that everyone in your Chamber and community can profit from the Junior Chamber of Commerce tradition, and has the opportunity to acquire all the benefits the Chamber has to offer. This Course (program, handbook and tutorial) is intended to assist in enhancing the opportunity for young adults to develop personal and leadership skills through community involvement.

3:00 – 4:00 pm: “Corporate Recruiting”- Potential Benefits of Corporate Recruiting are:

o Target companies where a mutually beneficial relationship could take place.

o Increase local presence through marketing efforts.

o Secure operating funds for your business/chamber through corporate sponsorships.

o Create networking opportunities for yourself and clients.

o Foster new relationships with businesses with the purpose of creating additional resources for your business/chamber.

4:00 – 4:30 pm: Closing

This is FREE but seating is limited please respond to:

Jane Amend
2007 Presidential Assistant
New Jersey Junior Chamber
janeamend@juno.com

Let her know you are a Guest of Jayme Luzzi from JCI/Tri-State Real Professionals Association

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

AlcoTest 7110

Zippi — Sun, 24 Dec 2006 14:46:08 GMT

State v. Chun is the New Jersey case that will ultimately determine if the Alcotest 7110 is sufficiently reliable to be used in New Jersey’s municipal courts in drunk driving prosecutions.
The presentation of proofs are completed and before the special master, Judge King, as of December 19th. Judge King has scheduled summations for January 9th and 10th with the January 11th reserved for additional argument if necessary. The defense will argue first, followed by the Attorney General and the attorneys who have appeared as amicus curiae.

Following the argument, Judge King will have 30 days to submit his report of recommended factual findings to the Supreme Court. This should occur on or about February 10th. The briefs of counsel will be due in the Supreme Court two weeks thereafter (approximately February 24th). The Justices will schedule oral argument following the receipt of the briefs.

posted in New Jersey - 0 replies

NJ is the center of the universe!!! Global consciousness Project and Global Orgasm Day

Tue, 21 Nov 2006 15:12:19 GMT

http://noosphere.princeton.edu/

and

www.globalorgasm.org/

See how NJ is the center of the universe and your pants are the protecting the tools for peace.

posted in New Jersey - 1 reply